Articulating Animal Rights: Activism, Networks and Anthropocentrism

Eva Haifa Sarah Giraud

Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2011
Abstract

The thesis establishes a conversation between Donna Haraway and the work of contemporary UK animal rights groups, in order to develop their – respective – approaches to articulating animal rights issues. To analyse the tactics of these movements a conceptual framework is constructed through combining Haraway's insights with those of Bruno Latour, performative uses of actor-network theory and key concepts from Pierre Bourdieu (such as field, habitus and doxa).

Through focusing on the tactics of UK animal rights groups the thesis works to recuperate certain of these practices from the criticisms Haraway levels at animal rights groups more broadly; illustrating contexts where these movements are departing from humanist rights-discourses and developing approaches more suited to the radical critique of anthropocentrism that is central to Haraway's own project.

To develop a sense of the disparate approaches taken by these animal rights movements that complement Haraway's arguments, various online and offline tactics are analysed; drawing on a range of lobbying practices undertaken by movements involved in the vivisection debate (such as SPEAK and the BUAV), before focusing on more creative forms of vegan campaigning engaged in by local Nottingham groups (such as Veggies Catering Campaign and Nottingham Animal Rights).
Love and thanks to:

Robin Shackford; for making me happy and centred, as well as hearing me repetitively go over my arguments.

Annie Giraud; for love and support and everything else that I can’t put into words.

Abdulrahman Giraud; wanting to do right by you has driven so much of what I've done academically.

Alice Shackford; for giving me the sort of insight that only a thoughtful teenager can and making it easy to juggle being a step-mum and a postgraduate.

Danny Giraud and Ethel Hannant; your support has meant so much to me.

Bushra Aytour; I hope I’ve made you happy!

Annette Foster and Debs Storey: my Nottingham family.

Brent Reid; for encouraging me to move to Nottingham and get involved more with AR, as well as being a font of knowledge about local activism.

Anita and Roger Bromley; for just being really lovely people and giving me a huge amount of support throughout the PhD.

Thanks also to the other postgraduate people from the Department of Cultural Studies at Nottingham University and Nottingham’s Feminism and Teaching Network, especially Adity, Ying, Caroline, Matt, Michael, Teodora, Kathryn, Stefanie, Charlotte, Marta, Calvin, Melissa, Eireann, Iain, Jude, Laura. Being around you all has helped me so much over the past four years.

Nottingham friends; particularly Chris and Kristabel Beeley.

Edinburgh friends; particularly Matt, Katarina, Aythan, Leanne, Alice, Mark, Flo, Claire.

Norwich friends; Carly and Naomi.

Thanks should also go to all of the places that let me sit and write for hours, including: Dotty's Cafe, the Alley Cafe and the Broadway.

Particular thanks has to go to Nottingham Animal Rights and Veggies Catering Campaign, especially Patrick Smith and everyone who helped and contributed to the free food give-aways in 2010 – especially Lily and Eshe, who were a ray of sunshine.

Post-viva thanks must also go to Jenny Pickerill and Colin Wright, for making the final hurdle a really stimulating and rewarding experience.

Finally, an absolutely huge thank you to my lovely, supportive supervisors: Neal Curtis and Tracey Potts. Thank you so much.
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Introduction: Articulating Animal Rights

The purpose of the thesis is to develop a conversation between theoretical perspectives that focus on articulating issues surrounding animal ethics, networked activism and social transformation – notably the work of Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu – and animal rights movements in the UK. The aim of developing this dialogue is to resolve a central difficulty faced by animal rights groups (as identified by Haraway, 2008): how can activists articulate arguments in favour of animal rights, when ‘rights language’ itself is underpinned by values that ground human exceptionalism? The theoretical perspectives drawn on throughout the thesis will work to map out this difficulty and develop an understanding of contexts where it is being overcome in practice, drawing on a range of UK animal rights groups as case studies, including SPEAK (a movement opposed to Oxford University’s 2008 animal laboratory), the British Union Against Vivisection (BUAV), Nottingham Vegan Campaigns and Veggies Catering Campaign (described by Peace News as ‘the field kitchen of the British activist scene’; Smith, 2009).

This will not be a one-way conversation, as the animal rights networks focused on will also bring valuable insights to the table as to how to overcome a parallel problem relating to the theoretical positions explored, all of which betray the vestige of humanist values despite their arguments to the contrary. Indeed, focusing on the work of animal rights movements provides useful insight about how to articulate more egalitarian approaches to engaging with non-human actors, by exposing some of the implicit humanist values that inhibit the emergence of a more radical ethics in texts such as Haraway’s When Species Meet (2008).

Therefore, developing this conversation should prove useful in pointing towards more productive approaches to engaging with non-human animals, both in theory and within activist practice, which
overcome the respective limitations of both of these fields.

As inferred through reference to notions such as ‘animal rights’, ‘humanism’ and ‘activist networks’, this conversation necessitates engagement with concepts that might seem commonplace, but are actually deceptively complex; a complexity that is masked if these areas are only referred to in a very general sense. For this reason, before beginning to develop the conversation between theory and activism that is at the core of the project, it will be useful to pin down a more specific understanding of the key areas that will form the foundation of the thesis. In other words, it will be necessary to flesh out its central theoretical themes: firstly, the problems associated with ‘right-language’ (due to its anthropocentrism); secondly, the issue of how to articulate these rights; thirdly, what is being referred to by ‘animal rights activism’ and, finally, the significance of the term ‘network’ (in relation to both theory and activism).

**Anthropocentrism in Animal Rights**

Difficulties associated with the concept of rights have been extensively acknowledged and debated within the contemporary UK animal rights movement, for instance, at the outset of activist pamphlet *Beasts of Burden* (2004), it is argued that:

Rights are a limited recognition granted by the powerful to the less powerful, and as such ‘animal rights' implies at least a separation between people and animals, and the definitive superiority of people [...] There is a need to move beyond 'animal rights' as such in order to fight inequality. (*Beasts of Burden*, 2004: 25)

Foreshadowing Haraway, this assertion identifies that the concept of 'rights' itself is problematic, as rights-discourse is frequently grounded in conceptions of what these rights constitute in relation to
Man, which means that the animal rights are necessarily defined against human rights and articulated by humans.

At stake throughout the thesis, is the question of whether activist groups can overcome these tensions within the concept of ‘animal rights’ itself, which arise from the anthropocentric nature of rights-discourse, with this anthropocentrism stemming from the prevalence of narrow humanist conceptions of rights. The repressive effects of humanism have been discussed extensively, as summarised by N. Katherine Hayles:

The liberal humanist subject has, of course, been cogently criticized from a number of perspectives. Feminist theorists have pointed out that is has been historically constructed as a white European male, presuming a universality that has worked to suppress and disenfranchise women’s voices; postcolonial theorists have taken issue not only with the universality of the (white male) liberal subject but also with the very idea of a unified, constant identity, focusing instead on hybridity; and postmodern theorists such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have linked it with capitalism... (Hayles, 1999: 4)

In other words, for theorists working in fields such as postcolonial or feminist studies, appealing to this form of subject has been problematic due to its very construction rendering other groups of people who do not fall into this category (such as women or non-western men) subaltern. Thus for these groups, it is impossible to draw upon the humanist subject as a means of articulating their own rights-claims, due to the very existence of this subject automatically casting them as marginalised ‘others’.

Moreover, for Hayles (in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s link between humanism and capitalism),
this form of humanist subject leads to understandings of rights grounded in possessive individualism, or the 'conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them [...] the human essence is freedom from the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession' (MacPherson, qtd in Hayles, 1999: 3). As Hayles foregrounds, this understanding of the humanist subject and their rights as only expressed through possession and individual agency, means that there is a disconnect between the assertion of ‘rights’ and the impact of these rights upon other actors; particularly actors classed as subaltern in relation to this privileged subject. The result of this is that any attempt to defend the rights of subaltern groups that are being impinged upon, is portrayed – conversely – as impinging on the rights of the possessive individual to own, purchase, or act as they choose. In other words, any attempt to campaign for the rights of these marginalised actors through modifying the behaviour of the actors that are, in effect, contributing to their oppression, is condemned as an attack on the freedom of the humanist subject. For this reason, theorists such as Hayles are intensely critical of any appeal to this form of subjectivity (and the category of objects it creates), which is used to avoid ethical interrogation of whether these relations could be reconfigured differently (or, indeed, are necessary at all).

The implications of this are elucidated in political terms wherever a focus on the subject's rights is used to avoid accounting for how these rights impact upon other (human and nonhuman) entities. This is exemplified by a debate that will be discussed extensively in the following chapter, the international anti-McDonald’s campaign, particularly during the McLibel trial, which ensued when two activists were sued by McDonald’s for their distribution of an allegedly libellous pamphlet. Throughout the trial McDonald’s cited consumer rights, such as the freedom to make purchasing choices, as a means of truncating ethical debate regarding the social relations lying behind the corporation. As will be discussed in chapter two, this approach is also exemplified by the entirety of Haraway’s When Species Meet, foregrounding contexts in which humanist discourses that privilege
specific forms of subjects over others, lead to certain actors becoming objectified as 'other' and rendered legitimately exploitable, whenever they contradict or become an obstacle to the rights of the possessive individual. For Haraway, this is epitomised by the way in which animals are classed as acceptably ‘killable’ in scientific, industrial and agricultural practices on the basis of the hierarchical man/animal relation that renders any use of animals perceived to benefit humans as socially acceptable (Haraway, 2008: 3-160).

In line with these arguments, therefore, humanist conceptions of rights are intrinsically anthropocentric, due to their grounding in a series of hierarchical binary oppositions that privilege not simply the human, but a specific type of human. This criticism of humanist discourses of rights reflects the reason why, for theorists concerned with human-animal interaction such as Haraway, this form of humanism is particularly damaging, due to certain groups of actors automatically being cast as subaltern and exploitable as soon as rights grounded in possessive individualism are appealed to. As Haraway argues in When Species Meet, this problem is compounded whenever animal rights are constructed in relation to human rights: 'We do not get very far with the categories generally used by animal rights discourses, in which animals end up as permanent dependents ("lesser humans"), utterly natural ("nonhuman"), or exactly the same ("humans in fur suits")' (2008: 67). In other words, if animal rights are only articulated in relation to the human, then the metaphysical disparity between human and animal is perpetuated by suggesting animals are only valuable if they are in some way like humans.

For this reason, Haraway is particularly wary of any attempts by animal rights activists to anthropomorphise animals. As Tony Brown argues in his review of When Species Meet: Haraway perceives the 'need to guard against personification. [As] What worse way than to try and make everything "not about ‘man’" by personifying all that is “not man”?' (2009: 751). In contrast, she states that she is: ‘needy for ways to specify these matters in non-humanist terms’ (2008: 67), as
only a departure from humanism can yield an approach to ethics that departs from anthropocentrism. The question, therefore, whether it is possible to campaign for ‘animal rights’ without appealing to humanist understandings of what these rights constitute: a question hinging around the issue of articulation.

**Articulation and Activist Politics**

Chapter one will focus on this question of articulation, drawing upon Haraway’s specific account of ‘a political semiotics of articulation’ (1992: 309), as a theoretical framework. This theory will be defined more comprehensively in the chapter, but it is essentially the process of mapping out the network of relations that exists between the different social actors that constitute a particular social context, from a situated position within this network. The aim of this process is to develop an understanding of the ways in which the relationships forged within the network shape the lived reality of all of the actors embroiled in it, in order to determine whether these relations could be reconfigured in less exploitative ways.

As will be discussed in more depth in chapter one, this is a departure from understandings of political articulation as a discursive practise working to establish a hegemonic definition of a political issue (such as Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Instead, Haraway advocates a process of situated mapping; where activists work to articulate the complex material-semiotic networks of social relations that form particular cultural contexts, without presuming their account of the situation to be neutral, indisputable or from a transcendental perspective. The term material-semiotic in this context, is in reference to the way that the networks at stake are composed of both material actors and symbolic relations, which create particular forms of social reality though co-shaping processes of interaction: as Haraway puts it 'trope and flesh [are] always cohabiting, always co-constituting' (2008: 383, n.11). For Haraway, the only means of avoiding reductive categories such as
human/animal, material/semiotic, is through articulating these irreducibly complex relationships. As will emerge throughout the thesis, this approach has both conceptual and political advantages for activist movements.

The political value of this process can be understood in line with another theorist central to the thesis, Pierre Bourdieu, particularly his account of how to challenge the implicit, unacknowledged relations and values that underpin certain sociological realities, which he calls ‘doxa’ (2008: 164). In Bourdieu’s terms, the process of exposing doxa deprives them of some of their power, as they can no longer function as pre-given, natural and inevitable. This is not to say that foregrounding doxa wholly removes them, but it does transform them into merely being perceived as orthodox practices – which might exist as cultural norms at present, but are no longer inevitable. Moreover, by foregrounding the arbitrariness, or cultural contingency, of these norms, space can be opened for alternative (or in his term heterodox) discourses that articulate different social values.

In light of these arguments, a politics of articulation can be seen as valuable in mapping out the material-semiotic networks that give rise to doxa: bringing unspoken social relations into the realm of debate, where they become merely orthodox and can be opened up to critique by the activists’ heterodox perspective. This is somewhat of an abbreviated account of the theoretical interrelation between Bourdieu and Haraway, which will be explored in greater depth in chapters three and four, but still gives a sense of the value of a politics of articulation for activist groups seeking to reconfigure existing social relations.

The other advantage of a politics of articulation is more of a conceptual issue, which needs to be understood in relation to the other key theoretical perspective drawn upon in the thesis – actor-network theory (ANT) – particularly the work of Latour and more performative accounts of ANT provided by theorists such as Annemarie Mol and John Law. The advantage of using ANT is the
way it works to de-naturalise certain sociological realities (in a similar way to Haraway, who repeatedly refers to her theoretical allegiance with Latour; 1992: 305; 2008: 305, n.9) by foregrounding how these realities are constituted through a network of interaction (the actor-network) between actors that are often not conventionally categorised as 'social'. Significantly these include technological, environmental and scientific entities, as well as material objects and non-human animals – with even the texts that articulate these networks becoming actors soon as they begin to intervene in the behaviour of the actor-networks they describe.

In ANT terms, therefore, non-human actors are not 'intermediaries' that enable or inhibit different forms of agency but are actors in themselves, due to being mediators 'endowed with the capacity to translate what they transport, to redefine it, redeploy it, and also to betray it' (Latour, 1993:81). In other words, non-human actors can be understood as active entities in terms of shaping reality; they are not intermediaries for human action but actively shape, enable, or inhibit that action. This erasure of the difference between human and animal, subject and object, by understanding them all as social actors, has the effect of undermining certain metaphysical attributes that become attached to these categories, particularly the privileges afforded to the humanist subject (as made explicit in Latour’s *Politics of Nature*, 2004: 70-77).

This understanding of sociological reality as being constituted by networks of interaction between human and non-human actors is (with certain caveats that will be set out in chapter one) akin to Haraway’s outline of the task faced by a politics of articulation. Due to these similarities, and the value of ANT in challenging the distinction between human and non-human actors, the thesis will develop a more specific understanding of a politics of articulation as the process of mapping out an *actor*-network in order to expose the doxic social structures it perpetuates.

What is particularly valuable about this process for animal rights movements is that it necessitates
articulating the hybrid interrelations between human and non-human actors that constitute the actor-network. Echoing her earlier argument in the ‘Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991a), therefore, that a more productive form of politics ‘entails a clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture’ (151-2), for Haraway a key part of a politics of articulation involves foregrounding the connections between human and non-human entities. This is because working to articulate and foreground the co-constitutive relations existing between both human and non-human actors provides a mode of political analysis that moves beyond anthropocentrism, due to threatening the autonomous status of Man. As Rosi Braidotti makes explicit in her analysis of Haraway's approach, her work foregrounds that 'it is crucial to invent conceptual schemes which allow us to think the unity and inter-dependence of the human [...] and of its historical 'others' at the very point in time when these others return to dislocate the foundations of the humanistic world-view' (Braidotti, 2006: 11).

The process of mapping out and exposing humanist doxa as arbitrary, therefore, involves articulating the hybrid composition of social reality, by foregrounding the interrelations between human and non-human actors that constitute the underlying actor-network that shapes this reality. This is significant because the process of articulating the hybrid constitution of social reality undermines the autonomous status of man, and so renders pre-existing forms of humanist ethics inoperable due to their dependence on the distinctions between Man and non-human actors. Instead, a new form of ethics has to be grappled with: which is what Haraway strives for within When Species Meet and what is emerging in the work of the movements that will be discussed throughout the thesis.

In a nutshell, therefore, through gradually combining the work of Haraway, Latour and Bourdieu, throughout the first three chapters, an understanding will be developed of a politics of articulation as the process of articulating an actor-network in order to expose doxa; which in the context of the
thesis consist of the hierarchical binary oppositions between human and non-human actors that sanction the exploitation of the latter.

Thus, in line with these theoretical perspectives, a politics of articulation has both political and conceptual advantages, which make it potentially valuable for animal rights activists. It is important to reiterate, however, that engaging in this form of politics must be a process of situated mapping, as opposed to providing a transcendental overview of the networks at stake. Indeed, understanding a politics of articulation as the development of situated knowledge – working to unsettle existing social norms, instead of imposing new ones – is at the heart of Haraway’s project. For Haraway, it is crucial that, rather than presenting a bird’s eye perspective of the issue, activists work to articulate their own position within the network – making their own perspective explicit, rather than presuming neutrality (a position that will be explored in more depth in chapter three, in relation to anti-vivisection campaigns).

What is particularly important for Haraway is not merely the activists’ articulation of their own position in the network, but for them to also find a means of recognising the work of other actors embroiled in this network. Ultimately she is arguing for a form of situated knowledge where the role of activists should be to create space for other actors to speak for themselves, or (if actors lack the capacity to do this) to foreground their capacity to shape social relations in other ways, as opposed to what she describes as a ‘political semiotics of representation' (1992: 311), or attempting to represent what the activists perceive to be in the best interests of these actors. Precisely how to enable these other actors to (literally or metaphorically) speak for themselves is a central issue that will be addressed in the thesis – as this is a difficult, and sometimes nearly impossible, task – but a key part of this process is simply acknowledging the perspectives of other actors, or of foregrounding their mediating role, with a particular focus on the capacity of non-humans to be social actors that have a central role in creating, forming and disrupting cultural realities. Therefore,
a large amount of the work in developing a politics of articulation is simply finding means of creating space for other (human and non-human) entities to emerge as actors and be part of the activists’ politics of articulation, rather than the object of it – be it through a direct inclusion of their perspectives, or simply by foregrounding their work as social actors.

Aside from these theoretical issues in relation to the activist movements that will be drawn upon, a politics of articulation also provides a valuable methodological approach for the thesis as a whole. In other words, the entire project is essentially engaging in this form of politics, by attempting to map out and reveal certain networks of relations; both in the sense of discussing the emergence of particular activist networks and in analysing the networks of relations that are (in turn) being articulated by these activists. The implications of this methodological approach are elucidated by John Law and Vicky Singleton's argument regarding the significance of theoretical texts, particularly those relating to feminist technoscience (such as Haraway’s work) and (to some extent) actor-network theory, the field they themselves derive from:

The stories we tell work to reinforce (extend, undermine, celebrate) arrangements that are explicitly political (having to do, for instance, with national security, or gender, or the proper organisation of technological effort) or implicitly so (having to do, for instance, with the rights and duties of humans and non-humans, or indeed the very distinction between humans and nonhumans). (2000: 770)

As suggested by Law and Singleton's argument that in mapping out such politically significant networks texts necessarily intervene in them; by tracing the network enacted by certain activist movements, the thesis works to emphasise and – to some extent – reinforce the progressive forms of politics emerging in the work of animal rights groups. The significance of this is that the work of these groups tends to be overshadowed by stereotypical perceptions of animal rights groups as
either engaging in extremist forms of direct action or relying on discourses which anthropomorphise animals (Hall, 2006; Torres, 2007); stereotypes that are not only commonplace in relation to activists’ media portrayal, but in the way Haraway herself tends to characterise animal rights activists (as will be discussed in chapter two). In foregrounding the work of these activists and including material directly from activist pamphlets and websites, therefore, the thesis will seek to display a serious engagement with activists' work and, ultimately, challenge these stereotypes.

All of these theoretical arguments are complex and have not been delved into in sufficient depth at this juncture, but will be elaborated on throughout the thesis to illustrate how these theorists' insights relate to activist practice. This leads to the question of what sort of activist groups will be drawn on to illustrate and develop these theoretical perspectives; a question that both necessitates defining what is meant by ‘animal rights groups’ in this context and establishing which specific movements will be focused on in the thesis.

**Activist Networks and Animal Rights**

The case-studies that will be drawn upon share a key element in common; an attempt to re-articulate issues in order to unsettle pre-existing ethical categories that render certain actors open to (culturally legitimate) exploitation; broadly speaking, this is the purpose of the politics of articulation that it will be argued these groups are engaging in. In theoretical terms, a useful definition of the forms of social movement at stake can be derived from social movements theory, as defined by Jenny Pickerill:

NSMs [new social movements] are concerned with adjusting the logic of the system. They want more than simply a reallocation of resources or mere representation, they question the whole system and its codes and instead propose new cultural codes
(Melucci, 1994). In this sense, NSMs assert their ability to produce new meanings and new forms of social life and change societal values in a paradigmatic battle with the dominant model of society and existing concentrations of power. (Pickerill, 2003: 16)

In other words, for such movements the issue at stake is not merely the articulation of rights within the existing system; instead the very structures of the system are under question. The aims of these movements, therefore, are akin to the demands Haraway makes for a means of re-articulating animal rights outside a humanist framework; a task which necessitates an entire re-evaluation of what constitutes these rights and the cultural norms that underpin them.

In light of Bourdieu’s account of the doxa, the thesis will focus on movements that have developed a politics of articulation that can work to map out and expose the doxic network of relations that constitute particular social realities, in order to argue that these relations could be reconfigured in less exploitative ways. To illustrate how this can occur in practice, animal rights as opposed to animal welfare movements will be drawn on throughout the thesis, as the former seek to challenge the cultural logic that sanctions certain forms of animal exploitation as acceptable, whereas the latter maintains the human/non-human dichotomy and simply advocate improved conditions for animals (see Hall, 2006; Francione, 1996).

For the same reason, due to the theoretical sources discussed focusing on the cultural logic that enables certain social relations to function as normative and beyond question, groups that explicitly attempt to challenge this logic via some form of public engagement will be analysed in the case studies. Therefore, movements will be focused on that attempt to make these re-articulations publicly available – either through documenting and attempting to re-frame issues in an online context, or through enacting these re-articulations of cultural values in public spaces – and usually a combination of the two. For this reason, the thesis will draw on groups working to comprehensively
enact a politics of articulation, in a manner that redefines the issue and unsettles the normative cultural assumptions that lie behind it; focusing on movements – such as anti-vivisection groups – who are constantly working to gain public support.

This is as opposed to animal rights networks identifying themselves more explicitly as ‘animal liberation’ movements, such as the Animal Liberation Front, who work to remove animals from the existing system rather than directly articulating challenges to the structures of the system. In light of this, due to its associations with movements such as the ALF, when characterising the groups drawn on in the thesis the term 'animal liberation' will be set aside in favour of 'animal rights'. A further issue with the former concept is, despite the fact that certain of the activist texts drawn upon, such as Beasts of Burden and Brian Dominick's Animal Liberation and Social Revolution (1995) use the term 'animal liberation' as well as rights, it carries certain philosophical connotations due to its association with Peter Singer and the utilitarian stance he adheres to which, as will be foregrounded in chapter three, are not compatible with the position that Haraway holds. For these reasons, even though (as will be foregrounded throughout the thesis) the term 'animal rights' has certain problems, it is still the term that most closely reflects the aims of the majority of the movements at stake and is central to the philosophical issues that will be explored.

Thus, with the groups drawn upon in the thesis being established as movements working to articulate social norms, it is now time to focus on what strategies these groups engage in to achieve their aims. As will emerge through the case studies drawn upon, a key component of developing this a politics of articulation is compiling sufficient information to understand and map out the networks at stake: crudely put, in order to articulate an actor-network, a literal network is needed in order to collate and document this information. Whilst this could be a material activist network or a virtual network, in line with arguments put forward by a number of theorists, in the current informational paradigm (Hardt and Negri, 2005), where the network becomes the dominant form of economic and
social organisation (Castells, 1996), frequently both forms of activism have been used simultaneously, informing and enhancing one another. Corresponding to these arguments, in many of these case studies information and communications technologies (ICTs) play a valuable role in enabling the development of a politics of information, proving particularly valuable in compiling the collaborative bodies of knowledge necessary to unsettle cultural doxa and articulate heterodox alternatives. However, it is important ICTs are understood as an effective tool with which to articulate, rather than being given centre stage in the work of these movements, who also rely on other means of public engagement to articulate their arguments.

For instance, this is evident in the work of the anti-McDonald's activists that will be discussed in chapter one, who worked to accumulate information about the corporation in order to support criticisms of the chain originally made in a pamphlet, but which needed to be substantiated with further evidence in the trial itself. Both as part of their defence and the expansion of the campaign that ensued after the initial libel writs were issued, the activists worked to articulate the complex network of relations brought together in the processes integral to McDonald's, in order to foreground how this network impacted upon a range of social actors (including workers, children, the city space, the environment and animals bred for livestock). Their argument, both throughout the trial (in which this network of relations was articulated) and on the *McSpotlight* website (which documented this politics of articulation, as well as enabling others affected by the McDonald's actor-network to participate in this process of mapping out) thus relied on compiling this information.

Similarly, will be as analysed in chapters three and four, integral to the work of anti-vivisection movements in the UK is the re-articulation of the practice as not simply a straight-forward route to medical progress, but a network of social, ethical, technical and economic factors – with some of the relations within this network being highly contested, even within certain branches of the
scientific community. Again, for these activists it was necessary to engage with a myriad of other actors embroiled in this network, in order to articulate effectively: in this instance, this involved engagement with anti-vivisection scientific actors, governmental bodies responsible for legislating the practice and even antagonistic debates with pro-vivisection groups – all of which served to map out complex aspects of this actor-network. As with the anti-McDonald’s campaign, this process also made use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in order to document this re-articulation of vivisection, leading to the emergence of what Noorje Marres characterises as an online ‘issue-network’, a concept:

Used today to characterize a variety of political practices that add to and intervene in the representative politics characteristic of national democracies and the international system. The term has been taken up by grassroots organisations and individuals in mobilising around affairs that affect people in their daily lives, from the environment to media ownership and gender issues. (Marres 2006: 6).

Marres traces the concept of the issue network, from its 1970s definition as a form of reactionary single-issue popular mobilisation that 'weakens' democracy (2006: 5), to contemporary affirmative accounts of the issue network as 'compatible with, or even an instance of, liberal democracy' (2006: 5).

For Marres, the term assumes a new relevance in light of the use of ICTs by non-governmental organisations and activist groups, in the sense of new technology allowing such groups to have greater participatory power within specific issue networks, enabling them to re-frame the issue in line with their own arguments. In Marres words, 'issue formation takes on the aspect of a collective, technologically mediated, distributed practice. This points toward a first merit of the concept of the issue network: it highlights a specific political effect that CSOs [civil society organisations] seek to achieve when sharing information, namely, the political articulation of the issues to which they are
committed' (2006: 7). Marres' conceptualisation of the issue network therefore, foregrounds the capacity of ICTs to facilitate the production of collaborative knowledge that can then be compiled in order to re-articulate the social relations that constitute a particular issue in a manner that challenges the normative political definition of the issue. What Marres also foregrounds is the role of antagonistic actors in these networks, as in the context of an issue network disparate actors with a vested interest in the issue contest their, respective, definitions of the issue. This is made explicit in chapter three, with the navigation of the online network existing between activist sites (both pro- and anti-vivisection) revealing a complex actor-network that departs from simplistic assertions as to vivisection being unproblematically ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’. Regardless of whether the animal rights activists succeed in re-articulating vivisection as an unethical practice, the chapter will argue that the antagonistic nature of the issue network that emerged between these actors rendered it – at best – a contested area and unsettled its status as a normative social practice.

However, whilst new media can play an important role in enabling a politics of articulation to be constructed, other forms of networked politics can assume a similar role and chapters four and five will illustrate that it is important not to neglect these strategies. Chapter four, for instance, will discuss the work of groups such as the BUAV in forging networks with governmental and scientific bodies in order to re-articulate the issue as an ethical as well as a scientific debate. Such material networks are forged via more conventional tactics (including lobbying and undercover reporting), but can still lead to a politics of articulation that reframes the debate. Hence conventional protest methods can still play a valuable role in developing this form of politics.

Finally, as will be discussed in the final chapter, the work of animal rights movements in relation to alter-globalisation projects illustrates interrelations between animal rights movements and the network politics more commonly associated with anti-capitalist movements (Castells, 2006; Dyer-Witheford, 1999) and environmental groups (Pickerill, 2003). This is evident by the way in which
activists have literally attempted to enact a politics of articulation in an interventional manner within public spaces, in order to challenge and disrupt normative social relations: both in working with anti-capitalist movements (as with the role of groups such as Veggies in the anti-G8 protests near Gleneagles in 2005) and in the influence of movements such as Food Not Bombs on vegan campaigning in the UK. In other words, this chapter will focus specifically on animal rights groups with explicit links to the alter-globalisation movement, who seek to articulate animal rights as part of the matrix of social and environmental issues the movement is attempting to encompass in their critique of neo-liberal capitalism.

This emphasis on characteristics of animal rights groups that are akin to, or interrelate with, alter-globalisation movements is, in part, an attempt to redress the frequent characterisation of animal rights groups as engaged in more conventional, or even regressive, forms of activism in comparison with anti-capitalist movements. However, it will be argued that even within movements perceived as focusing on single-issues (such as SPEAK) or long-standing groups (such as the BUAV, founded in 1898), a politics of articulation is beginning to co-exist with, if not replace, more conventional uses of rights-discourses.

Therefore, even though the animal rights groups discussed in the thesis often take the form of literal activist networks, frequently using computer networks, this is not the reason ANT has been used as a methodological approach. Indeed, the concept of an actor-network is not synonymous with a material network and these two understandings of ‘network’ need to be understood not as synonymous but in relation to one another. As Latour makes explicit: 'The network does not designate a thing out there that would have roughly the shape of interconnected points, much like a telephone, a freeway, or a sewage “network”’ (2005: 129). Instead an actor-network is 'a tool to help describe something, not what is being described' (2005: 130). What he means by this statement is that, as discussed earlier, for Latour lived reality is shaped by relations that are formed between
different actors (which can be both human or non-human entities, including animals, technological artefacts and environmental factors). In other words, each social context is created by a collective configuration of actors (the network), with these actors mediating one another in such a way that the lived reality of each is shaped by the overall dynamic of this network. In this light, the actor-network is what emerges when you begin to articulate how a certain collective of actors is constituted, in order to understand how a particular form of sociological reality is produced.

The relation between activist networks and actor-networks is therefore that – in engaging in a politics of articulation – these literal networks work to articulate actor-networks; a process that reveals the hybrid composition of social reality and undermines the humanist categories (such as human/non-human, subject/object) that impinge upon the rights of certain types of social actors if they are used as a foundation for ethics or political strategies.

Furthermore, these two forms of networks are linked on a theoretical level, due to both undermining the status of the possessive individual, or humanist subject. Just as, for Latour and Haraway, the process of articulating the hybrid composition of actor-networks poses a challenge to the autonomous humanist subject, for theorists such as Manuel Castells what is particularly significant of the emergence of networks as a form of organisation for activist movements in particular is that:

While information and networking augment human powers of organisation and integration, they simultaneously subvert the traditional Western concept of a separate, independent subject: ‘The historical shift from mechanical to information technologies helps to subvert the notions of sovereignty and self-sufficiency that have provided an ideological anchoring for individual identity since Greek philosophers elaborated on the concept more than two millennia ago. In short, technology is helping to dismantle the very vision of the world that in the past it fostered’. (Castells, 1997: 23, citing Barglow,
In other words, through both their organisational form and use of ICTs, the activist movements at stake are enacting a form of politics that undermines key tenets of the humanist subjects whilst, simultaneously, the articulation of actor-networks works to critique humanism on a fundamental, conceptual level. The case studies drawn upon will elucidate the interrelation between these forms of network, foregrounding their value in developing a more radical approach to articulating animal rights issues.

Throughout the thesis, these case-studies and the theoretical perspectives that will be related to them will be mapped out, with each chapter focusing on a particular aspect of the politics of articulation emerging in the work of animal rights movements. In other words, the thesis' theoretical framework will be developed gradually, rather than introducing the Latour-Haraway-Bourdieu synthesis from the outset. Broadly speaking, chapter one will focus on articulation (in Haraway's sense of the term), which will be drawn on to map out the relation between Haraway and animal rights perspectives more comprehensively (in chapter two), chapter three will then focus on the articulation of hybridity, with subsequent chapters analysing how this can lead to both political and cultural change (chapters four and five, respectively).

**Chapters**

The first chapter will set out Haraway's politics of articulation in more detail, to foreground its value to activism. Initially it will set out the themes touched on here in more depth – such as the difference between Haraway's politics of articulation and other forms of articulation; the value of ANT in developing this politics and the importance of attempting to articulate with other actors, as opposed to attempting to represent their interests.
In order to understand how these themes relate to activist practice more directly, the anti-McDonald’s campaign will then be drawn upon as a case-study, due to the link that Haraway herself draws between alter-globalisation projects and her own perspective, stating – on the first page of *When Species Meet* – that her own attempt to re-think human-animal relations is in line with the way that ‘European activists [...] stress that their approaches to militarized neo-liberal models of world building are not about antiglobalisation but about nurturing a more just and peaceful other-globalisation’ (2008: 3). Due to the connection that Haraway herself perceives between her own work and alter-globalisation, therefore, the anti-McDonald’s campaign will be drawn upon as a means of illustrating this relation, because of its critique of globalised capitalism playing a formative role in the discourse surrounding the alter-globalisation movement.

The campaign is also particularly useful in having an explicit relationship with the UK animal rights movement for, as well as focusing on links between animal exploitation and multinational capitalism, Nottingham-based Veggies vegan catering campaign were also threatened with libel action for reprinting the anti-McDonald’s fact sheet that was at the centre of the McLibel trial. Indeed Patrick Smith from Veggies even appeared as a witness at the trial itself, with his witness statement appearing on *McSpotlight* to make the link between the group and the anti-McDonald’s campaign specific:

> Since 1985 Veggies have supported, and drawn inspiration from Greenpeace (London), and its wide ranging campaigns for the well-being of people, animals and the planet. As the ‘business’ part of Veggies work promotes soya-based Veggies Burgers as a healthy, humane and economic alternative to burgers made from cows, it was natural that Veggies should back the Greenpeace (London) information campaign against the multinational burger corporation McDonalds, especially in that it highlights far more
issues than simply the cruel and wasteful use of animals for food. (McInformation Network, N.D.: People, Witnesses, Publication)

Due to these links, the case-study provides a useful bridge between the alter-globalisation movement that Haraway claims affinity with and the animal rights groups she is critical of in *When Species Meet*: setting the stage for the following chapter's attempts to interrelate her work with animal rights more directly.

Chapter two takes its name from the aforementioned activist pamphlet *Beasts of Burden*, initially drawing on this and other activist texts as a means of foregrounding pre-existing connections between Haraway's stance and the perspectives of animal rights activists. It will develop Haraway's relationship with animal rights more specifically than the first chapter – focusing on *When Species Meet*, in which Haraway maps out this relationship and puts forward her own arguments regarding animal rights ethics. This analysis of *When Species Meet* will foreground how the text develops aspects of her politics of articulation in a manner that provides a valuable platform for a non-anthropocentric ethical perspective to be developed; an ethics potentially valuable for animal rights groups seeking to depart from humanist rights-discourses.

However, through the process of demarcating this ethics, a major obstacle will emerge to developing a productive conversation between Haraway's work and animal rights groups: Haraway's critical stance towards these movements. In reading Haraway against radical activist pamphlets, which draw links between animal rights, veganism and anarchism, the chapter will reveal that the only thing preventing this conversation are the implicit humanist values that persist in Haraway's work. In this light, the main aim of the chapter is to expose some of these assumptions, in order to move beyond them and set the stage for relating Haraway's work to animal rights in a more productive manner, in the rest of the thesis.
The first two chapters, therefore, lay the foundations for establishing the subsequent interrelation of Haraway's ethical approach and the work of animal rights movements, which will be developed in the final three chapters. Three and four will both discuss the vivisection debate, but each will focus on a different type of movement in order to depart from generalisations about animal rights movements and develop a sense of the disparate approaches of animal rights groups concerned with this issue alone – whilst also highlighting how non-anthropocentric approaches to animal rights are present in totally different political contexts within animal rights.

Chapter three will draw on the work of SPEAK, who have received negative media attention due to alleged arson attempts on property at Oxford University (Ford, Irving and Woolcock, 2005); the involvement of some of its members in other high-profile court cases against Huntingdon Life Sciences (Jha, 2004); and their tactics of writing protest letters to construction companies and shareholders involved with the laboratory – which has led to the introduction of legislation 'making "economic sabotage" linked to animal research a crime' (Walsh, 2008). Furthermore, they describe themselves as 'the voice for the rights of animals' (SPEAK campaigns, 2004), suggesting that they are working to represent animal rights and so seemingly assuming an antithetical stance to the one that Haraway advocates.

The chapter will attempt to counter this negative characterisation of the movement by foregrounding that in other contexts, particularly online, the activists are moving away from representational politics. Instead, they are building up a complex picture of the vivisection debate that works to map out the actor-network at stake, in order to argue that it could be re-configured differently. Both in working with anti-vivisection scientific groups (such as the Safer Medicines Campaign) and locked in an antagonistic relationship with groups such as Pro-Test, the online vivisection issue-network that will be explored in the chapter – of which SPEAK is a central node –
works to build up a collaborative body of knowledge that articulates the complexities of the vivisection actor-network.

In line with Bourdieu, the political advantage of this approach can be understood in terms of this network providing a source of heterodox knowledge that exposes the doxa underlying the cultural practice of vivisection, bringing the unspoken, implicit values that provide ethical sanction for animal research, into the realm of debate. Moreover, this approach reveals the way in which the doxa sustains humanist values and hierarchical relations, which function as natural and pre-given, and are used to shut down debate by characterising activists as against human progress. For instance, allegations of favouring animal life over human have been levelled at anti-vivisectionists from the origin of the contemporary anti-vivisection movement in the UK, often underpinned by the dichotomy 'shall we save a rabbit and allow a man to die?' (cited in Paget, 1903). Indeed, this argument still underpins recent characterisations of anti-vivisection movements as against 'science and human progress' (Pro-Test, 2006); as reflected by Gary Francoine's abolitionist text on animal rights ethics being entitled *Animal Rights: Your Child or Your Dog?* (2000). Mapping out this actor-network, however, reveals a more complex picture that brings other elements into play in order to challenge dichotomies such as this.

For instance, the chapter will discuss ways in which the activists have challenged the causal link between medical progress and animal research, by foregrounding the role of animals in experimental (as opposed to applied) medical research, the influence of economic factors, the lack of success of vivisection in certain areas and the development of alternatives. Through the process of articulating these complex relations, it will be argued that the activists are working not only to unsettle the causal link between vivisection and progress, but simultaneously exposing the implicit hierarchical distinctions between man and animal used to provide ethical sanction for vivisection, by foregrounding the role of animals as social actors.
Chapter four will develop these arguments further, drawing more extensively on the work of Bourdieu, in order to understand the political implications of these strategies. The chapter will also focus on slightly different tactics employed in the debate, namely the way that groups such as the BUAV are working to foreground the role of non-scientific actors in the vivisection actor-network (such as economic and legislative entities) in an attempt to move away from its portrayal as a purely scientific network; a tactic which foregrounds the validity of ethical arguments in relation to the issue. In other words, their process of mapping out the vivisection actor-network leads to the group articulating the role of actors not conventionally perceived as scientific within this network. This process alters the dynamic of the network so that vivisection can no longer be framed purely as a scientific issue, which enables ethical arguments to bear more relevance to the debate.

The BUAV will be focused on in particular, due to their concerted engagement with commercial and governmental actors in order to increase their own mediating power within the network, and intervene in the cultural discourse surrounding vivisection. Due to this focus on developing the mediating power necessary to challenge existing social conceptions of vivisection, Bourdieu will be drawn on extensively in this chapter to reach a clearer understanding of how power relations emerge within the network, and whether the dynamic of the network can be altered in order to redistribute power in an advantageous manner for activist movements.

Bourdieu's analysis of the formation and distribution of power within specific social contexts provides an explanation as to why certain actors have greater power to maintain the existing form of the vivisection actor-network, whilst others lack the power to challenge these existing relations. In order to understand why it is difficult for activists in particular to transform a network, and the nature of the task faced by movements attempting to do this, Bourdieu's concept of "the field" will be mapped onto the idea of the actor-network, in order to better understand how power relations
emerge – and are maintained – within the network. More performative understandings of ANT will prove valuable in making this network-field connection, due to theorists such as Mol foregrounding how the actors embroiled in a particular network interact to produce a particular version of reality, that goes on to shape the lived experience of all of the actors at stake, in a performance that is retroactively treated as a priori reality by these actors, who continue to enact and embody it, making it difficult to change.

Bourdieu's notion of the field captures this concept of performativity and foregrounds its political implications, by reflecting how knowledge, norms and values are embodied by the members of a particular field and enacted within mundane, day-to-day behavioural practices and habits (as what he calls habitus). What is significant, is that the sum-total of the intersubjective values embodied by all of the members of a field sustain certain social structures and values, which can be stubbornly difficult to displace. A particular field of relations, therefore, has a corresponding set of social relations and structures that make transforming this field difficult, due to literally being embodied by its members.

Whilst this approach explains why change is difficult, however, it also illustrates how these relations could – potentially – be modified: which is where the work of the BUAV comes in; foregrounding the role of non-scientific actors within the field, in order to alter its power dynamic and afford themselves greater mediating power in the eyes of the governmental actors they engage with. In other words, by relating Bourdieu's arguments about power relations to the notion of the actor-network it will be possible to foreground ways in which the BUAV have worked to articulate the hybrid composition of this network, which is masked when it is perceived as an autonomous domain, governed solely by scientific logic. In simplistic terms, the chapter will trace how these tactics have effectively enlarged the field, by introducing new actors to it, a process which has – in turn – challenged its internal structures (due to these structures originating and being sustained by
its members).

While at this stage this argument might seem a little complex or abstract, in focusing on the BUAV in chapter four, it will become evident that this approach has led to some concrete legislative changes which alter the dynamic of the field by casting it as an ethical as well as a scientific issue – from the establishment of the Animal Procedures Committee in 1986, to governmental investigations that have arisen as a result of the BUAV's undercover work in the past decade. In all of these instances, arguments put forward by anti-vivisection groups have been recognised (by the very bodies responsible for legislating vivisection) as relevant due to the intersection of ethical and scientific issues that constitute this field. In a very literal sense, therefore, the chapter will illustrate how the work of movements such as the BUAV in articulating the hybridity of the vivisection actor-network, has led to shifts in the material-semiotic relations that sustain this network in its existing form, having a concrete impact on cultural practices.

These discussions of Bourdieu in relation to transforming and intervening in social structures will be developed in the final chapter, which will move beyond the vivisection debate in order to focus on other animal rights groups that have reflected a more non-anthropocentric approach to animal rights. In order to foreground the value of these strategies, in relation to a politics of articulation, Bourdieu's arguments will be developed further by focusing on movements that have sought not only to intervene in the legislative relations that impact upon cultural practice, but pose a direct challenge to the embodiment of cultural norms and values. In other words, it will focus on movements that attempt to expose what Bourdieu describes as 'habitus', or – as succinctly defined by Hayles – 'embodied practices' which correspond to particular cultural relations. For instance, in reference to Bourdieu's study of the Kabyle (tribal groups inhabiting areas of Tunisia and Algeria), Hayles states:
Whereas the anthropologist's schema will show fields, houses, and calendars arranged according to such dualities as hot and cold, male and female, for the Kabyle this knowledge exists not as abstractions but as patterns of daily life learned by practicing actions until they become habitual (1999: 202)

In other words, certain hierarchical dichotomies are not experienced in the abstract or ever 'cognitively recognized as such' (Hayles, 1999: 202). As with the doxa, for Bourdieu the durability of certain cultural practices lies in the fact that they are not consciously acknowledged and – just as the anti-vivisection activists in chapters three and four focused on exposing the doxa in order to open these relations to critique – the final chapter will explore ways that activist movements have worked to expose and critique habitus that is embodied in day-to-day activities, by intervening in normative public behaviour (such as going to certain shops, or consuming certain products).

For instance, the 2010 Spring Animal Rights gathering, in Nottingham, will be used to foreground ways in which activists have performatively worked to articulate animal exploitation in urban contexts – with a protest day of action taking place across the city centre, where activists simultaneously picketed various locations (from fur shops to McDonald's), in order to enact the network of relations relating to animal oppression that pervade daily life. Similarly, the series of free food give-aways held by Nottingham vegan campaigns throughout 2010 will be drawn on to illustrate attempts by activists to performatively intervene in public behaviour, foregrounding the exploitative social relations lying behind the freedom of the possessive individual to consume what they want, whilst positing alternatives to these relations.

The value of articulating alternatives – as part of a heterodox performance that bring habitus into consciousness – will then be developed more extensively, focusing on the work of Veggies Catering Campaign in developing the infrastructure of the Hori-zone (the temporary eco-village constructed
near Gleneagles, as part of the 2005 anti-G8 protests). The anti-G8 protests will thus be drawn on as a means of foregrounding the interrelation of animal rights perspectives and the performative, interventional politics associated with alter-globalisation movements.

Ultimately, therefore, the thesis will work to establish a conversation between Haraway and animal rights in order to argue for the value of Haraway to activist movements (in moving away from humanist rights-discourse), whilst foregrounding how her criticisms of these movements originate in the humanist values persisting in her own work. This conversation will be established by engaging in a politics of articulation: mapping out the complex actor-networks emerging in the work of literal, activist networks.

In order to achieve this, the thesis will foreground the ways that these movements are enacting Haraway's arguments and challenging her negative assertions about animal rights. It will also draw directly on activist literature, websites and tactics, in order to include these perspectives in the thesis and foreground the value of these movements as social actors. Both of these tactics will be used to develop a conversation between Haraway and animal rights, in an attempt to expose the problems with humanism for each perspective. More productively, the interrelation of these perspectives will enable a move toward a more radical approach to articulating animal rights issues in theory and practice, foregrounding how combining these approaches can lead to transformative modes of articulating animal rights.
Chapter 1

A Politics of Articulation

In order to set the foundation for the subsequent dialogue between Haraway and animal rights movements, which will be developed throughout the course of the thesis, two key questions need to be addressed: firstly, exactly what form of politics is Haraway advocating for activists and, secondly, how is this politics manifested within her own work? Whereas the second – perhaps more thorny – problem will be addressed in the following chapter in relation to *When Species Meet*, this chapter will draw upon her concept of 'a politics of articulation' (1992: 311), from an earlier essay, 'The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others' (1992), which she refers to as a 'mapping exercise' and 'sighting device' for understanding the political approach she advocates (1992: 295). In brief, this form of politics is the process of describing (or articulating) a specific network of relations, from a situated position within that network, with the aim of critically intervening in these relations.

Haraway's own characterisation of 'The Promises of Monsters' as a form of situated theoretical map, combined with its comparative brevity, means that nowhere in her work is a framework for political action set out so clearly. Due to the continuing themes between the essay and her subsequent work (themes that, as will be discussed in chapter two, are thrust to the foreground at the outset of *When Species Meet*) the essay is both a useful 'sighting device' for understanding the relevance of Haraway's work to political practice (in the form of her proposed politics of articulation), and valuable in navigating a path through the rich case studies and dense theoretical arguments that abound in her subsequent work. Mapping out precisely what this form of politics entails, therefore, will provide a useful foundation for not only understanding the value of Haraway’s work to activism more generally but also for comprehending the nuances of Haraway's arguments in *When Species Meet*, in which she discusses animal rights ethics more explicitly.
As will emerge during the course of the project, engaging in a politics of articulation (in order to map out activist networks whilst foregrounding ways in which the activists themselves are articulating networks of relations), does not provide an indisputable account or transcendental view of the networks at stake. Instead, this approach works to develop a context-specific perspective that can point toward contexts where a progressive politics of articulation (as opposed to a regressive political semiotics of representation) is emerging in the work of animal rights movements and tease out the implications of this form of politics in terms of both its strategic value and its ethical significance. For methodological, ethical and even practical reasons, therefore, it is vital to set out what a politics of articulation entails in more detail.

To do this, the chapter will firstly set out Haraway's arguments within 'The Promises of Monsters' before relating her key theoretical arguments to a case study that is both related to animal rights (though not solely focused on animal rights issues) and a key forerunner and influence upon the alter-globalisation movement: the anti-McDonald’s campaign surrounding the so-called McLibel trial and McSpotlight website. Although pre-dated by anti-McDonald’s campaigning that had been occurring on a small scale in the UK throughout the 1980s (notably the first International Day of Action against McDonald’s that the small London Greenpeace\(^1\) campaigning group held on 16\(^{th}\) October 1985), the campaign grew exponentially after McDonald’s attempted to sue two activists\(^2\) from the London group for distributing a six-page fact-sheet that was critical of the corporation, serving libel writs against them in 1990. Ironically, the company's actions gave the campaign unprecedented levels of publicity, due to the trial itself lasting almost three years (from 28\(^{th}\) June 1994 to 19\(^{th}\) June 1997), with 'fifty camera crews and photographers' waiting outside the courts on the day of the verdict (Vidal, 1997: 315) and solidarity website McSpotlight allegedly accessed 2.2 million times on the same day (McInformation Network, N.D.: 'Story').
What makes this campaign particularly valuable in elucidating Haraway's theoretical approach, is its focus on articulating the complex network of social relations that are created by a corporation such as McDonald’s: ranging from its impact on everything to labour relations to farming practices. Both in their original anti-McDonald’s pamphlet and, far more extensively, in the context of the trial and McSpotlight website, the activists mapped out the network of social relations forged by McDonald’s in order to open these relations to critique and argue that they could be reconfigured differently. For this reason, the work of these activists provides a means of understanding what a politics of articulation could entail in practice.

Moreover, though the movement developed prior to the 1999 mobilisation against the World Trade Organisation in Seattle – which is frequently referred to as the birth of the alter-globalisation movement – it embodied the same radical zeitgeist that gave rise to the demonstrations, with its critique of globalised capitalism and development of an international network of activists against McDonald’s (Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Klein, 2000). In other words, campaigns such as this are precisely what Haraway is referring to in *When Species Meet* when she herself draws a link between contemporary anti-capitalist networks and her own perspective, arguing that her work is a reflection of the principles of the alter-globalisation movement in not being 'about antiglobalization but about nurturing a more just and peaceful other-globalisation' (2008: 3).

The relation that Haraway herself claims exists between her own perspective and that of the alter-globalisation movement allows the anti-McDonald’s network to function as a bridge between her theoretical stance and the work of animal rights groups (who, conversely, she tends to distance herself from). This is because, due to having an explicit relationship with both the principles of alter-globalisation advocated by Haraway and the work of UK animal rights movements, who played a key role in supporting and sustaining the campaign, the case-study sets the stage for the interrelation of these perspectives that will occur throughout the rest of the thesis. Before relating
Haraway’s work to this case-study, however, it is necessary to understand what a politics of articulation entails in more depth.

**Monsters and Mapping**

Haraway begins ‘The Promises of Monsters’ by claiming that the essay is:

> A mapping exercise and travelogue through mind-scapes and landscapes of what may count as nature in certain local/global struggles [...] My diminutive theory's optical features are set to produce not effects of distance, but effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here. (1992: 295)

In other words, the text aims to map out ways in which 'nature' is constructed as 'otherness' in cultural discourse and material practice, in order to explore the political consequences of this nature/culture separation and – ultimately – challenge it. This approach foreshadows the aims set out at the beginning of *When Species Meet*, sharing the latter's ambition of exploring whether relations with other entities can be realised in ways that do not reify or damage the other actors involved in these relationships, by objectifying them as other. In order to achieve this and, in her words 'produce not effects of distance, but effects of connection', Haraway's texts work to foreground the connections that link together and shape both human and non-human entities; in other words, she is constantly revealing the co-constitutive relations that exist between actors categorised as belonging to the fields of 'nature' and 'culture', respectively, in order to challenge the hierarchical separation of these two categories. Integral to this process is the rejection of transcendental metaphysical frameworks that delimit the ontological potential of other actors by understanding them purely in line with the dominant epistemological paradigm. For instance, her
criticisms of humanism are due to it allegedly constructing the human by defining it against other categories, in a series of hierarchical binary oppositions such as culture/nature, human/animal, man/woman; with the latter term in these pairings assuming a subaltern position. As Rosi Braidotti argues, in her analysis of Haraway's philosophical stance:

In order to restructure our collective relationship to the new nature-culture compound of contemporary techno-sciences, Haraway calls for a renewed kinship system; radicalized by concretely affectionate ties to the non-human 'others'. Haraway argues that the subject-object, nature-culture divides are linked to patriarchal, Oedipal familial narratives. Against them, she mobilizes an enlarged sense of community, based on empathy, accountability and recognition. Moreover, she extends these prerogatives to non-human agents or subjects, such as animals, plants, cells, bacteria and the Earth as a whole. (Braidotti, 2006: 5)

Overall, Braidotti's analysis focuses a little too much on the novelty of what she describes as the 'new nature-culture compound' whereas (as will be discussed in more detail shortly) Haraway's work takes a lead from Latour's stance in We Have Never Been Modern (1993), which argues that connections have always existed between nature and culture with their separation simply being a political construction. Nonetheless, Braidotti's analysis still foregrounds a key aspect of Haraway's work: that the process of articulating the connections that exist between disparate entities, in order to overcome their separation into discreet metaphysical categories, necessarily entails the articulation of hybridity. For instance, she argues that:

Haraway's cyborgs, companion species and other figurations [...] suggest that it is crucial to invent conceptual schemes which allow us to think the unity and interdependence of the human [...] and of its historical 'others' at the very point in time when
these others return to dislocate the foundations of the humanistic world-view. (Braidotti, 2006: 11)

In other words, the figures that Haraway uses throughout her work are necessarily hybrid or 'monstrous' entities who blur the boundaries between categories that are treated as distinct according to certain metaphysical schema (such as those embodied within humanist philosophy). In focusing on these figures, therefore, Haraway's work seeks to challenge the integrity of these metaphysical categories; interrogating their political consequences and asking whether they could be reconfigured in different ways, which do not automatically render the non-human subaltern.

Thus in 'Promises of Monsters' she states that she has:

high stakes in reclaiming vision from the technopornographers, those theorists of minds, bodies, and planets who insist effectively – i.e., in practice – that sight is the sense made to realise the fantasies of the phallocrats. I think sight can be remade for the activists and advocates engaged in fitting political filters to see the world in the hues of red, green and ultraviolet, i.e., from the perspectives of a still possible socialism, feminist and anti-racist environmentalism, and science for the people. (1992: 296)

In other words, these 'high stakes' are in rejecting a patriarchal humanism that casts all other actors as somehow inferior to the human, or – more specifically – to enlightenment Man, in order to develop alternative ways of perceiving and understanding the relations between humans and other entities, which focus on their interrelation as opposed to their separation.

Haraway's arguments, therefore, draw an explicit link between the strategy of articulating the network of relations between human and non-human entities (in order to foreground how they
collectively shape each other's lived reality) and the development of alternative modes of political organisation. Indeed, she argues that the former is the first step in developing a more egalitarian form of politics that departs from anthropocentric humanism and does not automatically construct certain categories of actor as inferior or legitimately exploitable.

As touched on at the outset of the chapter, Haraway’s own account of a politics of articulation is relatively straight-forward (even though how to actually achieve it in practise is somewhat more complicated), in being the process of mapping out the complex networks of relations that exist between disparate actors, in order to understand how this network of relations creates and sustains particular social contexts. To understand what this means in practice, she – firstly – contrasts this form of politics with representational politics, or what she describes as ‘a political semiotics of representation’ and – secondly – draws upon a series of case studies to elucidate how a politics of articulation can be manifested in practical terms.

Both of these approaches are evident in Haraway's discussion of the plight of the Kayapo, an indigenous minority who inhabit parts of central Amazonia, who she draws upon to foreground the value of a politics of articulation. Any form of representational politics is described in negative terms as activist groups attempting to speak on behalf of those they are campaigning for, which has the effect of denying the subaltern a voice and replacing it with the voice of the campaigner in a misguided form of political ventriloquism: 'Who speaks for the jaguar? Who speaks for the fetus? Both questions rely on a political semiotics of representation. Permanently speechless, forever requiring the services of a ventriloquist, never forcing a recall vote, in each case the object or ground of representation is the realisation of the representative's fondest dream' (1992: 312). She describes how debates about conservation are often couched in language that represents the rainforest as a space that needs to be separated from the human and saved from encroachment, in a process that reinstates the same nature/culture opposition that constructs the Kayapo as indigenous
'other’. In other words, integral to a politics of semiotics is the assumption that certain actors (be they indigenous populations, endangered species or the forest itself) need to be spoken for by more powerful actors, as this is the only possibility of having their interests represented.

As a means of illustrating the damaging impact of this approach, Haraway instigates her discussion of the Kayapo by referring to an article in *Discover* magazine entitled ‘Tech in the Jungle’ (a title which, in itself, infers a separation between ‘technological development’ and ‘nature’ that makes their juxtaposition a novelty), but which Haraway finds particularly distasteful due to the representation of a Kayapo man holding a video-camera who was featured in an accompanying photograph. She argues that: ‘All the cues in the *Discover* article invite us to read this photo as the drama of the meeting of the "traditional" and the "modern," staged in this popular North American scientific publication for audiences who have a stake in maintaining belief in those categories’ (1992: 309). For Haraway, this separation of entities into categories, is the first stage in affording certain of these categories the privilege of speaking for actors belonging to other (less privileged) categories; for instance, giving Western Man the capacity to speak for nature, or for the indigenous.

Haraway clarifies this point by drawing on an environmental text by Joe Kane, *Running the Amazon* (1989), stating that a key quote from the text ‘will sharpen and clarify [her] stakes in arguing against a politics of representation generally, and in relation to questions of environmentalism and conservation specifically’, this quote being the aforementioned ‘[W]ho speaks for the jaguar?’ (Haraway, 1992: 311). On a certain level, this argument seems pertinent – simply calling for those who can speak to defend those who cannot – but Haraway responds by foregrounding why this argument is so deeply problematic, stating:

Now, I care about the survival of the jaguar-and the chimpanzee, and the Hawaiian land snails, and the spotted owl, and a lot of other earthlings. I care a great deal; in fact, I
think I and my social groups are particularly, but not uniquely, responsible if jaguars, and many other non-human, as well as human, ways of life should perish. But Kane’s question seemed wrong on a fundamental level. Then I understood why. His question was precisely like that asked by some pro-life groups in the abortion debates: Who speaks for the fetus? What is wrong with both questions? And how does this matter relate to science studies as cultural studies? (Haraway, 1992: 311)

For Haraway, the answer to this question of how this issue of representation relates to cultural studies is that seeking to represent other actors constructs certain actors as lacking the capacity to speak for themselves, because in a politics of semiotics:

The represented must be disengaged from surrounding and constituting discursive and non-discursive nexuses and relocated in the authorial domain of the representative. Indeed, the effect of this magical operation is to disempower precisely those-in our case, the pregnant woman and the peoples of the forest-who are ‘close’ to the now-represented ‘natural’ object. Both the jaguar and the fetus are carved out of one collective entity and relocated in another, where they are reconstituted as objects of a particular kind-as the ground of a representational practice that forever authorizes the ventriloquist. Tutelage will be eternal. The represented is reduced to the permanent status of the recipient of action, never to be a co-actor in an articulated practice among unlike, but joined, social partners. (Haraway, 1992: 312)

In other words, such practices work to separate certain actors from their social context in order for more powerful entities to represent their interests; a practice that is disempowering due to rendering the agency of these actors invisible (by disengaging them from the context in which this agency is
manifested), which means that ‘the ventriloquist’ has not just authority over, but authorial power to represent the (now) subaltern party in line with their own agenda.

In direct opposition to such tactics of representation, or politics of semiotics, Haraway draws upon a study by Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn that deconstructs ‘the image of the tropical rainforest [...] as “Eden under glass”’, which needs to be separated and protected from man’ (1992: 309). Instead, their text enacts Haraway’s politics of articulation by, firstly, rooting the Kayapo in their material context:

> The authors tell a relentless story of a ‘social nature’ over many hundreds of years, at every turn co-inhabited and co-constituted by humans, land and other organisms. For example the diversity and patterns of tree species in the forest cannot be explained without the deliberate, long-term practices of the Kayapo and other groups. (1992: 309)

In this sense, the human is understood in relation to nature rather than in opposition to it; humans are simply understood as a mediating actor amongst other human and non-human actors that shape one another’s reality. In other words, Haraway understands the Kayapo as actors that have the capacity to interact with and transform their environment, just as the rainforest is an actor mediating the social organisation of the Kayapo. Hence she argues that the only appropriate form of politics for intervening in such contexts is not through attempting to speak for the Kayapo, or indeed to speak for the rainforest, but through articulating their co-constitutive roles as actors. Thus the approach taken by Hecht and Cockburn (and via them, Haraway) is not to foreground the separation of entities such as nature/culture, man/environment, but to focus on instances where their interrelation is essential to developing a more egalitarian approach to ‘conservation’.
The second aspect of Hecht and Cockburn’s work that Haraway cites as valuable (and reflective of their engagement in a politics of articulation) is their work in foregrounding contexts in which the indigenous people themselves work to articulate their relation to the forest, particularly the text’s analysis of the self-organisation of different tribal populations into the Indigenous People of the Amazon movement, ‘made up of national and tribal groups from Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, numbering about one million persons, who in turn articulate themselves with other organized groups of the indigenous peoples of the Americas’ (Haraway, 1992: 310). Focusing on this collective actor’s role in the annual Forest People’s Alliance in 1989, Hecht and Cockburn outline the group’s development of their own programme of conservation that was:

in tension with the latest Brazilian state policy called Nossa Natureza. Articulating quite a different notion of the first person plural relation to nature or natural surroundings, the basis of the program of the Forest People's Alliance is control by and for the peoples of the forest. The core matters are direct control of indigenous lands by native peoples; agrarian reform joined to an environmental program; economic and technical development; health posts; raised incomes; locally controlled marketing systems; an end to fiscal incentives for cattle ranchers, agribusiness, and unsustainable logging; an end to debt peonage; and police and legal protection. (Haraway, 1992: 310-11)

The importance of Hecht and Cockburn’s focus on the formulation of this programme, for Haraway, is that rather than attempting to speak for the Kayapo, or the rainforest, their text worked to articulate a context where indigenous populations were working together to devise a means to conserve their environment without removing themselves from it. For Haraway this approach not only refused to speak for the Kayapo, but foregrounded their work and created space for them to emerge as actors inseparable from their material-semiotic context:
Hecht and Cockburn call this an "ecology of justice" that rejects a technicist solution, in whatever benign or malignant form, to environmental destruction. The Forest People's Alliance does not reject scientific or technical know-how, their own and others'; instead, they reject the 'modern' political epistemology that bestows jurisdiction on the basis of technoscientific discourse. The fundamental point is that the Amazonian Biosphere is an irreducibly human/non-human collective entity. There will be no nature without justice. Nature and justice, contested discursive objects embodied in the material world, will become extinct or survive together. (Haraway, 1992: 311)

This move away from attempting to speak for and represent other actors (a politics of semiotics), is thus replaced with a politics that instead works to articulate the network of relations that causes the plight of the Kayapo, and how they themselves are responding to this context, in order to create space for them to emerge as actors with the capacity of articulating for themselves. The strategy of foregrounding these relations is, for Haraway, a powerful means of countering a politics and, more fundamentally, a metaphysics, that reduces social relations to hierarchical binary oppositions; subject/object, nature/culture, black/white are not categories that can be used to elucidate the situation of the Kayapo.

Thus not only is there a move from speaking for another actor (a politics of semiotics) to foregrounding the network of relations in which different actors co-produce lived reality (a politics of articulation), there is a shift from a politics grounded in humanist conceptions of subjective rights to developing a politics that treats both human and non-human as co-shaping actors and grapples to articulate some means of reconfiguring their interaction in a manner that is less harmful to all of the parties involved in these relations. It is the task of developing such a politics that is a central theme throughout all of Haraway’s key texts, right up to When Species Meet, with the concept of the actor
providing her with a crucial tool in formulating her approach to animal rights ethics.

**Articulating Actor-Networks**

Haraway’s use of the term ‘actor’ is also key to formulating a more nuanced account of how a politics of articulation can be used to depart from a politics predicated upon humanist subjectivity. Moreover, this use of ‘actor’ is essential to developing a clearer understanding of what a politics of articulation consists of, in both theory and practice. For this reason, the term requires further exposition at this juncture, due to the more specific understanding of a politics of articulation that will subsequently be used throughout the thesis: the process of mapping out an *actor-network* from a situated perspective, in order to open it to critique and, potentially, to structural transformation.

Whilst Haraway refers to networks of interaction in 'The Promises of Monsters', she never explicitly uses the term ‘actor-network theory’ to describe her methodological approach. Indeed, she sets out very specific reasons for not identifying her approach with ANT, but (as will be explored shortly) these reasons need to be temporarily put aside in order to re-combine her theoretical insights with those provided by ANT theorists: Only this combination of Haraway’s approach with the methodological framework provided by ANT can provide an appropriate theoretical tool for exploring the work of the animal rights networks that will be focused on throughout the thesis.

It is therefore important, at this juncture, to go into the principles of ANT in a little more depth because the process of mapping out an actor-network is not straightforward. For Latour the process of unearthing this network does not entail following stable connections that exist between actors, rather the traces left by these actors as they mediate one another; traces that can be difficult to uncover once a particular sociological reality is treated as normative or natural. For Latour, therefore, engaging in ANT is an attempt to 'trace social connections' (2005: 122), or understand
how actors mediate one another and – through these processes of mediation – create particular social configurations that are treated as \textit{a priori} reality. In line with this argument you can only build up a picture of the network by following the actors themselves – in other words, the actor-network is what emerges as you follow the actors at stake.

The problem with this task is that it is difficult to follow the traces left by the processes of mediation occurring between actors in contexts that are perceived as having a relatively stable, or naturalised, sociological reality. For this reason, ANT texts often focus on controversies that have disrupted particular networks of relations, or challenged the normative status of particular accounts of reality, as it is at these junctures that certain elements of the network that were formerly invisible, due to being uncontested, suddenly emerge as problematic. For instance, Michel Callon's 'Society in the Making' (1989) focuses on the controversy between French automobile companies EDF and Renault surrounding the development of electric fuel cells. He foregrounds how apparent sociological and technological 'facts' upon which EDF had based their engineering decisions, were actually the product of a much more complex network of relations; a network that only emerged when these apparent 'facts' were challenged by their rivals, Renault, and shown to be simplifications of a far more complex network configuration:

Such simplifications will only be sustained as long as other entities do not appear that render the world more complex [...] instead of being easily mastered, fuel cells were transformed into an apparatus whose ever increasing elements turned out to be beyond control. A 'black box' whose operation had been reduced to a few well-defined parameters gave way to a swarm of new actors: scientists and engineers who claimed to hold the key to the functioning of the fuel cell, hydrogen atoms that refused to be trapped by the cheaper catalysts, third world countries that raised the price of precious metals, etc. (Callon, 1989: 94)
Likewise, Latour's *Science In Action* (from which Callon's usage of 'black box' was derived), draws upon moments within technological and scientific development in which the actor-network was still visible, that is to say, when it was still possible to trace the way in which certain realities were being created via specific actors assembling together and interacting in particular ways, before they had become an opaque 'black box'. In Latour's terms: 'The term black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery is too complex. In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and output' (1987: 3). Therefore, once a black box has formed it becomes difficult to understand its contents, as any internal complexity is bypassed by simply treating the entity as a tool that 'works' or a simple fact that reflects reality. For this reason, it is often necessary to examine the historical development of a particular artifact, or piece of information, and reveal any controversies that existed in its early stages of development, as such controversies can provide the route into understanding the workings of the black box and, crucially, whether a different form of black box – or sociological reality – could exist in its place. Again, this focus on understanding how specific 'black boxes' – and the realities they sustain – are produced, is valuable in understanding the work of animal rights groups that seek to challenge existing social practices and illustrate the existence of more ethical alternatives.

There is a huge amount of debate regarding the merits of ANT, which cannot be developed in depth at this juncture (although key criticisms will be touched on throughout the course of the thesis). However, the chief criticisms relate to Latour's very destabilisation of the philosophical categories that – for the purposes of the thesis – are so useful for the task of re-thinking human animal relations in the way that Haraway proposes. For instance, David Bloor argues that:

> Latour's errors about the sociology of knowledge derive from his stance towards a very basic principle which may be called 'the schema of subject and object'. This schema
implies that knowledge is to be understood in terms of an interaction between an independent reality, the 'object of knowledge', and a 'knowing subject', embodying its own principles of receptivity [...] Remarkably, Latour wants the sociologist to reject this schema. (1999: 82)

For Bloor, such a rejection is hugely problematic due to depriving sociologists of the interpretative framework that is conventionally used to understand technological and scientific development (particularly from the social constructivist perspective that Bloor is espousing). Furthermore, Bloor cannot comprehend how – without this subject/object distinction – any form of sociological analysis can take place: 'it still remains wholly unclear how to connect this metaphysical talk to historical and everyday reality' (1999: 97). However, as Ofer Gal argues in his analysis of the Bloor/Latour debate (and its philosophical ramifications):

If realism were to provide an alternative to oppositional metaphysics and its corresponding visualistic epistemology, it would have to start "from the middle" – from things as we know them. Alas, we know them historically, and as they are part of our history, we are, ipso facto, part of theirs. There are no standing grounds from which to view the relations between humans and reality 'from sideways on' (McDowell 1994, p.34), but if the planets had a different effect on European society before and after Copernicus, if germs effected French economy differently after Pasteur, and if we already fully digested and assimilated the understanding that the difference is not well-grasped by the simplistic notion of 'discovery', then we are forced to look for this middle kingdom, where human history and natural history meet. That this kingdom is not a place we feel comfortable in is not Latour's fault. (2002: 547)

For Gal, therefore, just because Latour deprives sociology and philosophy of its conventional
metaphysical framework, does not mean that his work should be rejected. Instead, perhaps attempts should be made to develop a new framework that is not reliant on metaphysical absolutes that truncate our understanding of sociological reality just because it is a framework we are 'comfortable' with. It is in moving toward such a framework that ANT proves valuable, particularly in foregrounding this 'middle kingdom' where the co-shaping interactions of human and non-human actors break down the distinctions between the two. In a sense, therefore, Bloor's criticisms foreground precisely why Latour's networks are so valuable in underpinning the ethical perspective espoused by Haraway, as this dissolution of normative categories that Bloor is so uncomfortable with, correspond with her underlining the importance of: 'Doing without both teleology and human exceptionalism', in the process of developing more ethical forms of human-animal relations (2008: 12).

Combining ANT with the work of Haraway is therefore not a huge theoretical leap to make, because as well as sharing general thematic elements, central theoretical principles are made explicit in both When Species Meet and 'the Promises of Monsters', particularly their reference to ANT. For instance, Haraway uses the same phrase to describe her relation to Latour in both texts, describing herself as 'allied to Bruno Latour' (1992: 305) in the earlier essay and similarly referring to her 'alliance with Bruno Latour' as 'being obvious' in When Species Meet (2008: 305, n.9). Moreover, as is suggested by the term 'alliance', this theoretical reference point is vital in understanding the metaphysical perspective that Haraway's work is informed by.

However, before going into more depth as to the value of ANT to Haraway’s arguments, it is important to note that she does not concur with every aspect of ANT; for instance, the necessity of accentuating the political value of networks is emphasised by Haraway within the essay, as it is a value that she claims ANT fails to develop itself, due to central ANT texts describing techno-scientific actor-networks without interrogating 'how the practices of masculine supremacy, or many
other systems of inequality, get built into and out of working machines' (1992: 332, n.14). In addition, she criticises ANT texts for focusing on technological artefacts at the expense of other non-human entities. For these reasons Haraway does not explicitly refer to 'actor-network theory' in her work, but despite these issues she still finds aspects of ANT can be used to analyse and critique the construction of political reality, even if certain ANT texts themselves neglect to do this.

Hence, despite these criticisms, Haraway still makes her theoretical allegiance to Latour explicit; an allegiance consisting of her understanding of lived reality as structured by 'permanent and multi-patterned interaction through which lives and worlds get built, human and unhuman' (Haraway, 1992: 305). In other words, her approach is akin to the ANT understanding of networks of interaction between actors as world-forming, in the sense of this network of relations shaping and constituting the reality of all of the actors within these networks. Likewise, the key element of both theorists' work is their determined attempts to assert the role of non-human entities as actors that have ontological, or reality-shaping, effects.

Another slight terminological difference between their approaches is Haraway's use of the term 'actant' as opposed to 'actor' in 'Promises of Monsters'; a difference that again foregrounds her attempts to politicise ANT and fully break with humanist metaphysics. Whilst she initially uses the term actor in earlier work such as 'Situated Knowledges' (1988), by 'The Promises of Monsters' it has been replaced by actant due to concerns that a focus on actors might lead to 'the methodological individualism inherent in concentrating constantly on who the agents and actors are in the sense of liberal theories of agency' (1992: 331, n.11). For this reason Haraway favours actant, which refers more directly to collectives of actors, rather than focusing on individual actors. Indeed, she explicitly distances the term actant from that of actor, arguing that: 'Actants are not the same as actors [...] actants operate at the level of function, not of character. Several characters in a narrative may make up a single actant. The structure of a narrative generates its actants' (331, n.11). This
change is therefore due to the associations the term actor has – outside of ANT – with individual agency and, more specifically, human agency. However, this is just due to the connotations of 'actor' in a general sense for, as clearly outlined by Graham Harman, the very definition of an actor in ANT itself involves collectivity and is linked the actor's function, hence his deliberate use of actor and actant interchangeably in *Prince of Networks* (2009):

> since Latour grants all actants an equal right to existence, regardless of size or complexity, all natural and artificial things must count as actants as long as they have some sort of effect on other things [...] for Latour an actant is always an event, and events are always completely specific [...] an actant is always completely deployed in the world, fully implicated in the sum of its dealings at any given moment [...] an actor is its relations. (Harman, 2009: 17)

Despite these issues, therefore, overall – like Latour's actors – each actant for Haraway is a node in a network of relations that performs a functional role within this network: mediating other entities within the network through its relation with them and, in turn, being mediated by the other actors/actants it engages with. Indeed, for Haraway this functional role is what defines something as an actant, rather than any intrinsic property it might have (such as a sense of agency attributed to it through virtue of being human). This bears close relation to subsequent, more nuanced, ANT accounts of actors, with Latour's more recent texts, such as *Politics of Nature* (2004) and *Reassembling the Social* (2005), in particular moving away from a focus on technology and exploring the broader political and metaphysical implications of ANT. An actor in these texts is, as for Haraway, simply defined through its functional role, as 'if an actor makes no difference it's not an actor' (Latour, 2005: 130). The fundamental importance of this understanding of actants for Haraway, and for ANT, is that non-human entities can be classed as actants/actors, because the capacity to perform a functional, mediating, role within a network is not limited to the human: for
instance, human activity itself is always shaped by and through interacting with other actors, both human and non-human.

In the *Companion Species Manifesto* (2003), for example, Haraway discusses theories that relate to the co-evolution of dogs and humans, where interaction between them shaped the 'reality' of each species in determining the pattern of each other's evolution. For instance, the stamina and physiology of wolves was altered with their proximity to easily accessible human food sources, as well as being directly modified through subsequent processes of domestication and then selective breeding. What Haraway foregrounds, however, is that this is not a one-way process as, conversely, human patterns of work, hunting and protection were mediated through their interaction with canines. In the more comprehensive *When Species Meet*, she develops this account of co-evolution, before examining one of its basic units and focusing on the contemporary relation between a dog and its trainer; whereupon the human might teach the dog, but is simultaneously mediated by the dog's behaviour because they 'have to respond to the authority of the dog's actual performance' (2008: 221). In other words, the act of training the dog is not simply a matter of imposing certain modes of behaviour onto the dog, instead the trainer must be responsive and learn how to interact in accordance with the dog's behaviour, in a way that the dog understands, in order for the animal to respond to them. Human behaviour is thus shaped by the dog, as Haraway experienced when training her own dog for agility competitions and realised she had to 'be willing to learn to make moves on the field that give her better information even if those moves are hard for me to master, and treat her like an adult by not bending over and hovering at difficult parts of a course' (2008: 224-5). Haraway argues that this relation is co-constitutive in the sense that both human and non-human have to be responsive to the needs of one another – and essentially mediate one another's behaviour – in order to interact in a manner that benefits both parties. Moreover, the very ontology of each actor, in this sense, is contingent on its relations with its companion, right down to the microbiological level, for instance in both the *Manifesto* and *When Species Meet*, in describing her
relation with her dog, she suggests that:

our genomes are more alike than they should be. Some molecular record of our touch in the codes of the living will surely leave traces in the world [...] Her red merle Australian shepherd's quick and lithe tongue has swabbed the tissues of my tonsils, with all their eager immune receptors. Who knows where my chemical receptors carried her messages or what she took from my cellular system for distinguishing self from other and binding outside to inside? (2008: 16)

The boundary between human and animal, for Haraway, is thus a fluid one – both literally in the interchange of genetic material – and epistemologically in the sense that, throughout When Species Meet, she undermines the possibility of using a humanist framework to establish such a distinction.

This perspective has a direct lineage from her earlier essay, as it is this rejection of the privileged subject as the only entity that can 'act' in the world, and the corresponding potential for entities that do not, or cannot, assume the position of privileged subject in humanist terms to still be understood as mediating actors, that underpins Haraway's politics. By extension, it is due to this active role of both human and non-human actors that she advocates a form of politics that does not simply seek to represent other actors in line with a humanist discourse of rights (as with a politics of semiotics).

**Situated Mapping**

Importantly, a key part of this process of articulation is locating oneself within the network and acknowledging the situated perspective from which you articulate these relations, in contrast to humanism's pretensions to neutrality. Moving away from attempting to represent a situation from the perspective of a neutral observer, a politics of articulation is necessarily a form of situated
knowledge, the practical realisation of Haraway's earlier argument that 'objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibilities' (1988: 582). In other words, any position that presumes to be neutral is problematic, as: 'Only those occupying the positions of the dominators are self-identical, unmarked, disembodied, unmediated, born again' (1988: 582). To overcome these problems, Haraway advocates a form of 'critical positioning' that offers a particular form of knowledge or perspective, but acknowledges its own cultural and social situatedness in the production of knowledge (1988: 589). These forms of knowledge do not, therefore, dominate others through attempting to define their nature 'objectively', but instead 'require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not as a screen or a ground or resource, never finally as a slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and his authorship of “objective” knowledge' (1988: 592). A politics of articulation, therefore, is a practice of situated knowledge that occurs when actors within a network attempt to articulate, to map out, the network of relations that shapes their reality: without attempting to portray themselves as neutral or deny the active role of the other actors they engage with. In Haraway's words, any actor engaging in this form of politics has 'authority [that] derives not from the power to represent from a distance, not from an ontological neutral status, but from a constitutive social relationality' (1992: 310).

Again, understanding this process in line with the work of ANT theorists can provide insight as to the value of this approach, due to it intersecting with subsequent methodological approaches set out in texts such as John Law's After Method (2004) and Complexities (2002, with Annemarie Mol), which draw upon complexity theory and ANT in order to devise ways of writing about complex networks that do not simplify them to meaningless abstractions. For Law, any attempt to write about sociological realities runs into the problem that: 'what is important in the world including its structures is not simply complex in the sense that they are technically difficult to grasp [...] rather they are also complex because they necessarily exceed our capacity to know them' (2004: 6). For
Law, what is needed is a means of writing about complex realities that does not deny this complexity by deploying universalising abstractions, but still find some means of articulating it. In line with his argument, this requires 'a way of pointing to and articulating a sense of the world as unformed by generative flux of forces and relations that work together to produce particular realities' (2004: 7).

In relation to Haraway's perspective and the task of developing a non-anthropocentric ethics, this amounts to finding a way of articulating what sorts of possibilities are open to human-animal relations, before these relations are forced to conform to particular political or sociological realities that tend to legitimise the subjugation of animals. The way the movements at stake in the thesis achieve this, is through articulating existing networks of relations in order to understand how they are structured, often foregrounding the humanist values that are formed by these relations and proceed to shape them so long as the network is enacted in this manner. This process of denaturalising these relations thus opens space to ask what the options are and whether lived reality could be performed in a different way. In Haraway's terms, the question is whether these relations can be reconfigured without a guiding ethical framework grounded in the 'transcendent excellence of the Human over the Animal, which can then be killed without the charge of murder being brought' (2008: 77). Indeed, it is this task of developing such an ethical approach that the animal rights activists who will subsequently be discussed are grappling with in their political articulations.

Law and Mol's analogy regarding the difference between processes of mapping cities and walking through them, is informative in understanding how a politics of articulation could fill this ethical role. They suggest that: 'Maps draw surfaces that contain details (a set of sites or attributes of what is contained within these sites) that are related in an accountable manner [...] walking, as Michel de Certeau has noted, is a mode of covering space that gives no overview' (Law and Mol, 2002: 16). This distinction between processes of mapping, of providing an overview, and walking – or
providing a situated perspective of a particular context – relates to both the methodological approach of the thesis and the work of the activist groups at stake. For instance, the activists are continuously engaging in attempts to articulate specific networks of relations, from an explicit political position within the network, whilst the thesis itself works to engage in a similar situated form of articulation, in attempting to foreground the work of the activist movements and enact an account of animal rights that depicts a reality in stark contrast with the stereotypes of the movement that appear in the media and even persist in Haraway's work. In contrast with these stereotypes, the work of the animal rights groups articulated in the thesis will highlight contexts in which these movements depart from humanist values and demand a re-working of both the epistemological and ontological privilege afforded to the human.

It is important to note, however, that this analogy of 'walking' is not in opposition to, but in relation with the concept of mapping: as even whilst Law and Mol make this mapping/walking distinction, the process of walking can still entail some form of mapping, but this mapping is a more situated and open-ended process than constructing such an overview from a bird's eye perspective:

as we walk, we may encounter a variety of comforting – or stunning – sights and situations, and then we can bring these together instead, or leave them separate, as they would be on a map, removed from one another. We may juxtapose them in the way we sometimes do after a journey, by telling stories or showing pictures [...] There are, then, modes of relating that allow the simple to coexist with the complex, of aligning elements without necessarily turning them into a complex system or a complete overview. (2004: 16)

In other words, this process of walking and experiencing a site from a particular perspective, necessitates some form of recording, re-telling or writing about this process, which articulates a
particular story, without negating the possibility of other stories co-existing – and even partially overlapping – with the situated perspective being enacted. Finding such a mode of telling a story about a complex network of relations without either becoming lost in complexity, or reducing it to a single uncontested version of events, is the challenge at stake; and one that Haraway attempts to take up in her work, which is what makes her theoretical perspective so valuable to the thesis.

Overall, therefore, this specific interpretation of a politics of articulation – as a situated process of mapping out an actor-network – plays a central role in the thesis due to the necessity of replacing a representational politics, grounded in the capacity of the neutral observer to represent others, with the concept of articulation, which can open the possibility to:

>'Articulate' with humans and unhumans in a social relationship, which for us is always language-mediated [...] But, for our unlike partners, well, the action is different, perhaps negative from our linguistic point of view, but crucial to the generativity of the collective. It is the empty space, the undecidability, the williness of other actors, the negativity, that give me confidence in the reality and therefore ultimate unrepresentability of social nature that make me suspect doctrines of representation and objectivity. (1992: 313)

This recognition of non-linguistic modes of articulation and the potential for non-human actors to articulate, is what sets Haraway's concept apart from earlier accounts of articulation, such as Laclau and Mouffe's discussion of it as a 'discursive practice'; a perspective that denies any possibility for entities to 'constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence' (1985: 108-9). Laclau and Mouffe posit only two positions from which to approach the question of articulation: either understanding entities 'to have a fully constituted identity which is not subverted by any exterior' or, the position that they themselves adhere to: an understanding of articulation as
'the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning' (1985: 111-3). What this second account of articulation means, is that every social 'element' for Laclau and Mouffe is discursive. Therefore, hegemonic articulations of cultural reality (be they capitalist or socialist world-views) operate through partially or temporarily creating meaning between these elements, or nodal points.

Articulation in this sense is simply the process of discursively establishing a hegemonic, or socially normative, conception of cultural/political reality. This position does bear a slight relation to Haraway, as the 'elements' upon which meaning is affixed might be non-human and are only ever floating signifiers, or underdetermined in their identity, in the sense that their meaning is shaped through articulation and does not exist in an a priori sense. Hence, in a break from Marxist teleology, certain elements can be articulated as a political configuration but their roles and identities are never fully determined within it.

However, Haraway's use of networks of relations suggests the two positions offered (of either understanding entities as having a fixed identity or accepting Laclau and Mouffe's argument) are a false dichotomy. In explicitly rejecting the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and phenomenological, Haraway clearly does not fall into the first position, which maintains entities have a preconstituted identity, arguing: 'Kant's critique, which set off at extreme poles Things-in-Themselves from the Transcendental Ego, is what made us believe to be “modern”, with escalating and dire consequences for the repertoire of explanatory possibilities' (1992: 329). On the other hand, despite this, her understanding of articulation is not wholly discursive (unlike Laclau and Mouffe), as she foregrounds that whilst our mode of articulation is 'language-mediated' other non-human actors can articulate in other ways. In other words, in their material capacity to mediate other entities within their actor-networks, non-human entities are articulating actors: which is why Haraway insists on using the term 'material-semiotic' in her work to encompass both discursive and non-discursive aspects of networks. Hence the non-human is not precluded from the political just
because it cannot engage in discursive forms of articulation, as articulation is possible in other –
often unexpected – ways. Indeed, this acknowledgement of non-discursive modes of articulation is
vital in terms of recognising the co-shaping processes of mediation that need to be mapped out in
order to overcome the metaphysical distinctions – of subject/object, nature/culture – which
Haraway perceives as a barrier to developing a more egalitarian politics. Crucially, this argument
means that within Haraway's work the realisation of an egalitarian politics is explicitly linked to a
move away from anthropocentrism, due to the necessity of acknowledging the capacity of non-
human entities to articulate and assume the role of actor.

A politics of articulation in Haraway's sense, therefore, consists of mapping out networks of
interaction between actors – both human and non-human – from a situated position within the
network at stake. Although practising a politics of articulation might necessitate language, it must
not be a language that seeks to represent the demands of other actors (as with a politics of
semiotics), but must instead foreground their active role within the network, at least from the
situated perspective of the one articulating. It is thus a process of engaging in an actor-network with
these other actors, in order to – as Haraway puts it – articulate with them. This is because whilst the
one articulating might only have a partial perspective, the network articulated will reveal material
processes that cannot be contained within the mode of articulation employed: certain actors might
challenge or subvert the articulator's perspective. This is in marked contrast to Laclau and Mouffe's
account of articulation as a process of temporarily fixing the meaning of actors, in order to facilitate
a hegemonic articulation of political reality. Instead Haraway argues that those seeking to become
objective must face the challenge of constantly revising their own articulation of networks in the
face of actors that challenge these articulations, in line with her earlier argument that: 'Objectivity is
not about disengagement but about mutual and usually unequal structuring, about taking risks in a
world where “we” are permanently mortal, that is, not in “final” control' (1988: 596).
These attributes of Haraway's politics of articulation begin to indicate the rationale behind the subsequent comparisons that she, herself, makes between her theoretical perspective and the work of alter-globalisation movements. For instance, she suggests that a central task of a politics of articulation is to overcome the reduction of subaltern actors into passive objects that can legitimately be appropriated for human benefit, arguing that:

Actors are entities that do things, have effects, build worlds in concatenation with other unlike actors. Some actors, for example specific human ones, can try to reduce other actors to resources – to mere ground and matrix for their action; but such a move is contestable, not the necessary relation of 'human nature', to the rest of the world. Other actors, human and nonhuman, regularly resist reductions. The powers of domination do fail sometimes in their projects to pin other actors down; people can work to enhance the relevant failure rates. (1992: 311)

For Haraway, therefore, a politics of articulation is a means of preventing certain actors objectifying others, or treating them as resources. Indeed, she perceives that this form of politics provides a route for activists to 'increase the failure rates' of actors seeking to pin down or dominate others. It is this approach that Haraway seems to identify in alter-globalisation groups, which is the reason why, in later work, she cites their practice as a model for her own attempts to articulate alternative human-animal relations, in which the animal is not automatically rendered subaltern, as a means of departing from anthropocentrism and developing a more egalitarian approach to politics. In order to develop a foundation for understanding what form these human-animal relations could take, and ultimately whether they are realised either in Haraway's theory or in the practice of animal rights groups, it will now be necessary to understand the relation between Haraway and the alter-globalisation movement in more depth: using a politics of articulation as a 'sighting device' to trace ways in which her theory relates to political practice.
In parallel to Haraway’s approach in ‘The Promises of Monsters’, a route into this process of situated mapping will be developed via relating the concept of a politics of articulation to a series of case studies, due to cases – again in line with Law and Mol – being valuable for this purpose:

Because they are not, so to speak, representative of something larger (a 'theory'), cases are able to do all kinds of other work. For instance, they may sensitise the reader to events and situations elsewhere that have not been recognised so far and that may well be improbable [...] They may suggest ways of thinking about and tackling other specificities, not because they are 'generally applicable', but because they may be transferable, translatable. (2002: 15)

In line with this perspective, the thesis is structured around a series of case studies that aim to prevent it from rushing to hasty conclusions regarding developing a fixed template for how a non-anthropocentric ethics could be realised in practice. For the same reasons, as Braidotti touches on, Haraway's work – particularly from the 'Cyborg Manifesto' (1991) onwards – has always embraced the use of specific case-studies, or figurations, drawing upon particular figures to relate theory to practice, as: 'Figures are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another' (Haraway, 2008: 4). In line with the insights of Law and Haraway, therefore, the approach taken by the thesis is that only context-specific cases can form the building blocks for understanding how to realise a form of nonanthropocentric ethics. In Law's terms, these cases might be 'transferable' and 'translatable', providing insight into human-animal relations emerging in other contexts, but they should never been seen as the sole mode of politics available for activist movements. The thesis will thus use a series of case studies as a route into the process of situated mapping that constitutes a politics of articulation, using these case studies as a means of tracing the networks that specific activist groups
are, in turn, articulating.

As touched on earlier, before discussing cases drawn from the UK animal rights movement, the anti-McDonald’s Campaign will be focused on, not only due to displaying a similar form of ethics to that advocated by Haraway, but because of its relation to animal rights movements. For instance, in a very direct sense, animal rights groups – and Veggies Catering Campaign in particular – played an integral role in the McLibel Support Campaign: distributing the original anti-McDonald’s pamphlets in the 1980s (which they continue to do today), as well as providing moral support for the McLibel Two. Indeed the vegan food-giveaways, which are a central case study in the final chapter, grew out of the McLibel campaign. For this reason, relating the campaign to a politics of articulation is a useful means of establishing an initial conversation between Haraway’s work and the political approach taken by animal rights movements.

**McLibel: Articulating the McDonald’s Actor-Network**

The story of the McLibel Support Campaign can be understood as a microcosm for the political strategies identified by Haraway, in the sense that the court case itself (and the electronic archive of the case available on the *McSpotlight* website) engaged in a politics of articulation through mapping out a specific actor-network, that fostered by McDonald’s, in order to intervene in it. As will emerge upon discussing both the trial itself and *McSpotlight*, this process was not without its problems – notably the difficulty of creating space for other actors implicated in the McDonald’s actor-network to speak for themselves, as opposed to being spoken for. However, the case is particularly useful in illustrating the practical tactics necessary for engaging in a politics of articulation; namely, foregrounding the role of large-scale activist networks, aided by the strategic use of information and communications technologies, with these literal (ICT-enhanced) networks being valuable in mapping out and engaging with the actor-network at stake.
Ultimately, therefore, three strands of the anti-McDonald’s campaign will be focused on in the process of discussing the case-study: the role of a politics of articulation in the campaign, along with its value to the activists; the problems the activists faced in developing this form of politics (factors inhibiting its realisation); and the role of literal activist networks, aided by ICTs, in developing and documenting the activists’ politics of articulation. A discussion of all of these elements is essential in understanding the ethical value of a politics of articulation to contemporary activist movements and how it can be realised in practical terms — all of them being key factors in the work of animal rights movements, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters — making the anti-McDonald’s campaign a useful starting point for introducing the themes that will be analysed in more depth later on in the thesis.

Although pre-existing the trial on a smaller-scale, the campaign was expanded and developed primarily as a means of supporting Helen Steel and David Morris, the so-called 'McLibel Two', in their legal battle against McDonald’s, which centred around the content of a six page fact sheet containing criticisms of the corporation (which was subsequently pared down into an A5 leaflet entitled What's Wrong With McDonald's? which continues to be distributed today). Due to its inflammatory (and allegedly defamatory) language, including terms such as 'McMurder', 'McCancer' and 'McCruelty', the original pamphlet became the locus of an international campaign against the corporation, when the activists were sued for their role in its publication and distribution between 1986-1990.

The company's decision to serve a libel writ against Steel and Morris transformed the series of local demonstrations into an international campaign, elevating the protest to the global stage befitting the issues it was addressing. These issues ranged from environmental damage arising from livestock ranching on ex-rainforest land, the corresponding removal of indigenous populations from this land,
workers' rights, the use of unrecyclable (and unrecycled) materials in fast-food packaging, litter, animal welfare and the health implications of a poor diet. However, in order to sustain a campaign on this scale the activists had to seek other means of enabling a local campaign about global issues to be adequately articulated in the global context appropriate to the issues at stake. It was against this backdrop that the international anti-McDonald’s and McLibel Support Campaign emerged, which facilitated the development of a network of activist groups each of whom 'adopted' their local McDonald’s to picket. In addition, the campaign made a pioneering use of the internet, establishing the anti-McDonald’s McSpotlight website on 16th February 1996, several months before the corporation launched their own website, with the site used as a means of compiling and disseminating information about McDonald’s and enabling activists to mobilise behind the anti-McDonald’s campaign on an international scale.

Annemarie Mol's 'ontological politics' (1999: 74), is a useful starting point for analysing the interventional potential of the activists’ politics of articulation; a concept she uses to undermine the status of social reality as being ontologically stable:

If the term 'ontology' is combined with that of 'politics' then this suggests that the conditions of possibility are not given. That reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped by these practices. (1999: 75)

This idea of reality being shaped through social interaction, draws upon an understanding of ANT in relation to a specific use of performativity. The concept is underpinned by the basic principle of ANT; that social reality is the product of interaction between various actors (including non-human actors). For example, if this concept is applied to the McDonald’s corporation, the McDonald’s actor-network would be understood as the network of entities that are drawn together through their relation to McDonald’s, and whose interaction produces (and reproduces) McDonald’s in its
existing form. These actors would therefore include everything from shop-floor workers, management and kitchen technology, to animals farmed for McNuggets and Big Macs, ex-forest land maintained as cattle ranches, factory workers producing happy meal toys and – crucially – customers who frequent the restaurant. The relations between these actors is foregrounded by the *What's Wrong With McDonald's?* pamphlet itself, which (in its A5 format) focuses on five main areas of criticism, with sections entitled 'promoting unhealthy food', 'exploiting workers', 'robbing the poor', 'damaging the environment' and 'cruelty to animals'. Links between these areas are continuously foregrounded within the pamphlet, for instance, the 'robbing the poor' section reads:

The demands made by multinationals for cheap food supplies result in the exploitation of agricultural workers throughout the world. Vast areas of land in poor countries are used for cash crops or cattle ranching, or to grow grain to feed animals to be eaten in the West. This is at the expense of local food needs. McDonald’s continually promote meat products, encouraging people to eat meat more often, which wastes more and more food resources. 7 million tons of grain fed to livestock produces only 1 million tons of meat and by-products. (Veggies, N.D.a.)

Hence in this short paragraph alone, business practices are linked to issues of workers' rights, food scarcity, poverty and environmental issues. In this sense, the group are attempting to articulate this network of relations in order to foreground their social and material consequences. The question is, therefore, what is the political purpose of mapping out these relations, which is where Mol’s ontological politics proves particularly informative.

This understanding of apparently objective entities (such as a restaurant chain) having their status, or practical realisation, contingent upon the interactions between various actors, is informed by an understanding of performativity evolving from Judith Butler's (1991) account of how entities that
are perceived as having a stable ontological status only have this status because it is repeatedly performed as such. This relates to Latour's account of how an actor can become dominant within a network through becoming well-connected within it and sustaining its connections with other actors over time. Understanding power as mediating power, an actor's dominance is only maintained if it perpetuates the pre-existing relations it holds with other actors within its network, which have secured its dominance; if these relations are continually enacted. The concept of a network as performative therefore reinforces Latour's concept of power as something that does not simply 'come into being' from nowhere, but is derived from an actor's mediating capacity and must be 'stabilized' (or repeatedly enacted) in order for an actor to maintain its dominance (Latour, 1991: 128).

Thus in the case of McDonald's the reality of the corporation as a 'family restaurant' is a specific performance that is enacted by all of the actors embroiled in the McDonald's actor-network; a performance that has to be continuously perpetuated in order for the restaurant to exist as such. The significance of this use of performativity is that, as Mol claims, 'the conditions of possibility are not given' (1999: 75), in the sense that a performance could potentially be enacted in a different manner and the role of the activists' politics of articulation is in opening space for illustrating that the existing performance is not natural or inevitable. The difficulty facing the activists is that, similar to Butler's account of gender as performative, for Mol an individual cannot simply opt-out of a particular performance, as it is determined by a broader social and cultural network of relations. In other words, the means to alter social reality cannot be attained through individual attempts to resist or reject participating in a specific social performance, the broader cultural discourse that enables and legitimises this performance needs to be transformed.

If this difficulty is understood in ANT terms in relation to McDonald's, the task of the activists is therefore not to simply boycott McDonald's, as this will not alter (what they perceive to be) the
network of socially problematic relations that support the corporation, but to transform the actor-network that determines how cultural practice is realised. Indeed, theorists such as Castells have cited these attempts to transform social structures as characteristic of contemporary activist movements, describing these movements as ‘project identities’ or: 'a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seeks the transformation of overall social structure' (1997: 8). In line with this argument, in the case of McDonald’s, the useful course of action for activist groups was not just to reject participating in the McDonald’s actor-network themselves, but to attempt to transform it by challenging the relations that sustained it in its existing form.

In contrast, McDonald’s can be understood as (again in Castells words) a 'legitimising identity' that adhered to and perpetuated the version of 'reality' articulated by existing social practice, or an identity ‘introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination (1997: 8); a definition that relates to the issues raised by ontological politics in the sense that through repeatedly enacting certain normative relations this type of actor perpetuates their social dominance. Therefore, even though dominance and power are never guaranteed – as they have to be enacted – it is easier for a legitimising identity to perpetuate social norms than for a project identity to intervene in them. In other words, in order to sustain the ontological status of McDonald’s as a restaurant, the corporation simply had to perpetuate norms already being enacted; in this case, norms justified through an appeal to possessive individualism. For instance, appeals to consumer freedom (without interrogating the consequences of this freedom) is explicit in the advertising section of the trial, with a witness for the plaintiffs, Kenneth Miles – Director General and Chief Executive of The Incorporated Society of British Advertisers – defending McDonald’s’ practice of targeting advertising at children:

In the United Kingdom, as in most countries, advertising is seen as a legitimate part of commercial activity and is valued by customers. It
reinforces the role of competition in ensuring high quality goods and services for the public, who understand that most advertising is designed to keep them informed about one competitive brand or service in competition with another [...] I see the advertisements for McDonald's Restaurants as playing a construction [sic] part in showing both parents and children an additional and competitive choice in meal time opportunities. (McInformation Network, N.D.: Issues, Advertising, K. Miles Witness Statement)

In other words, arguments as to whether directly targeting children through advertising is ethical are by-passed, by arguing that advertising plays an integral role in securing the consumer’s freedom of choice. Moreover, Miles reiterates that advertising is ‘a legitimate part of commercial activity’ – arguing that an existing practice is a cultural norm, and thus socially acceptable, rather than questioning whether this practice is ethical. In contrast, the activists had to intervene in the performance of norms, effectively modifying the social, in order to enact their own definition of the fast food chain as unethical. Indeed, in clarifying their position as part of their defence in the advertising section of the trial, the activists even stated: ‘The effect of such advertising is that some children then think it is the 'norm' to go to McDonald’s and that they are not 'normal' if they do not go there’ (McInformation Network, N.D.: Issues, Advertising, Defence on Advertising). In this sense, whilst McDonald’s were seeking to appeal to pre-existing cultural norms, in order to establish frequenting the chain as ‘normative’ behaviour, the activists were foregrounding the social relations implicated in these norms, in order to illustrate the consequences this process has on the actors involved: in this case children (with a focus on the impact of McDonald’s food in children’s health) and parents (with a focus on pressures created for parents due to using children to manipulate consumer behaviour).
In line with Latour's account of power, engaging in a politics of articulation could be a means for anti-capitalist movements to compensate for some of these difficulties and become more powerful project identities, or a more powerful mediating force within the actor-network they seek to transform. This is because, for Latour, power is never understood as stable or indisputable, but is developed through an actor (or collective actor) increasing the number of and quality of connections it has within its network – increasing its capacity to mediate other actors. Because power is understood in terms of an actor's mediating capacity, when a well-connected actor is capable of maintaining stable relations with other actors over a substantial period of time, in such a way that the overall network is enacted in a manner advantageous for the actor, then the actor can be understood as dominant. Thus, in ANT terms 'power and domination are the words given to those stabilizations and not an account of their coming into being' (1991: 128). Relating this to Castells' discussion of project actors, destabilising dominant relations entails marginalised actors with shared aims developing links with one another, in order to increase their own collective mediating power and form new relations within the network. A politics of articulation can be understood as a means of developing the links that allow disparate movements to become collective actors with greater power to articulate, and potentially transform, the relations within the actor-networks at stake.

These issues of asymmetry between the tasks faced by project and legitimising actors, and the potential to overcome this disparity, is reflected throughout the McLibel trial. For instance, an appeal to cultural norms is implicit in McDonald's' justifications after Steel questioned them about their multi-million advertising budget, in contrast with the low wages paid to McDonald’s’ workers:

Helen Steel: Why can't crew members be paid higher wages out of the $1 billion global profits McDonald's made last year?

Paul Preston (president of McDonald's UK): People are paid a wage for the job they do.

Steel: Why doesn't the company use its $1 billion advertising budget to pay higher
For the activists this exemplified the drive for profit being used as the rationale behind a low paid workforce: with economics held up as a justification for the divorce of free-market laws from ethical considerations. However, McDonald’s responded through appealing to apparent ‘common sense’ arguments about wage labour: the fact that Preston does not even elaborate on his statements foregrounds the way in which he treats the rationale behind his claims as self-evident, beyond dispute. Steel and Morris attempted to foreground and de-naturalise McDonald’s use of economics to by-pass ethical issues throughout the trial, ranging from making broader claims regarding the low-paid workforce and anti-union policies of McDonald’s, to focusing on issues on a micro-scale such as how practices in particular restaurants were formed in relation to overarching policies. For instance, they drew upon witnesses such as ex-store manager Simon Gibney who claimed that in his Colchester store on at least two occasions: 'Sewerage came flooding up from the floor vents in the kitchen. On one occasion the employees were forced to stand on bun trays to keep above the rising sewage' (Penman, 1995). Again it was suggested that this demonstrated profits taking precedent over ethical issues such as hygiene and worker safety, as:

The flooding, said Mr Gibney, resulted from the management’s refusal to replace special equipment which allowed them to clean and re-use the fat. As a result, they were forced to pour large quantities of fat down the drains, which solidified and blocked them. (Penman, 1995)

In a similar manner to the way that discourses of rights grounded in possessive individualism have been criticised by the political movements for ‘short-circuiting’ discussion of how these rights affect others, in the context of the McDonald’s actor-network accounts of individual consumer choice and
the need for profit are presented as a rational argument that short-circuited any need to account for the impact of this form of choice or this drive for profit upon other actors. As Mol points out, certain perspectives ‘shift the site of the decision elsewhere [...] they displace the decisive moment to places where, seen from here, it seems no decision but a fact’ (1999: 79). In this way, throughout the trial the practices criticised by Steel and Morris were not portrayed as a product of decisions, but an inevitable consequence of McDonald’s obeying a certain set of social norms; the norms of the free market and the necessity of profit above all else. For instance, the McDonald’s legal team frequently referred to their adherence to ‘industry standards’, stemming from capitalist social relations, as a means of by-passing ethical reflection on their practices without acknowledging their role in setting these standards, whereas the activists were explicitly critical of capitalism itself. *McSpotlight* makes this stance explicit by stating:

> We're not arguing that the environmental and social crisis is entirely the fault of one high-profile burger chain, or even just the whole food industry. McDonald's are of course simply a particularly arrogant, shiny and self-important example of a system which values profits at the expense of anything else. (McInformation Network, N.D.: Issues, Capitalism)

However, what is significant about the trial is that McDonald’s’ tactics of appealing to these unspoken social norms and pre-existing ‘industry standards’ was not always successful, with the activists often succeeding in exposing these norms to ethical scrutiny: particularly in the animal welfare portion of the hearing. Indeed, suddenly things that were unacknowledged, but socially acceptable, cultural practices – such as the treatment of farmed animals – became open to debate and discussion and even the acknowledgement that existing laws were inadequate in terms of making ethical judgements and claims as to the well-being of animals.
As Wolfson (1999) points out, during the trial the inadequacies of existing animal protection laws were foregrounded. For instance, the ‘classic position of agribusiness’ was treated as the benchmark of acceptable behaviour for McDonald’s, a position that was also – in legislative terms – the 'Customary Approach' in gauging whether a practice was lawful, even though 'any practice in accordance with common modern farming or slaughter practices is acceptable to the law, even if it is cruel' (Wolfson, 1999: 19). In other words, common slaughter practices were treated as socially acceptable through virtue of being widely used, as opposed to because of any ethical or welfare consideration. However, during the trial, Chief Justice Bell:

unequivocally rejected the Customary Approach stating he could not accept it for use in the case. He correctly noted that 'to do so would be to hand the decision as to what is cruel to the food industry completely, moved as it must be by economic as well as animal welfare considerations'. (Wolfson, 1999: 19)

This meant that, in the criteria used to judge the libel case at least, the McLibel Two had succeeded in making a distinction between an ethics that responded to the well-being of the animals and the perfunctory framework set out by the livestock industry and the legal system, which structured in line with economic imperatives. In other words, they had distinguished between what was legally acceptable (or a standard part of intensive farming practices) and what was ethically acceptable: opening pre-existing, but hidden, social relations to critique and even transformation. As Chief Justice Bell ruled, these existing legal structures were inadequate in judging the ethical claims made by the defendants' pamphlet. Indeed the very focus of the animal welfare section of the trial was to judge whether existing social norms, that were at present socially acceptable due to being common, could be sanctioned ethically and, as evident in the trial's verdict, some of them could not: with almost the entire animal cruelty portion of the trial being won by the defendants (Vidal, 1997: 311).
In line with Haraway’s characterisation of a politics of articulation, therefore, the question is whether this strategy actually enabled other (non-human) entities to emerge as actors or was simply speaking for them. This issue is complex as, on the one hand, the activists could be seen as engaging in this form of politics through working to articulate the networks of relations causing their plight – and arguing that they could be reconfigured – rather than literally attempting to speak for the animals at stake. For instance, they were continuously attempting to map out the network of relations that lay behind an object such as a ‘Big Mac’, foregrounding the way in which human rights issues were intimately connected with animal welfare – from the impact of slaughterhouse conditions upon human health, to the link between cattle ranching and the forcible removal of indigenous populations from rainforest land. In this sense, Haraway’s aforementioned analysis of Hecht and Cockburn’s account of the Kayapo could equally apply to McLibel: ‘The fundamental point is that the Amazonian Biosphere is an irreducibly human/non-human collective entity. There will be no nature without justice. Nature and justice, contested discursive objects embodied in the material world, will become extinct or survive together’ (Haraway, 1992: 311).

In this sense, through tracing the network of relations lying behind something as seemingly innocuous as a Big Mac, neither the animals nor the people involved in producing them could be unproblematically objectified; the processes involved in producing the meat could no longer be legitimised through an appeal to unspoken social norms. As evident in both the employment and animal welfare sections of the trial being won almost entirely by the defendants, industry standards could no longer function as a benchmark that provided ethical sanction to the network of relations brought together by the corporation. Furthermore, the process of rendering certain groups as legitimately exploitable was disrupted, meaning that the work of the activists mirrored Haraway’s aforementioned argument that even though ‘Some actors, for example specific human ones, can try to reduce other actors to resources – to mere ground and matrix for their action [...] such a move is contestable, not the necessary relation of “human nature”, to the rest of the world’. Moreover:
‘Other actors, human and nonhuman, regularly resist reductions. The powers of domination do fail sometimes in their projects to pin other actors down’ and for Haraway the work of activists is to aid these actors in resisting reduction by more powerful entities, as ‘people can work to enhance the relevant failure rates’ of these dominant actors (1992: 311).

However, despite the best attempts on the part of the activists, whilst some of the actors whom the original pamphlet referred to were enabled to literally speak for themselves by giving evidence at the trial, there were still certain limitations in the activists’ attempts to do this: particularly financial constraints due to their lack of legal aid. This caused a huge amount of asymmetry between which actors could – literally – be enabled so speak and which could not. Therefore, the courtroom itself reflected the economic disparity the activists were attempting to critique: it was no surprise that the strongest portion of the trial (in terms of the amount of evidence provided and as reflected by the verdict) was the workers’ rights section, which could draw on evidence directly provided by UK McDonald's employees who could afford to travel to the hearing. Indeed, in his final verdict Chief Justice Bell noted that:

The evidence relating to the Plaintiffs’ employment practices took nearly one hundred court days spread over nearly eleven months [...] The result of all this is that the message of this part of the leaflet to the effect that the Second Plaintiff pays its workers low wages, helping to depress wages for workers in the catering trade in Britain has been proved to be true. It is justified. (McInformation Campaign, N.D.: McLibel, Verdict)

This was because a huge amount of evidence could be supplied directly from workers themselves, with key case-studies provided from stores within the UK. In contrast, the section of the trial that
was found by Chief Justice Bell to lack sufficient evidence on the part of the defendants was the link between McDonald’s’ cattle ranches and deforestation in the rainforest, due to a lack of resources to transport witnesses from the areas in question to give evidence: with only fifteen witnesses providing evidence for the defendants, as opposed to forty in the employment section (McInformation Network: Issues, Employment and Environment). The structures of the court, therefore, worked to perpetuate existing cultural relations and made it difficult to enable the activists to even articulate these relations they wanted to critique, let alone transform them. This asymmetry between western/non-western actors is even before addressing the human/non-human dichotomy and asking whether it was possible to create space to acknowledge non-humans’ capacity to be articulating actors in a court context.

These issues are perhaps too complicated to be overcome entirely, but to some extent it is in this role that the value of McSpotlight emerged as particularly valuable, both as a means of making the complex politics of articulation developed in the trial more accessible and in its ability to emphasise the role of actors that were not able to speak in the trial itself. The site both provided transcripts of the trial to allow the public to gain access to the activists’ arguments in their entirety and also made supplementary evidence accessible that went beyond the scope of the original 'fact sheet' and indeed the trial itself.

In one sense, therefore, the site enabled the activists to partake in a politics of articulation by documenting, and therefore concretising and making publicly accessible, their account of the McDonald’s actor-network that was mapped out during the trial, in an attempt to expose the corporation to further public criticism, whilst also allowing others to contribute to this process of articulation. Eventually, a summary of the trial, its outcome and any articles relating to the trial from the mass media were also archived on the site and after the end of the court case the section of McSpotlight dedicated specifically to McLibel itself, broke down the proceedings into six sections;
McDonald’s case, the defendants' case, witnesses, defendants' analysis of the evidence, closing speeches and legal documents. This enabled the user to gain comprehensive and systematic access to the proceedings and swiftly access whichever aspect of the trial they were concerned with. Official court transcripts of the entire proceeding were also made available to download, as McSpotlight terms it: 'all 313 days worth. That's 30,000 pages, or 130 megabytes. You can view them by date, by witness or by subject' (McInformation Network, N.D.: Court Transcripts). The role of the website in relation to the trial, in this sense, was that while the trial itself played a vital role in revealing the underlying structure of the McDonald’s actor-network, McSpotlight was essential in archiving the picture painted of this network and making it publicly, and internationally, available.

In addition to this focus on the trial, the site compiled further evidence regarding the issues at stake, expanding the critique from the evidence that the London-based activists could garner, to criticisms that were made in local contexts around the globe that went beyond the confines of the trial. For instance, each issue focused on in the trial had a separate web-page, which listed the arguments made by both sides during the trial with a complete list of the witnesses. In addition to information directly used during the trial, there were also hyperlinks to a series of articles that appeared in the press pertaining to the issue, as well as links to other books and reports that related to the key arguments, and interviews with experts regarding the issue. The nutrition section, for example, provided an additional nineteen articles from the media regarding McDonald’s’ food, seven books and reports that related to the nutritional issues at stake and interviews with experts from institutions including the World Cancer Research Fund and the Food Commission. Moreover, while the site focused on McDonald’s it also compiled information on other corporations, expanding their critique to multinational capitalism more generally. In addition to these archived bodies of information and evidence, users of the site could contribute their own experiences of the corporation in the McSpotlight debating room; web-forums split into categories that covered each area of the trial, as well as two dedicated to discussing issues relating to multinationals more
generally and the political alternatives to capitalism.

Importantly, this enabled actors who could not be flown in to participate in the court case itself to provide evidence and personal testimony to appear on the website, including ex-cattle ranchers and ecologists, as well as web-forums where people could debate and discuss issues for themselves, with sections dedicated to McWorkers and McJobs (for McDonald’s’ employees) and McDonald’s’ practices more generally, as well as a forum encouraging people to debate and discuss alternatives to capitalism. In a sense, therefore, the site enabled other actors to engage with the activists’ politics of articulation, which overcame certain financial or geographical constraints. Another important aspect of this virtual politics of articulation was its capacity to articulate this network as a form of situated knowledge, explicitly framing its analysis of McDonald’s as part of a broader anti-capitalist perspective: ‘There is a much more fundamental problem than Big Macs and French Fries: capitalism’ (McInformation Network, N.D.: Issues, Capitalism).

Yet, despite the value of ICTs in enhancing their pre-existing politics of articulation, the difficulties faced by the activists were not entirely overcome, with certain inequalities reproduced despite the activists’ efforts. For instance, Pickerill’s analysis of McSpotlight illustrates that the activists themselves had concerns as to whether a reliance on ICTs would perpetuate, or even create, forms of inequality: 'Many accepted that the accessibility of CMC [computer mediated communication] was limited and that there were exclusions: “you're excluding the poor, the off-lined, the people in countries that don't have great internet access” (Gideon, McSpotlight)’ (Pickerill, 2003: 49). In this sense, ICTs should be understood as a means of contributing to a politics of articulation, by making it easier for other actors to participate and collaborate in producing it (a theme that will be developed in chapter three). However, it should not be seen as a solution to all of the problems that inhibit activist politics from creating space for less powerful actors to articulate for themselves.
Another danger of affording ICTs too pivotal a role in the work of these activists was that, though it can be a valuable tool for activists to collaborate with one another and develop a politics of articulation – in line with Mol – an important aspect of this form of politics is its capacity to intervene in and transform existing social relations by modifying the behaviour of actors within this network. It is in this interventional role that further difficulties for activist groups lie, due to the difficulties of encouraging public engagement with their work; engagement which was vital due to the public’s pivotal role in sustaining the economic relations that allow the corporation to function.

The aforementioned entities in the McDonald’s actor-network might interact in such a way that they were integral to McDonald’s’ existence as a restaurant chain, however, almost all of these other relations were contingent upon the corporation having sufficient funds to sustain these interactions. In other words, only through generating sufficient revenue could the corporation seek to sustain the farms, factories, management structures, kitchens and shop-floors, which are essential in its processes of producing, advertising and selling fast food. Hence, as John Vidal foregrounds, McDonald’s had a '1,800 million a year' advertising budget at the time of the trial (1997: 17), which was designed to generate the revenue stream vital to perpetuating these other relations. The consumer's role within the McDonald’s actor-network was, in this sense, integral in sustaining its existing form, through providing the capital that perpetuated vital interactions within the McDonald’s network.

*McSpotlight* had the advantage of being a pioneer of activist uses of use of the internet, with the site’s launch itself being a newsworthy event in 1996 – with reviews in the *New Statesman, Guardian, Telegraph, Observer, Daily Express, Independent* and a number of international publications (for a complete listing see McInformation Network, N.D.: Press Cuttings, *McSpotlight*). However, even with this level of publicity there were technological limitations that inhibited access to those who lacked internet reliable internet access, as recognised by activists’
initially offering to ‘reduce the costs for its audience by enabling the site to be downloaded free of charge or viewed as a CD-ROM which enabled "unlimited use, free of the constraints of continued Net access, line rentals and connection charges' (Atton, 2000: 2)’ (Pickerill, 2003: 57), aside from the fact that some people had no access to the internet at all.

Conversely, in the present day context, with the popularity of the internet – and its widespread use by activist movements – there is the opposite problem of gaining an audience outside of the activist community. As analysed by Shirky (2006), due to power-law distributions, the most popular political sites tend to maintain their popularity and have an exponential difference in web-traffic than the majority of blogs, because the visibility of these sites leads to high traffic, which – in turn – leads to large numbers of people linking to these sites, increasing this traffic further. Another difficulty is that activist websites are primarily valuable to pre-existing members of activist groups, or those with an existing interest in the issue at stake, as this awareness is necessary before the site could be accessed. This is a difficulty even with high-profile activist sites such as Indymedia, as Pickerill foregrounds, with a number of activists themselves acknowledging that:

Reaching beyond the activist community could be difficult because 'we have our own language and our own discourse and our own acronyms' (Alex, Melbourne Indymedia) and [that in relation to sites such as] ‘Indymedia, it’s only people that go there and people who are interested in it. You have to find it first … it still has that problem of reach’ (Adam, Melbourne Indymedia). (Pickerill, 2006: 9)

The key difference between virtual and paper campaigns is therefore that the latter is, in contrast, 'interventional'; pamphlets are directly handed to members of the public to inform them of an issue, usually outside of the restaurant in question in an attempt to deter them from entering. Anti-McDonald’s protest days of action, for example, where simultaneous protests take place outside
McDonald’s across the globe, mean that even though the overarching event takes place on a global scale, each activist group pickets their local branch of the chain and so directly engages with the public entering the restaurant.

This does not mean there is necessarily a dichotomy between paper and virtual pamphleteering, where the first compiles information for activists whilst the second engages with the public: indeed, the McLibel campaign is testament to the value of the two forms of pamphleteering interrelating in order to simultaneously expand and consolidate a campaign to tangible political effect. For instance, theorists such as Jonathan Bach and David Stark describe online politics as 'de-territorializing' (2004: 103), in the sense of removing an issue from a specific territorial context governed by laws that are grounded in a politics deriving their authority from the structure of nation states and their corresponding forms of sovereignty: 'the electronic space in which power and action are being reconstituted is literally not located in territorial space, and [...] the institutions that evolved to regulate life within territorial borders are ill-suited to the tasks of regulating trans-border flows' (2004: 103). Initially McSpotlight would seem to epitomise this process, both ideologically, encouraging critique on a global scale against a comprehensive range of issues, and practically in terms being the product of a collaboration between activists from twenty-two different countries, making the site itself akin to a trans-border flow. For example, it has 'mirrors' (duplicate sites) set up from various other countries, meaning that the information has been literally 'de-territorialised', by not existing in a specific location: even in a virtual context it runs from numerous locations (Hardy, 1997). This meant that, while McDonald’s took advantage of British libel law to repress Steel and Morris, even if they used the same law to shut down the UK version of the site, its 'mirrors' would continue to maintain the information and circulate the issues at stake.

However, In contrast to this 'de-territorializing' capacity, McSpotlight also demonstrated how ICTs could be used to re-territorialise an issue to maximise the local effectiveness of a campaign. The
specificity of local experiences articulated in the personal stories submitted to the site's web-forums again functions to establish links between McDonald’s and social reality, this time linking specific personal experiences to the actions of the company. More dramatically, the ' Adopt-a-Store' campaign that was encouraged through McSpotlight provided resources for activist groups – from contextual information to pdf.files of the What's Wrong with McDonald's pamphlet in multiple languages – to conduct their own local campaigns. The advantage of this approach was that this mode of re-territorialisation involved direct personal interaction, with this form of consciousness-raising resolving the problematic point of access between public and activists that persists in virtual activism. In this way, the two modes of pamphleteering could function together: interpersonal, interventional paper pamphleteering being used to generate interest in the more comprehensive online arguments: an interrelation that will be explored in more detail in chapter five, in relation to animal rights movements.

Conclusion

In exploring Haraway’s concept of a politics of articulation, and understanding it specifically as the process of mapping out an actor-network in order to intervene in it – and challenge the cultural norms and material practices it sustains – the value of the concept has emerged for activist movements. Firstly, it is a useful means of developing an understanding of how certain configurations of social relations arise and lead to particular forms of reality being treated as cultural norms. This process of exposing the relations that lie behind cultural norms is useful for activists both because it denaturalises these norms and exposes them as arbitrary (opening potential for them to be enacted in different ways) and because it can help activists themselves understand how to intervene in these networks more effectively.

On another level, the practicalities of engaging in a politics of articulation have emerged; with the
forms of networked activism and use of ICTs making it easier for this form of politics to be developed – and for activists to develop more collaborative approaches to articulating issues (an advantage that will be discussed in more depth in chapter three). Again, this is not to say that new media is the sole enabling factor in developing this form of politics, more that the forms of networked activism that characterise the so-called informational paradigm, lend themselves to a politics of articulation (although these networks can take other forms, as will be discussed in the final two chapters). In other words, the value of literal activist networks, as a means of articulating actor-networks, has emerged.

Finally, the role this form of activism could have in developing an ethics that moves away from anthropocentric appeals to rights based on possessive individualism, or other humanist values, is starting to emerge. Instead, this form of politics aims to focus on co-shaping interactions between human and non-human entities, which understand them both as mediating actors, rather than applying predefined categories (such as ‘subject’ and ‘object’) onto these entities in order to determine whether they are entitled to political rights. However, this latter aspect of a politics of articulation is complex and needs to be developed in more depth – particularly in light of the way that, despite its sensitive engagement with a huge range of issues, even the anti-McDonald’s campaign struggled to find ways of engaging with all of the actors embroiled with the McDonald’s actor-network.

For this reason, the following chapter will focus on the issue of developing a less anthropocentric approach to rights in more detail; drawing upon Haraway’s *When Species Meet*, in which she is concerned more directly with animal rights issues. Although Haraway does not refer to a politics of articulation by name in the later text, its central principles are present in a slightly more nuanced form. Moreover, again in line with Haraway’s characterisation of ‘The Promises of Monsters’ as a sighting device, drawing upon this form of politics is a useful means of understanding where
Haraway’s work itself fails to realise the non-anthropocentric politics that she advocates.

Within this chapter, the anti-McDonald’s campaign has proved useful in elucidating some of Haraway’s arguments and relating her work to a campaign with associations with the UK animal rights movement in this way, holds promise for establishing the more extensive conversation between Haraway and animal rights that will be central to the thesis. The problem is that, throughout *When Species Meet*, she frequently denies the possibility of reconciling her work with animal rights perspectives; though she does not dismiss them entirely she is often heavily critical of their work. Therefore, before relating her arguments to these groups it is important to understand why she is so critical and how these tensions can be overcome, foregrounading that her criticisms often stem from implicit humanist values that she herself holds. Ultimately, therefore, it will be argued that in order to enhance the valuable forms of politics emerging in her work, her perspective needs to be read against that of the animal rights groups she is critical of, as this process can work to expose and overcome the remnants of humanism that inhibit her from developing a more radical ethical perspective within *When Species Meet*. 
Notes

1 London Greenpeace is not related to the international organisation Greenpeace, but was a small local activist group that pre-dated the more well-known movement.

2 Originally six members of London Greenpeace were threatened with legal action, but the other members felt unable to proceed with the trial due to financial pressures. Nottingham-based group Veggies were also threatened with legal action, for their role in distributing the 'What's Wrong With McDonald's' pamphlet, but the action was dropped after they changed certain terms in the leaflet. They continue to distribute the, slightly revised, pamphlet today.

3 Braidotti's reference to hybrid cultural relations as something new is perhaps due to her attempts to disassociate Haraway from Latour, when in fact his perspective is an important theoretical component to Haraway's arguments. Braidotti states 'Contrary to Bruno Latour, Haraway perpetuates a tradition of thought which emphasizes the importance of the subject in terms of both ethical and political accountability' (2006: 1). However, this slightly misrepresents both perspectives, as Latour does not dismiss subjectivity per se, more the particular form of subjectivity (predicated on possessive individualism) that Haraway is also critical of. In other words, he is rejecting a particular metaphysical framework, rather than the notion of subjectivity in its entirety: 'We can even have [...] subjects and objects, so long as they are not located at the beginning of the analysis but at its provisional end' (2004: 180). What he means by this is that pre-established metaphysical categories (such as subject and object) should not be imposed onto specific entities at the outset of the analysis, as this process short-circuits ethical discussion. This is not, therefore, a perspective contrary to Haraway but entirely intersects with her approach, with her even calling the first part of When Species Meet 'We Have Never Been Human', in reference to Latour's arguments (and the title of We Have Never Been Modern).

4 Bloor, part of the Edinburgh School of Science and Technology Studies, promotes the 'Strong Programme' of constructivism, the central argument of which he summarises in Anti-Latour:

> The main feature of the Program is the so-called 'symmetry postulate'. Both true and false, rational and irrational ideas, in as far as they are collectively held, should all equally be the object of sociological curiosity, and should all be explained by reference to the same kind of cause. In all cases the analyst must identify the local, contingent causes of belief. This requirement was formulated in opposition to an earlier prevailing assumption, still defended in many quarters, which has it that true (or rational) beliefs are to be explained in reference to the distorting influence of society. (Bloor, 1999: 84)

Andrew Feenberg elucidates this argument in relation to the development of technology, describing how:

> Constructivism argues [...] that the choice between alternatives ultimately depends neither on technical nor economic efficiency, but on the "fit" between devices and the interests and beliefs of the various social groups that influence the design process. What singles out an artifact is its relationship to its environment, not some intrinsic property. (1999: 79)

5 From this point the terms will be conflated, with the term 'actor' used to refer to both Haraway's actants and ANT's actors, to avoid confusion.

6 Butler argues that an individual cannot simply opt-out of a particular performance, as it is
determined by a broader social and cultural network of relations. For example, even though she understands gender as performative, it is impossible to effectively opt-out entirely from a gender position as gender is: Always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural discourse predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal rationality. Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutes as the imaginable domain of gender (1991:12). While this concept is absolutely vital in developing an understanding of the constraints of actor-networks, like Laclau and Mouffe it is underpinned by a discursive understanding of hegemonic discourse, whereas performativity in Mol's sense is an embodied practice – a position Butler moves more toward in *Bodies that Matter* (1993) – and, crucially, non-human actors have an integral role in these performances. Hence even though constraint plays a part for both theorists, the way they conceptualise how constraint (and indeed resistance to these constraints) is enacted differs.
Chapter 2

Beasts of Burden†

As stated at the outset of the previous chapter, two key questions need to be addressed in order to develop a more productive conversation between the work of Haraway and animal rights groups, respectively: what sort of politics was Haraway advocating for activists, and whether her own work adhered to this politics. The previous chapter explored the value of her concept of a politics of articulation for the former task, but this chapter will focus more explicitly on animal rights issues by addressing the second issue, of whether Haraway’s own work rejects the anthropocentric understandings of animal rights in the manner that she advocates. For this reason, it is necessary to draw upon her most recent text, When Species Meet, due to its more specific exploration of animal rights ethics.

A politics of articulation will still be used to some extent within the chapter; as discussed previously, it is a useful ‘sighting device’ for understanding some of the more complex theoretical arguments Haraway makes in her later work. Moreover, even though it is not referred to directly in When Species Meet, principles integral to this form of politics lie at the core of the text – particularly if this approach is understood as the process of articulating the complex relations within specific actor-networks in order to reconfigure them – with Haraway again making her allegiance to Latour explicit, even entitling the first third of the book ‘We Have Never Been Human’ in reference to Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1993).

Relating a politics of articulation to When Species Meet is also essential in developing an understanding of why Haraway’s stance towards animal rights movements changes from suggesting they could play a valuable role in challenging human/animal dichotomies – as in her claim in the
‘Cyborg Manifesto’ that they provide a ‘clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture’ (1991a: 152) – to her arguments, throughout *When Species Meet*, that they perpetuate these categories by anthropomorphising animals and appealing to humanist conceptions of rights. Key to comprehending her criticisms, and to establishing a more productive dialogue between Haraway and animal rights, is her account of how engaging in a politics of articulation can provide a means of articulating animal rights that departs from anthropocentrism.

As touched on in the previous chapter these two issues are intimately related, as a politics of articulation that departs from humanist logic can only occur if the articulation of relations between human and non-human actors are at the crux of this politics. Such a politics of articulation is therefore intrinsically a move beyond anthropocentrism, due to its focus on the relations that undermine the autonomous status of humanist Man. In this sense, the attempts by activists in the previous chapter to articulate the McDonald's actor-network can be seen as having the articulation of hybrid relations (where categories such as nature/culture, human/non-human can no longer function) at its heart. As reiterated previously, upon articulating these relations the questions of animal rights and human rights became so intimately entwined that it becomes impossible to separate these issues out into separate categories.

*When Species Meet* develops this point in more detail; from the outset it argues that a move away from anthropocentrism is vital in any attempt to forge a more egalitarian ethical approach to human-animal relations, which recognises the rights of animals. For Haraway, this approach must acknowledge the status of animals as actors whose exploitation cannot be sanctioned merely by appealing to pre-existing metaphysical categories that cast them as subaltern:

Modernist versions of humanism and posthumanism alike have taproots in a series of
what Bruno Latour calls the Great Divides between what counts as human and as society, as nonhuman and as human. Whelped in the Great Divide, the principal Others to Man [...] the well documented in ontological breed registries in both past and present Western Cultures: gods, machines, animals, monsters, creepy crawlies, women, servants and slaves and noncitizens in general. (2008: 9-10)

For Haraway, this 'fantasy of human exceptionalism' stemming from the Great Divide perpetuates human/animal distinctions even when Man is attempting to act as defender of Nature (2008: 11), an argument with an identical structure to her criticisms of a politics of semiotics, in which – similarly – human exceptionalism underpins the notion that subaltern actors can only be spoken for. Again she calls for the articulation of hybridity as a means of challenging this exceptionalism and the metaphysical dichotomies it sustains: 'I want my people, those collected by figures of mortal relatedness, to go back to that old political button from the late 1980s “Cyborgs for earthly survival”, joined by my newer bumper sticker from Bark magazine, “Dog is my co-pilot”' (2008: 12).

On a superficial level, therefore, Haraway’s project in When Species Meet seems akin to the aims of animal rights groups, in challenging the human exceptionalism that provides ethical sanction to animal exploitation. However, Haraway implies instead that these movements persist in employing a political semiotics of representation (speaking for animals) or evoking the ‘rights’ of animals, in line with humanist accounts of what these rights constitute: with both of these strategies working to perpetuate the relations legitimising animal exploitation (2008: 67). The chapter will argue that this characterisation of animal rights movements is somewhat misleading, as there are already animal rights groups moving toward the politics she advocates. Conversely, reading Haraway against these groups illustrates places where her own work appeals to humanist values.

It will also be argued that her criticisms of animal rights movements are, ironically, the product of
certain humanist traits (and notions of human exceptionalism) that often emerge both within her criticisms of animal rights perspectives and in the case studies she draws upon: with *When Species Meet* itself occasionally descending into a politics of semiotics. Thus the chapter will focus on the relation between Haraway and animal rights groups in more depth, in order provide a more sustained understanding of why her work is so critical of animal rights and why this problem of humanism persists in her work; developing a critique of *When Species Meet* in order to foreground its shortcomings, whilst still maintaining that the text provides valuable insight into understanding and enhancing the perspective of animal rights groups. This will provide the foundation for the following chapters’ discussion of how these shortcomings could be overcome by turning to activist practice itself and that only by combining these approaches is it possible to depart from anthropocentrism in both practical and theoretical terms.

**Haraway and Animal Rights**

Despite the tensions between Haraway and animal rights perspectives, there is still a strong overlap in the aims of activist texts, animal rights groups and the work of Haraway herself; an overlap that will prove informative in terms of understanding how to develop a more productive relation between Haraway and activist practice. For instance, to reiterate the comparison made at the outset of the thesis, the relation between the central metaphysical argument of *When Species Meet* and animal rights arguments is evident upon contrasting Haraway's text with contemporary activist pamphlet *Beasts of Burden*, which states:

Rights are a limited recognition granted by the powerful to the less powerful, and as such 'animal rights' implies at least a separation between people and animals, and the definitive superiority of people. The end of animal abuse requires the destruction of capitalist, and indeed civilised relationship between humans and the animal world, and
its replacement not with an abstract equality (a capitalistic notion, as in the equality in market exchange of dissimilar goods), but with an appreciation of the difference of the other as an element in social reality. There is a need to move beyond 'animal rights' as such in order to fight inequality. (Anon, Beasts of Burden, 2004: 25)

In other words, the pamphlet is foregrounding the issue raised at the outset of the thesis; that a sense of inequality is bound up with the notion of animal rights due to the implicit human/animal separation entailed in the concept (and its philosophical lineage). Similarly, Haraway foregrounds the problems with animal rights discourse, continually appealing to pre-existing notions of human rights, in order to provide an ethical grounding for itself:

We do not get very far with the categories generally used by animal rights discourses [...] I am needy to specify these matters in nonhumanist terms in which specific difference is at least as crucial as continuities and similarities across kinds. (Haraway, 2008: 67)

The concurrence of Haraway's argument with the earlier claims put forward in Beasts of Burden, demonstrates the recognition – even within radical animal rights discourses – of the limitations of 'rights' as a mode of currency for activist groups. Thus even pamphlets ostensibly concerned with animal 'rights', can display a reflexivity about the conceptual and political limitations of the term. For both Haraway and the anonymous author of Beasts of Burden, this is due to the grounding of these rights in the possessive individualism characteristic of capitalist social relations and humanist political philosophy (as discussed in the introduction). This is reflective of the fact that in both theoretical and activist contexts there are numerous challenges to existing human-animal relations, which seek to pose these challenges without using a simplistic discourse of 'rights'. As Carol Adams acknowledges in an interview for Parallax, although there is a clear – and prominent – tradition of
rights based discourses about animal-human relations, there is also a strong tradition of theorists and activists who move away from rights-oriented positions. As Adams argues, in specific reference to Haraway:

I wish I could understand the categorical disparagement of animal rights that, with a broad sweep, includes even those animal advocates who challenge 'rights language' [...] I do not comprehend why a feminist concerned with relations between species decidedly ignores the many feminist scholars who have been writing and talking about this issue, some for at least twenty years. (2006: 125)

Adams' argument is also substantiated by the content of political pamphlets such as Beasts of Burden. The pamphlet was originally published in 1999, four years before Haraway's Companion Species Manifesto and nine years before When Species Meet, illustrating that well before Haraway articulated her arguments regarding human-animal relations, certain segments of the activist community perceived the need to follow a similar tactic to her subsequent call to 'nurture responsibility by plumbing the category of labour more than the category of rights' (Haraway, 2008: 73). This is reflected by the entirety of Beasts of Burden focusing on interrelations between the oppression of the working class and animal exploitation, treating these issues as inseparable:

the experiences of humans and animals are linked, having a common origin in the same system of production and exchange. But we want to go further and assert that the development and maintenance of capitalism as a system that exploits humans is in some way dependent upon the abuse of animals. Furthermore, the movement that abolishes capitalism by changing the relations between humans – communism⁴ – also involves a fundamental transformation of the relations between humans and animals. (Beasts of Burden, 2004: 2)
Before elaborating upon the implications of these specific arguments, it is important to note that Haraway's own claims typify her complex, sensitive engagement with the often thorny issues surrounding human-animal relations. Her demand for a non-humanist means of discussing animal 'rights' foregrounds how, to reiterate Tony Brown's review of *When Species Meet*, Haraway perceives the 'need to guard against personification. [As] What worse way than to try and make everything "not about 'man'" by personifying all that is "not man"?' (2009: 751). In this way, Haraway is not anti-animal rights or pro-vivisection (or indeed pro- the breeding of purebred dogs or consumption of meat) in the simplistic, reductive sense that Adams has perhaps inferred. Instead the arguments she develops make firm demands for an ethics that does not reduce the animal either to a tool for human use, or as an entity that has 'rights' that can only be understood in relation to the human, or by treating animals as 'humans in fur suits' (Haraway, 2008: 67).

In other words, Haraway seems to be calling for a non-anthropocentric account of rights. To say this is a difficult task is a considerable understatement, for as Matthew Calerco argues: 'implicit anthropocentrism is one of the chief blind spots of contemporary continental philosophy' (2008: 13). More than this, he claims that:

The central issue concerning the critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity concerns more than the consequences of a certain legacy of Cartesian subjectivity in modernity and postmodernity; if this critique is understood in a rigorous manner, it leads us to see more fully the inner connection between metaphysical humanism and metaphysical anthropocentrism. To allow this anthropocentrism to go unchallenged renders thoroughly unradical and conservative much of what today goes by the name of radical politics and theory. It is essential that the signposts toward a nonanthropocentric or critically anthropocentric thought [...] not to be shut down in the name of a hasty
retrieval of anthropocentric subjectivity toward supposedly radical political ends.

(2008: 13)

If Calerco's perspective is brought to bear on Haraway, the truly radical strand of her thought is brought to the fore, with the ethics she calls for being understood as an explicit rejection of the metaphysical anthropocentrism of continental philosophy, which is in Calerco's terms a necessary precursor to radical politics. This link between rejecting anthropocentric values and developing a radical politics is the reason Haraway draws parallels between her work and that of alter-globalisation groups, with the aim of When Species Meet being to challenge the anthropocentric structures emerging in contexts created by human-animal encounters: be it in laboratories or animal rights campaigns.

The problem is that her stance fails to be developed into a rigorous ethical approach that can also function on a practical level, due to two key problems that become increasingly prominent in When Species Meet: an apparent blind spot regarding animal rights groups who share her non-anthropocentric approach and the way that her own examples tend to undermine her theoretical perspective by presenting a resolutely anthropocentric picture of human-animal relations. The difficulty, in terms of Haraway's slightly antagonistic attitude towards animal rights groups, is not that she is entirely in opposition to an animal 'rights' perspective, but that (as suggested by Adams) she tends to portray animal rights perspectives as lacking the capacity to engage in similar forms of politics to the one she herself is practising (although, as will be discussed subsequently in the chapter this disparagement of animal rights is not absolute). This chapter will address these criticisms, whilst developing a critique of Haraway's text in order to create space for a conversation between her theory and the actual work of animal rights groups; a conversation that will be developed further in the next chapters, which draw upon specific animal rights case studies to foreground how activist practice resolves some of the problems raised in When Species Meet. However, before doing this, it
is necessary for this chapter to foreground the mutually beneficial nature of establishing such a dialogue: both in terms of showing how Haraway's arguments relate to political practice, and in providing a clearer understanding of the deeper conceptual significance of the contemporary strategies of animal rights groups and theorists.

Therefore, this approach will not simply criticise Haraway's dismissal of animal rights groups by arguing that they are practising the forms of politics she advocates, but illustrate that her approach in *When Species Meet* contains contradictions that blunt its own critical edge. Namely, the way the text uses certain examples (such as meat consumption, vivisection and pure-bred dog breeding) keeps in place, and sometimes even perpetuates, the humanist political framework that Haraway seeks to critique. This is because, despite her stated intentions, Haraway fails to approach these examples from a non-anthropocentric perspective: instead her text assumes a welfarist position, often insisting on the validity of these practices as long as they are in milder forms than is the present social norm. This chapter will work through these issues by reading Haraway's work against arguments presented from animal rights perspectives, in order to draw out the truly radical potential of Haraway's work and foreground the value of her approach in informing animal rights ethics and activism. Perhaps more importantly, it will pin-point where her work fails in its stated aims; the points at which activist practice itself needs to be turned to in order to understand practical ways of responding to the demands made by Haraway's ethical stance.

In order to develop this critique of *When Species Meet*, the chapter will approach Haraway's arguments in several stages. Firstly it will draw comparisons between Haraway and radical animal rights discourses, to illustrate potential for their interrelation, focusing explicitly on texts that have – like *When Species Meet* – called for a move away from discourses of rights. In order to do this, both her own arguments and the stance articulated by these activist texts will be related to the two key theoretical devices that Haraway uses to structure her ethics in the first half of her text, which
are essentially a more nuanced version of a politics of articulation: Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitical proposal and Haraway's own commandment 'thou shalt not make killable' (both of which will be explained shortly). However, it will then be argued that the examples Haraway uses to illustrate these principles actually contradict and even undermine them, and that more effective illustrations of these ethical tenets can be drawn from the work of animal rights groups themselves. This approach will set the stage for the following chapters, which will explore some specific instances of animal rights groups that reflect the ethical arguments set out in *When Species Meet* more closely than the case studies that Haraway herself supplies.

'value added dogs' and Burdened Beasts

Despite Haraway’s criticisms of animal rights groups within *When Species Meet*, certain activist texts have similar aims to Haraway and this overlap is particularly explicit between the arguments mapped out in *Beasts of Burden* and chapters two and three of *When Species Meet*: 'Value Added Dogs and Lively Capital' and 'Sharing Suffering'. Reading these texts against one another, therefore, will act as the basis for indicating ways in which Haraway and radical animal 'rights' perspectives both correspond with one another and have the potential to compliment each another in greater depth.

Haraway begins 'Value-Added Dogs' by invoking Marx and asking: 'What [...] if human labor power turns out to be only part of the story of lively capital?' (2008: 46). Whilst fundamentally working within a Marxian framework, she uses the rest of the chapter to develop a critique of Marx for focusing on the human at the expense of other actors who participate in this story of capital, arguing that:
Of all philosophers, Marx understood relational sensuousness, and he thought deeply about the metabolism between human beings and the rest of the world enacted in living labor. As I read him, however, he was finally unable to escape from the humanist teleology of that labor – the making of man himself [...] But what if the commodities of interest to those who live within the regime of Lively Capital cannot be understood within the categories of the natural and the social that Marx came so close to re-working but was finally unable to do under the goad of human exceptionalism? (2008: 46)

It is exactly this re-working that is attempted by texts such as *Beasts of Burden*, and other activist literature, which sketches out the role of human-animal interaction in this 'story of lively capital'. In other words, the entirety of the pamphlet attempts to instigate serious discussion as to the role of animals in sustaining capitalist relations, in an uncanny foreshadowing of Haraway's argument – ten years later – that:

If a Marx equivalent were writing *Biocapital*, volume I, today, insofar as dogs in the United States are commodities as well as consumers of commodities, the analyst would have to examine a tripartite structure: use value, exchange value, and encounter value, without the problematic solace of human exceptionalism. (2008: 46)

This development of 'encounter-value' mirrors the worker's production of surplus value: with the worker's alienation from the products of their labour effectively mirroring the animal's removal from what is produced (or constituted by) its own body. Moreover, the naturalisation of these relationships by capitalism is a problem shared by both of these relationships, with these processes of alienation acting as social relations that are beyond question; an unavoidable side-effect of the production of value that feeds back into and reproduces the system's existing structures. It is precisely this encounter-value that, despite its brevity, *Beasts of Burden* foregrounds and (as will be
argued in the following chapters), which activist practice in the past decade have sought to articulate.

For instance, in its account of various stages of capitalism, the pamphlet foregrounds the integral role of human-animal relations in primitive accumulation, arguing that 'not only is capitalism dependent on ruthless primitive accumulation, but primitive accumulation relies upon the animal industry' (2004: 7). Again drawing on Marx, it posits that:

In England, the process of 'forcibly driving the peasantry from the land' and enclosing common land started as early as the 15th century. But what was it that motivated the nobility to undertake this? Marx is clear that it was 'the rise in the price of the wool', which made it profitable to turn 'arable land into sheep walks'. (*Beasts of Burden*, 2004: 7)

Similarly, the Fordist factory system is understood as having its origins in Chicago's meat-packing district as 'the packing houses were the first American industry to create assembly lines, unable to cope with the constant stream of cattle coming in every day the packinghouse giants hit on a way of streamlining the slaughter process – they invented the conveyor belt' (2004: 9). This argument is explored in more extensive detail in Nicole Shukin's *Animal Capital* (2009) and it is notable that a text from the same series *Posthumanities* series as *When Species Meet* shares so many direct themes with an activist pamphlet. Shukin's text even states that its aim is to 'rectify a critical blind spot in Marxist and Post-Marxist theory around the nodal role of animals, ideologically and materially, in the reproduction of capital's hegemony' (2009: 7). Thus another theme shared with Shukin, is the way in which *Beasts of Burden* explores what Shukin describes as both the 'material and symbolic currency' of animal capital and how this enables 'oscillations between economic and symbolic logics of power' (Shukin, 2009: 5). This is explicit in the way *Beasts of Burden* does not solely
discuss the material role of animal capital, but describes the powerful political role of the category of animal itself, arguing that: 'Once it is taken for granted that animals are mere objects provided for the use of humans the introduction of slavery simply involves assigning to certain groups of humans the status of animals' (*Beasts of Burden*, 2004: 6). In other words, both Beasts of Burden and Shukin are attempting to sketch out the complex material-semiotic relations between human and animal that arise in specific cultural practices.

In this sense, both in activist texts preceding *When Species Meet*, and theoretical texts proceeding from it, *Biocapital* volume I is gradually being constructed, with *Beasts of Burden* sharing Haraway's distaste for animal rights discourses that fall back onto anthropomorphising arguments or humanist accounts of rights, as 'Anthropocentric humanism has been detrimental to humans as well as animals' (*Beasts of Burden*, 2004: 26). Ultimately, therefore, even this brief and relatively simple activist pamphlet displays nuanced arguments far more subtle than Haraway's general characterisations of animal rights groups give credit; making explicit links between humanist conceptions of rights and anthropocentrism.

This relevance to Haraway is particularly apparent in the way the pamphlet draws attention to the tension within animal rights movements, arguing that:

> While it addresses only a single issue, animal liberation does pose fundamental questions about the relationship of humans to the world. This can be a starting point for a fundamental questioning of the way we live our lives; on the other hand animal rights ideology can become a limit which prevents a wider critique of society. We need to go beyond this ideology without abandoning what is subversive within what it represents.  

(*Beasts of Burden*, 2004: 23)
This paragraph is thus wholly in line with Haraway, not only acknowledging problems with certain – narrow – realisations of animal rights ideology, but also difficulties associated with the political conception of 'rights' itself (and as Adams makes explicit, this stance is certainly not unique to this pamphlet). Again, this illustrates a shared demand between Haraway and activist perspectives for a radical politics that departs from humanist philosophy, in line with Calerco's arguments about the implications of movements seeking to move away from anthropocentrism. However, where Calerco departs from Haraway is that while he acknowledges that: 'Pro-animal discourse is often presented as an extension and deepening of liberal humanism' he seeks to 'recast this discourse as a direct challenge to liberal humanism and the metaphysical anthropocentrism that underlies it', in doing so 'aligning [himself] and theorists in animal studies who are doing similar work with the new social movements that are seeking to develop a postliberal, posthumanist approach to politics' (Calerco, 2008: 6).

This potential for a radical politics to be predicated on animal liberation perspectives that Calerco acknowledges, is what Haraway denies. While Haraway pin-points similar difficulties with animal activism and concepts of rights as those referred to by Calerco, she does not explore the subversive potential of animal rights perspectives for doing what she argues remains unfinished in Marx: namely undoing 'the categories of the natural and the social' (2008: 46). For example, pamphlets such as Beasts of Burden foreground the inseparability of animal and human rights issues, suggesting that: 'It is ludicrous, as occasionally happens, for McDonald's workers to be denounced as 'scum' when their exploitation is as central to the company's profits as the dead cows in the buns' (2004: 24). Such criticisms are also reflected by the tradition of published diatribes coming from within the animal rights community, which are staunchly critical of its practices. For instance, Animal Liberation: Devastate to Liberate or Devastatingly Liberal? (2009, originally published 1994) launches into a critique of the animal rights movement for being predominantly middle class and failing to interrelate animal rights and class issues:
Whenever one problem is separated from all the other problems a solution really is impossible since they are all linked and because, once isolated and specialised, a movement is weakened [...] Simply by concentrating on one of class society's repugnant features (the abuse of animals) and ignoring the relationship of that to the whole of society and all of the relationships within society, is exactly what those in power demand of their opposition. (Devastate..., 2009)

In other words, similar criticisms to those made by Haraway – of anthropomorphising animals, failing to acknowledge the inseparable nature of human and animal rights issues, or uncritically deploying rights-discourse – are made within the animal rights community itself, in self-reflexive critique. Therefore, there is a prominent counter-current within animal rights groups that acknowledges the same problems with the movement that Haraway refers to, but what is important is that these criticisms are careful not to dismiss the movement entirely and reiterate its value even as they are critical of elements of it. For instance, Beasts of Burden goes on to foreground that – despite the occasional, utterly misplaced, criticism of McDonald's workers themselves – there is an awareness of the intersection of animal rights with other issues:

We can all recognise these problems [with animal rights], and it suits the views of many anarchists and communists to pretend that all animal liberation activities take place in this reactionary framework. This is not the case. Notably the movement against McDonald's is an actually existing international struggle that takes on work conditions, the critique of the spectacular commodity and ecological issues as well as animal exploitation, and has even managed to involve meat eaters. (2004: 24)

Following a similar line of argument, Joseph Smith's preface to Animal Liberation and Social
"Revolution" (1998) argues that 'veganism in isolation defeats the purpose for which it is intended' because 'as a philosophy veganism stands in defiance to ideologies touching the core of Western thought' (Smith, in Dominick, 1998: 2). In other words, veganism is not simply concerned with consuming animals and understanding it as such is problematic, because it has the potential to be a philosophical outlook that foregrounds and seeks to challenge the social structures also giving rise to other forms of oppression: 'The vegan must go beyond a monist understanding of non-human oppression and understand its roots in human relations' (Dominick, 1998: 10). In other words, like Haraway, the text suggests the category of the animal, insofar as it is treated as distinct from the human, is hugely politically problematic, as: 'In order to maintain an us-them dichotomy between human and “animal” (as though we are not animals ourselves!), we cannot be allowed to hear basic arguments in favor of transcending this false sense of duality' (1998: 12-13). The construction of this category is then linked to other forms of exploitation and cited as lying at the root of self/other dichotomies that perpetuate and legitimise capitalist relations:

In everyday life we are alienated from the results of our most basic actions. When we purchase a food product at the grocery store, we can read the ingredients list and usually tell whether animals are murdered and/or tortured in the production process. But what do we learn of the people who made that product? Were the women paid less than the men? Were blacks subjugated by whites on the factory floor? Was a union or collectivization effort among employees crushed? Were a hundred slaughtered on a picket line for demanding minimum wage? (Dominick, 1998: 13)

In other words, similar to the anti-McDonalds campaign referred to in Beasts of Burden, the separation between human and animal and the rendering of the animal as subaltern, thus 'legitimately' killable, is merely part of a matrix of oppressive relations that all need to be challenged in order for fundamental social change to be achieved. In Dominik's terms: 'The ability
to ignore any oppressions is the ability to ignore other oppression/s' (1998: 14).

In line with the arguments contained within these pamphlets, therefore, perspectives such as veganism are not necessarily an appeal to the inviolable rights of the animal, but can work to unsettle the very structures that give rise to humanist conceptions of rights. For these theorists, this is because veganism in philosophical terms is a necessary component to anarchist theory and praxis: playing a key role in challenging the humanist rationale behind forms of oppression based on class, gender, ethnicity and age. In other words, for all of these authors philosophical perspectives such as veganism can play a key part in articulating the oppression intrinsic to certain normative social relations and are thus integral to the process of foregrounding these relations in order to challenge them.

On a certain level, Haraway seems to echo these arguments, stating: ‘I do not disagree that vegetarianism, veganism, and opposition to sentient animal experimentation can be powerful feminist positions’, but she then proceeds to state ‘I do disagree that they are Feminist Doxa’ (2008: 80). This is a subtle disparagement, inferring that there is a threat of a perspective such as veganism becoming authoritarian or normative: an implicit value that guides activist behaviour, and human-animal relations, which cannot be interrogated. However, whilst is seems correct to suggest that animal rights issues are not 'Feminist Doxa', as the relation between veganism and feminism is frequently contested and never implicit, stating that she disagrees that they are doxa seems to be a contradiction in terms. This is because the word 'disagrees' implies that Haraway is situating her arguments as being at odds with existing feminist doxa, whereas – in reality – the linking of these issues is not already implicit and does not provide an unacknowledged foundation that guides activist thought and behaviour, as Haraway seems to infer.

Indeed, the level of debate around the interrelation of these issues, both within theoretical texts –
including Haraway's own – and in activist practice, suggests that this linking, at most, provides a heterodox perspective. As *Beasts of Burden* makes explicit, many of 'those who define themselves as anarchists or communists [...] either dismiss animal liberation altogether or personally sympathise but don't see how it relates to their broader political stance' (2004: 1). Likewise, Dominick foregrounds that 'most people who call themselves anarchists have not embraced animal liberation and its corresponding lifestyle – veganism' (1995: 3). Moreover, Adams' preface to the tenth anniversary edition of the *Sexual Politics of Meat* details her long struggle to gain acknowledgement that 'we have to stop fragmenting activism; we cannot polarize human and animal suffering since they are interrelated' (2006: 16), suggesting the interrelation of these issues is far from normative. In this sense, it is only through abstracting animal rights or vegan perspectives from their cultural context that they can be portrayed as doxic, which is a problematic approach in light of Haraway's condemnation of any forms of politics that ignore the material-semiotic context in which they operate.

In the context of *When Species Meet*, suggesting that veganism fulfils (or has the possibility to fulfil) this role, seems to be a means of shutting down debate surrounding the ethics of killing animals. In other words this approach is used to sideline its promise as a valuable political stance for discovering new ways of engaging with animals. This positioning of veganism as perspective that shuts down ethical debate surrounding such relationships is then reinforced by Haraway's subsequent argument:

> I think that feminism outside the logic of sacrifice has to figure out how to honor the entangled labor of humans and animals together in science and in many other domains, including animal husbandry right up to the table. It is not killing that gets us into exterminism, but making beings killable.  (Haraway, 2008: 80)
In other words, Haraway’s stance is critical of texts espousing the value of perspectives such as veganism, or other animal rights values, due to concerns they could uncritically shut down certain forms of human-animal relations by imposing indisputable values that could – eventually – function as activist doxa. For this reason, she argues that killing *per se* should not be condemned (as in certain animal rights or vegan perspectives), instead only the metaphysical categorisation of animals as ‘killable’ is problematic. Indeed, Haraway’s criticism of metaphysical absolutes being appealed to as a basis for guiding human-animal interaction (be they casting animals as acceptably ‘killable’ or having an inviolable right to life), is a central argument within *When Species Meet* and needs further examination at this juncture. This is because these arguments often form the basis of rhetorical strategies that are used to reject or dismiss animal rights perspectives (as with her criticisms of veganism).

However, just as Haraway deploys these strategies to undermine humanist assumptions underlying certain animal rights perspectives, when her arguments are reflexively applied to *When Species Meet* itself, certain anthropocentric values of her own are revealed. For this reason, the two theoretical mechanisms she uses to develop this argument need to be explored in order to then relate these principles to her work itself, to gauge whether her own text actually adheres to the ethical framework she sets out. The next section will therefore explore one of the approaches central to Haraway, Isabelle Stengers' cosmopolitics, in order to argue that the examples that Haraway uses to illustrate her arguments ultimately fail to adhere to Stengers' 'cosmopolitan proposal' due – in part – to her hasty rejection of animal rights approaches.

**Haraway and Cosmopolitics**

Haraway claims her theoretical approach is explicitly cosmopolitical in the sense defined by
Stengers, whose use of the term relates to the sense of 'risk' she argues is essential to scientific practice. This risk is bound up with the acknowledgement of science's cultural situatedness, which Stengers argues is vital as 'this “cultural memory”, the knowledge that other self-evidences concerning our object have existed and still exist [...] reintroduces the world between us and ourselves, preventing us from fully adhering to theoretical self evidence' (1997: 18).

What she means by this relates to, like Haraway, her move away from understanding objects existing as 'things-in-themselves'. This means that any 'self-evident' attributes of the objects of study, that are seen as wholly objective and intrinsic to that object, can be understood as culturally contingent, thus 'reintroducing the world' through understanding the ontological status of all objects as being contingent on the way they are enacted. As she argues in her earlier text on complexity, Order Out of Chaos (1984) with Ilya Prigogine, for Stengers this reintroduction of the world in scientific practice liberates the scientist from a transcendental, totalising perspective. Indeed, Prigogine and Stengers argue that complex systems have rendered the possibility of scientific transcendentalism impossible: 'Classical science, the mythical science of a simple, passive world, belongs to the past, killed not by philosophical criticism or empiricist resignation but by the internal development of science itself' (1984: 55). Thus their perspective gives weight to Haraway's previous claim that scientists can no longer rely on the 'god trick of self certainty' (2008: 88).

Furthermore, this sense of reintroducing the world to scientific practice is an explicit rejection of practices that force evidence to adhere to a predefined epistemological framework whilst neglecting to acknowledge the existence of that framework. Stengers makes this point with a certain caveat though, stating:

> Lets not be mistaken in thinking that this implies a return to empiricism; it concerns, rather, what the majority of epistemologists do not want to accept, what they agree, over
and above their disagreements, to judge as irrational: the possibility that it is not man but the material that “asks the question”, that has a story to tell, which one has to learn to unravel. (1997: 126)

For Stengers, the practice of cosmopolitical science was embodied by Barbara McClintock, a scientist who conducted pioneering research on the human genome, describing her as belonging 'to a rare species of scientist; for nearly forty years she has carried out her research (which finally “had” to be awarded the Nobel Prize) in semi-reclusion, considered as an incomprehensible nut by most of her colleagues' (1997: 123). The reason why she can be described as cosmopolitical is epitomised a statement from McClintock herself, who says: 'I'm beginning to suspect that a large part of the research has been done with the ulterior motive of imposing an answer on it....If only we were content to let the material speak!” (cited in Stengers, 1997: 126). As an example of this form of science, Stengers focuses on McClintock's work with corn, which:

is the product of tangled histories, that of its reproduction, that of its development, that of its growth in the fields where it experiences the sun, the cold, predatory insects, and so on. Indeed, scientists should not accumulate 'neutral' observations about corn, but learn from it which questions to ask it, because, like every historical being, corn is a singular being. And to say 'corn' is already to say too much; for Barbara McClintock, each aberrant grain had to be understood in itself: not as representative “of” corn but more precisely in terms of the way it differed. Only later, certain general lessons would eventually be drawn. (1997: 128)

In order to further clarify what characterises this form of science, Stengers contrasts it with what she describes as the 'hunting packs' of scientific teams that generally produce 'the dominant epistemological theses' (129):
The pack's principle is rapidity. The solitary hunter takes his time [...] The practice of the pack is quite different. Here the prey is visible, panic-stricken, reduced to the channeled behaviour imposed on it by the pack, whose members are ideally interchangeable. The main thing is coordination between the behaviours of the participants, the fact that they all coherently understand the same signals. The pack creates an object accessible to 'inter-subjective' knowledge. (1997: 129)

In other words, this form of scientific ‘pack hunting’ means that any 'inter-subjective' knowledge produced in such contexts is constructed in line with its implicit rules that have been forged by the cultural values that are shared by its pack members. This notion has been discussed in detail in Haraway's earlier texts such as *Primate Visions* (1989) and *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* (1991), where she foregrounds interrelations between science and society. For instance, in her essay 'The Past Is the Contested Zone', Haraway draws upon four groups of primatologists who have contributed to understandings of aggression and competition in primates, illustrating how certain cultural values shaped this research by determining which aspects of primate society were the focus of the studies. For instance, due to preoccupations with 'legitimating beliefs in the natural necessity of aggression, competition and hierarchy', in early primate studies the aggression of male apes was the focus on the research, with cooperative behaviour between female primates and family units largely sidelined (1991b: 21). The research therefore effectively served to simply reinforce pre-existing beliefs as to certain hierarchical social relations being normative, with such forms of research simply acting 'as legitimating meta-languages that produce[d] homologies between social and symbolic systems' (1991b: 42). Or, in more specific terms: 'As dominance became the universal medium of exchange among males and the measure of value, the political and natural economy of Hobbes's Leviathan has found its twentieth century biological expression' (1991b: 28). In Stengers' terms, therefore, scientific 'pack-hunting' means that the objects of study must be made to conform
to the behavioural model imposed on it by the 'pack', a model that – by extension – makes it adhere to certain implicit cultural rules that are shared by the members of this 'pack'. Thus any evidence produced within such contexts, despite being treated as objective scientific evidence, has actually been constructed in a certain way that is in line with a particular cultural dynamic (associated with the perceptions of its members).

It is this treatment of such facts as 'objective' that Stengers opposes, likewise the corresponding treatment of the objects of study as capable of generating universal norms and values (as with Haraway's examples) is also disputed since if a cosmopolitical science is practised:

>You do not allow things to be uprooted from the tissue of circumstances whereby they take on meaning, you do not allow things to be isolated, you do not allow judgments to be constructed from them that enable generalisation, extrapolation, the oblivion of the thing for the comprehensible rule that can be used by anyone. In brief, you block the circulation. (Stengers, 1997: 129)

The risk, therefore, is in allowing the evidence to speak for itself in such a way that it might challenge the theory the scientist is attempting to substantiate through their experimentation. As referred to in chapter one, this risk is akin to the situated knowledge that is fundamental to Haraway's politics of articulation, whereupon actors (both human and non-human) must not be spoken for: instead the networks within which they are situated must be mapped out in such a way that these actors' positions in it are articulated, allowing them to emerge as entities with mediating capacities that allow them to articulate with the human. Likewise, Latour's mantra of following 'the actors themselves' (2005: 12) is explicitly cosmopolitical, with the task of ANT simply being to describe the network created by these actors as opposed to making them fit into a pre-defined network format, in line with his own account of Stengers' work in his introduction to her essay.
collection *Power and Invention* (1997): 'If one is daring enough to take the test, one should be ready to demonstrate instead that the questions raised by one’s experiment are at risk of being redefined by the phenomena mobilised by the laboratory or by the theory' (1997: xvi).

In his introduction to the text, Latour relates this principle to cultural studies, arguing that:

> If Milgram is taken as the emblematic bad experimenter, not giving the students he is torturing the chance to become torturers, what should be said of those thousands of radical tracts where the things to be studied – science, art, institutions, medicine – have no chance to say anything other than that they have been marked by the domination of white capitalists? Like most critical thinking, they reproduce exactly the outcome that was expected at the beginning, and if they have to be rejected, it is not because they are political, and not because they are not scientific enough, but simply because the writer incurred no risk in being kicked out of his or her standpoint in writing them. (1997: xix)

In other words, for Latour, the cosmopolitical principle of finding ways to enable the material at stake to 'speak' for itself, without imposing a pre-existing interpretive framework on it, is not just relevant to scientific practice, but is also vital in cultural studies. This approach is reiterated in *When Species Meet*, where Haraway makes explicit the specific interpretation she has of Stengers, arguing that in her development of cosmopolitics: 'She [Stengers] invoked Deleuze's idiot, the one who knew how to slow things down, to stop the rush to consensus or to a new dogmatism or to denunciation, in order to open up the chance of a common world. Stengers insists we cannot denounce the world in the name of an ideal world' (2008: 83). In other words, the difference between something that is cosmopolitical or 'un-cosmopolitical' (to coin Latour's phrase), harks back to Haraway's distinction between a politics of semiotics and a politics of articulation. Whilst the former attempts to speak *for* non-human (or even human) actors, locating their needs within a
pre-defined political agenda or identifying their action using pre-established political categories, a politics of articulation allows the actors to speak (or at least articulate) for themselves. This is the crux of Stengers' cosmopolitics: of allowing the actors, the evidence, to speak for itself (or themselves) and not silencing it through making it fit a pre-established scientific framework, or philosophical ideal, and discarding it if it does not fit with the hypothesis at stake. Thus this 'reintroduction of the world' is an attempt to prevent making other actors fit any pre-defined structures, which necessitates the risk of allowing these actors to speak for themselves, and the risk that in doing this these actors might confound expectation and challenge scientific or philosophical practice. Essentially, therefore, though she does not refer to a politics of articulation by name, this approach underpins her ethics in *When Species Meet*, due to being present (in a more sophisticated form) in Stengers’ cosmopolitical proposal.

This theoretical approach is developed further as Haraway develops Stengers’ ideas in relation to the ethics surrounding laboratory animals, arguing that cosmopolitics necessitates that 'decisions must take place somehow in the presence of those who bear their consequences. Making that “somehow” concrete is the work of practicing artful combinations' (2008: 83). Thus, for Haraway, the practical realisation of cosmopolitics is essentially a process of experimenting with various configurations of relations, in order to find how 'To get “in the presence of” these other actors, a process 'that demands work, speculative invention and ontological risks. No one knows how to do that in advance of coming together in composition' (2008: 83). This could be interpreted as a call for methods to be developed in order to enable laboratory actors to 'speak', or articulate, for themselves; for them to have a mediating role in the decision making processes that impact upon their very existence. In other words, the work that Haraway refers to is the process of realising a cosmopolitical agenda through enabling these actors to 'speak' for themselves, in doing so running the risk of having the experimental framework transformed. This entails developing the laboratory relations best suited to enabling these actors to articulate for themselves, a task that – again –
involves risk. What Haraway seems to imply, is that actors can only be enabled to speak through engaging in a risky process of trial and error, which involves constantly re-configuring the laboratory context until the non-human actors that share this context are enabled to influence it.

This is a complex argument and one that Haraway herself implies might be problematic to realise in a concrete laboratory setting. An example she provides on the final pages on the chapter 'Sharing Suffering', however, seems to provide a route into understanding what this actually means in practice. Haraway describes writing to several biologists regarding their own laboratory practices, in an attempt to find examples that could illustrate how the ethical issues she raises could be borne out in laboratory work:

Do you have an example from your own practice or those close to you of how the well being of the animals [...] matters in the daily life of the lab? I want to argue that such care is not instead of experiments that might involve killing and/or pain, but is intrinsic to the complex felt responsibility (and mundane non-anthropomorphic kinship) many researchers have for their animals. How do you make your animals happy in the lab (and vice versa)? (2008: 90)

Of the two responses to this query that she provides, the first responds with a discussion of his work with Hawaiian tree snails:

How do we see (assuming that we are 'good zoologists') that our animals are not flourishing? Ah, well, usually it's when they die [...] we take immediate steps to remedy situations, even when we don't fully understand them. E.g. I recently concluded that my lab group was over-filling the terraria with leafy branches from ohi'a trees at each cleaning/changing session. They had concluded that, since the snails' food is the mold
growing on the leaves, the more leaves the better. I explained that the snails needed more air flowing through the terraria, and that their activities were strongly regulated by light, little of which reached the centers of the leaf-crammed terraria. So, we've fixed that problem and are now looking for the next problem and 'remedy'. (2008: 91-2)

This example seems to adhere to the cosmopolitical principles that Haraway advocates. The welfare of the snails is apparently central to the work of the laboratory and various risky assemblages are experimented with, which seek to take into account the demands of the animals. In line with a politics of articulation, attempts are made to create space for the animals to articulate and risk redefining the laboratory context. The risk undertaken here is apparently two-fold: firstly, there is the risk in Haraway's words that – with the 'wrong' assemblage of relations – 'good data' will not be procured (2008: 90). The second risk is that of the death of the snails; a risk that opens up a series of highly complex problems that Haraway's analysis fails to foreground comprehensively. Whilst Professor Michael Hadfield, the researcher in question, provides numerous reasons why the death of the snails matters to his work – from 'their legally protected status' to his wry comment that he finds 'the snails to be beautiful and their babies to be “cute”'5 – fundamentally the snails 'matter' because the research is geared towards 'staving off even more extinctions than have already occurred' (2008: 91).

This leads to still further complications as, rather than being an example that simply reflects Haraway's arguments, through it she opens up a Pandora's box of ethical issues that problematise the relation of this example to her overarching arguments about vivisection. Three key issues in particular emerge as problematic. Firstly, if these experiments are designed to preserve an endangered species, it raises the question as to whether this form of research can be categorised in the same manner as experiments designed purely to benefit human health and, if not, whether this undermines the capacity of this form of experiment to support arguments about laboratory work in
general. This is a huge topic that cannot be developed in depth here, but before bracketing it to one side it is important to note that Haraway herself seems to distinguish between these two research aims, positing that the fundamental question to be asked about all laboratory research should be: 'Does the research benefit the animals?' (2008: 87). Moreover, she argues that 'Not asking that question seriously is, or ought to be, outside the pale of scientific practice' (87). The Hawaiian tree snail example certainly seems to grapple with this question, but – by extension – this delimits its relevance to vivisection's use in a more general sense. It is not clear, for instance, how this example could relate to research conducted upon guinea pigs infected with sleeping sickness or, likewise, how this guinea pig research would benefit the laboratory animals themselves. Similarly, in another of Haraway's examples, it is not clear how research on dogs that were selectively bred to have haemophilia, so-called 'bleeder dogs' (2008: 58), could benefit these animals, even if the actual experiments conform to Haraway's stated criteria of responding to such animals through:

the work of paying attention and making sure that the suffering is minimal, necessary and consequential. If any of those assurances are found impossible, which is always a risky judgment made on the basis of reasons but without the guarantee of Reason, then the responsible work is to bring the enterprise to a halt. (2008: 82)

The Hawaiian tree snail example, which seemingly demonstrates how a risky assemblage could work in practice, thus does not explain how these principles could operate in other contexts of vivisection or how these other contexts could be justified in line with Haraway's stance that this research should always benefit the animals. Ultimately, it does not provide a stance for arguing that vivisection's use in research to benefit human health could be justified in line with Haraway's ethical framework, even as she draws on these examples to argue that such research is permissible.

The second problem is that the tree snail example also raises the issue of asymmetry in the risky
scientific practice advocated by Haraway. In these experiments the death of the snail is the specific risk at stake for the animal: a burden of risk that seems at odds with any risks the scientists themselves might face (which are unlikely to be a literal matter of life or death). Haraway constantly argues that laboratory contexts – and human-animal relations in general – are necessarily asymmetrical, but this example raises the question as to what point the risk faced by each partner in these relations becomes so asymmetrical that the animal ceases to 'matter' in the way advocated by Haraway.

This relates to the third issue raised by this example: that in the tree snail research, the snail's only means of articulating is apparently through its death. So, in this case, this asymmetry is so radical that the only way the animal can impact upon the relations structuring its context is via its absence. Regardless of whether this form of research is beneficial to snails 'in general' the asymmetry of this relation is such that the specific snail at stake only 'matters' insofar as its death might lead to change in laboratory relations. In this sense, the way it 'matters' borders on being a form of utilitarian use-value; in this risky assemblage snails in general matter, but this mattering is only secured by individual snails occupying a role in the structure of the laboratory as 'killable' for the 'greater good'. In other words, the success (or otherwise) of this risky assemblage can only be secured by the sanctioning of individual death.

These issues are complex and, as Haraway rightfully argues, cannot be resolved with simplistic assertions about vivisection being 'right' or 'wrong'. Despite this, they still pose a problem for the internal logic of Haraway's ethics. Whilst her assertion of the importance of cosmopolitics is valuable in terms of raising some key issues – particularly with regard to the problems faced when attempting to navigate asymmetrical relations – the examples she gives fail to match this cosmopolitical agenda to a coherent approach to vivisection. This is brought to the fore by certain problems that prevent Haraway's cosmopolitical demands from being fully articulated. The
difficulty with her account of how to develop more ethical laboratory configurations is that there are scant opportunities provided for the entities at the most risk actually being involved in these processes in a tangible sense. This has the unintended effect of reducing the animal to, if not a passive object, an entity that can only become an actor at the moment it ceases to exist: as evident in the case of the tree snails whose only mode of articulation is through their death. Unfortunately, this example of the structural role of the animal as being ultimately 'killable' is not the exception in the text but is retained in her subsequent examples of human-animal relations (which will be the focus of the following section of the chapter).

Ultimately, despite raising some vital problems and foregrounding the complex nature of human-animal relations and the value of the non-human, Haraway fails to adhere to the cosmopolitical agenda she sets for herself. This is not simply due to the examples she chooses being asymmetrical, but because this asymmetry seems to be guided and legitimised by certain humanist values, namely, the privileging of human desire and communicative processes over that of non-human actors. This issue is brought sharply into focus around another key tenet of When Species Meet: the question of what mechanisms make the animal 'killable'.

**Killability: an autopoietic mechanism of capital**

In exploring the ethics surrounding humans killing animals, Haraway suggests that:

> The quest is to learn to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing so as to be in the open, in the quest of the capacity to respond in relentless historical, nonteleological, multispecies contingency. Perhaps the command should read 'Thou shalt not make killable'. (2008: 80)
This means that whilst killing is permissible, categorising something as legitimately 'killable' – in the sense of guilt-free, ethically sanctioned killing – is not. In other words, that no solace can ever be taken in the concept of human exceptionalism, or the 'god-trick of self certainty' (2008: 88), which privilege the human and cast any actor that is killed in the name of preserving human life as a necessary sacrifice. This line of argument is developed in the work of Nicole Shukin who relates such processes of ethically sanctioned killing to capitalist social relations, arguing:

If animal life is violently subject to capital, capital is inescapably contingent on animal life, such that disruptions in animal capital have the potential to percuss through the biopolitical chains of market life. One task of the critic of animal capital, then, is to make their contingency visible. (Shukin, 2009: 24)

Part of the same Posthumanities series as When Species Meet, Shukin's Animal Capital (2009) assumes the similar task of challenging the objectification of the animal, along with the humanist rationale that (literally) 'renders' the animal – in Haraway's terms – as legitimately 'killable'. In focusing on specific case studies, Shukin's work helps to illuminate Haraway's perspective in terms of how it relates to the material processes involved in agriculture and industry, which are pivotal in casting the animal as killable. Playing on the double meaning of the term, Shukin focuses both on the rendering industry itself (the transformation of animal parts unfit for human consumption into anything from glue to animal feed), and the act of rendering-visible the contradictory role of the animal in these processes. Rendering, in the first sense, is explicitly understood in terms of biopolitics and it is in this sense that Shukin's approach, firstly, demonstrates methodological similarities with Haraway and, secondly, illuminates Haraway's own discussion of the link between the killability of the animal and contemporary biopolitics.

Dealing first with their methodological similarities, essentially the task performed by Shukin is to
articulate – indeed she argues that articulation is a 'term crucial to conceptualising rendering as a counterhegemonic critical practice' (2009: 27)⁶ – the animal's pivotal role in securing the autopoietic mechanisms that perpetuate the flow of capital. Shukin's politics of articulation, therefore, is to render these processes visible in order to provide a starting point for developing alternative human-animal relations, hence the closing sentence of Animal Capital states that the text is 'addressed to a heterogeneity of protesting subjects struggling to articulate liveable alternatives to the present' (2009: 232). It is in this engagement in a politics of articulation in order to create space for alternatives, that Shukin's work parallels Haraway's, especially in terms of the latter's comprehensive analysis of the way in which biopolitical logic renders the animal 'killable'.

The third chapter of When Species Meet, 'Sharing Suffering', has this principle at its core. At the start of the chapter, Haraway uses a literary example which provides a valuable motif of the form of ethics she is advocating, a parable drawn from Nancy Farmer's novel A Girl Named Disaster, that featured:

The relationship between an old African Vapostori man and the guinea pigs he cared for in a little scientific outpost in Zimbabwe around 1980. Used for sleeping sickness research the lab rodents were at the centre of a knot tying together tsetse flies, trypanosomes, cattle and people. During their working hours the guinea pigs were held in tight little baskets while wire cages filled with biting flies were placed over them, their skins shaved and painted with poisons that might sicken the offending insects and their protozoan parasites. (Haraway, 2008: 69)

Whilst within the structure of the network, the guinea pigs are treated as a laboratory tool, the old man who cares for them – Baba Joseph – reveals how ethically complex the situation is. He resists the idea of medical progress functioning to absolve those engaged in vivisection of guilt or
responsibility toward the test subjects. Instead he places his own arm inside the tsetse fly cage, claiming “‘I do this to learn what the guinea pigs are suffering ... It's wicked to cause pain, but if I share it, God may forgive me’” (2008: 69).

This is a move away from the assumption that engaging in research in an attempt to make a medical breakthrough is an ethical trump card that legitimises vivisection. Indeed, this is the significance of Baba Joseph: he recognises that sharing suffering matters, that there is no means of absolving a situation of (in his words) its 'wickedness' under the guise of preserving human life, as this is simply rooted in the logic of human exceptionalism and so renders the animal 'killable'. In this sense, the guinea pigs are not objectified as entities that unproblematically assume a set role, Baba Joseph takes the risky approach of acknowledging the animals as actors with the capacity to experience pain. In recognising their suffering and attempting to share it, he is metaphorically searching for a means of responding to the animals as actors. They are not simply entities that can be tested on with no ethical obligation, but actors demanding an appropriate response; in sharing their suffering, Baba Joseph is simultaneously acknowledging their pain and grasping for a means of responding to it.

His literal sharing of their pain is, for Haraway, a metaphor for the risk scientists must take in conducting experiments (or indeed that theorists take when developing an ethics). For Haraway, Baba Joseph’s acknowledgement of the animals as actors disrupts the scientific anthropocentrism that structures and legitimises the laboratory context.

It is this threat to these metaphysical structures that leads into Haraway's call for a cosmopolitical approach. This is because the problem of how to respond to the animals' suffering in an appropriate, but context-specific way, necessitates the replacement of an ethics predicated upon universal categories (and their corresponding hierarchies). This is the reason why Haraway turns to Stengers' cosmopolitics as, in line with this cosmopolitical approach, the production of the category 'animal' is 'criminal' (2008: 82) – because this category bypasses cosmopolitical responsibility; inhibiting the
development of a politics of articulation that does not deploy predefined metaphysical categories. Thus laboratory work cannot be justified by hierarchical distinctions between man and animal and requires another form of response. What form this response should actually take is a key question in the rest of *When Species Meet*, which is again a progression of her arguments in ‘The Promises of Monsters’.

The outcome of Haraway bringing cosmopolitics to bear on her arguments regarding killability is essential in understanding how an ethical approach to relations with other beings could be developed. Hence Haraway’s claim that ‘Human beings learning to share other animals’ pain nonmimetically is, in [her] view, an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an ontological opening’ (2008: 84). While she does not mean that this pain should literally be shared (Baba Joseph’s act is a metaphor not a behavioural model!), the task of a cosmopolitical approach is still assuming responsibility toward ‘those who bear the consequences’. This approach is vital for Haraway in order to develop an ethical account of, and approach to, the (vivisection oriented) scientific networks that force certain actors to bear the consequence of actions designed to benefit other actors. However, as illustrated in her discussion of laboratory animals and as will be shown in subsequent analyses of her other examples, there is no getting around the fact that – structurally speaking – the animal’s position in this network renders it killable, even if there is an acknowledgement that this killing is not guilt free and demands a response. In contexts such as this the animal is still killable due to the promise of developing cures to preserve human life.

Shukin’s discussion of biopower in agriculture and industry brings this issue of killability into sharper focus, going beyond Haraway and not simply describing how the animal is rendered killable, but citing the production of the killable-animal as a prerequisite of biopolitical modes of power. Inverting the notion that ‘the power to reduce humans to the bare life of their species body arguably presupposes the power to suspend other species in a state of exception in which they can
noncriminally be put to death' (2009: 10), she argues that:

Discourses and technologies of biopower hinge on the species divide. That is, they hinge on the zoo-ontological production of species difference as a strategically ambivalent rather than absolute line, allowing for the contradictory power to both dissolve and reinscribe borders between humans and animals. (2009: 11)

Citing Carey Wolfe's *Animal Rites* (2003), Shukin posits that the basis for biopower is the concept of the killability of the animal, for 'So long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their species then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against others' (Wolfe, cited in Shukin, 2009: 10). Resonant of *Beasts of Burden*'s aforementioned claim that the category of animal ultimately justifies other practices including slave labour, for Shukin this perspective highlights the vital symbolic agency of the animal. In this sense, rather than understanding the application of biopower to the animal as being an extension of its application of the human, as suggested by Haraway's Foucauldian reference 'birth of the kennel' (2008: 139) as preceding from the birth of the clinic, the construction of the category of animal is for Shukin – conversely – what *founds* biopolitics.

This is due to the dual role of the animal as holding both symbolic and economic capital, with Shukin's focus on rendering providing 'a trope for a cultural-materialist analysis that navigates a fine line between reductively materialist and reductively culturalist approaches of the field of capital' (2009: 26). This is because 'rendering draws attention to the role that symbolic power plays in the reproduction of market life' (26). This dual role is epitomised by the 'killability' of the animal, as in this context it functions simultaneously to secure political power over life and death, by enabling certain categories of animals (or people) to be rendered legitimately killable, whilst also
serving to function as a direct source of economic revenue. In other words, it symbolically legitimises certain relations of capital, whilst also providing a steady stream of revenue to perpetuate these relations in economic terms.

In both instances, to render visible the processes that make the animal killable is also to articulate the autopoietic mechanisms that enable certain configurations of neoliberal capitalism to self-reproduce. For instance, in her account of the rendering industry, Shukin argues that it is 'an industry deploying particular material and rhetorical technologies at specific historical junctures to reproduce capitalism' (2009: 68, my emphasis). In economic terms it fulfils this role by enabling 'the even more total capitalization of nature', due to 'its pivotal role in opening up recycled material as a new resource frontier for capitalism' (2009: 68). Conversely, symbolically speaking: 'The discourses of speciesism that the modern rendering industry institutionalises underpins the economic and cultural power of a white European humanity over “others of whatever sort”’ (2009: 75). In other words, rendering is an instance of animal capital in which the literal rendering of something as 'killable' leads to a biopolitical complex in which not only is the animal literally killed, but this killing process instates a specific category of being – the killable – which goes on to function as a symbolic category that can be applied to human as well as nonhuman animals.

As with Beasts of Burden, therefore, the role of the animal becomes pivotal not just in terms of being the focus of early primitive accumulation, but also in enabling contemporary biopolitics. This is particularly due to the problems arising from the animal matter itself often resisting the role posited for it and emerging as an actor that can disrupt or subvert the flow of capital, just as easily as it can secure it. For instance, in discussing the production of gelatine for photography, Shukin foregrounds how something as seemingly insignificant as a mustard seed can become an actor, due to the discovery that cows who had consumed the seed produce better quality gelatine than those who had not. It was not until after Kodak had manufactured a batch of film that failed to produce
good quality photographs, that the role of these seeds was discovered. The discovery meant that suddenly apparently innocuous entities assumed the role of actors, including the mustard seed, the gelatine and the cows which chose to eat the plant:

It was generally believed that gelatin's role in the photographic process was wholly passive [...] following from Sheppard's discovery of the photochemical agency of the allyl mustard oil, gelatin graduated from a passive to an active part in the creation of photographic emulsions. (Shukin, 2009: 109)

However, to compensate for gelatine moving from being a passive entity to an unpredictable actor, it was necessary for increased biopolitical control over this actor in order to secure its economic value:

Tightened micropolitical control over the raw diet as well as the cooked hides and bones of animals allowed Eastman to manage organic impurities in photographic gelatin, signaling the almost maniacal mastery of animal physiology that made the mimetics of photography and film possible. (Shukin, 2009: 110)

Not only did this necessitate the extension of biopower over the minute actors embroiled in this rendering process, this and other activities focused on creating animal capital also demanded further biopolitical management of the human actors who produced it:

Fordizing and Taylorizing discourses intent on reducing workers to “the body part” best able to efficiently perform a piecemeal motion over and over again on the assembly or disassembly line presuppose the possibility of producing nature as a homogeneous and uninterrupted flow of material. Yet, especially when this material is animal, such
homogeneity is never absolute or guaranteed. (Shukin, 2009: 128)

In her analysis of rendering therefore, Shukin has identified a potential contradiction in the mechanisms of capital, which can function as a tool for undermining or resisting biopolitics, but also presents the danger of simply instigating a further extension of biopolitics. In other words, on the one hand the unpredictability of animals and animal matter often enable these actors to resist the roles posited for them within biopolitical capitalism. On the other hand, this unpredictability could potentially lead to a further extension of biopolitical relations in order to further control and regulate the actors at stake. The killability of the animal therefore both secures and extends biopolitics, but provides a source of tension that constantly disrupts the exertion of biopower; a tension which Haraway develops in the tenth chapter of *When Species Meet*. For instance, drawing on the example of avian influenza, Haraway describes how the virus disrupted the 'transnational industry' of poultry farming, wryly suggesting: 'Go ahead, microwave sponges in your kitchens as often as the clean food cops advise; inventive bacteria will unwittingly ally with their fowl alliances' (2008: 267). As with Shukin's example of photographic film production, though, this disruption to the industry did not put an end to the factory farming that allegedly gave rise to the epidemic, but instead resulted in intense biopolitical scrutiny of farming practices across the globe, in a dual colonisation of both the bodies of the animals (genetically regulated and imbued with symbolic meaning) and of global farming practices.

After all, prototypes for technoscientific, export-oriented, epidemic friendly chicken industries were big on the Peace Corps agenda [...] right along with artificial milk for infants. Proud progenitor of such meaty progress, the United states had high hopes for winning the cold war in Asia with standardized broilers and layers carrying democratic values. (Haraway, 2008: 270)
In line with these arguments, non-human actors can provide a valuable source of tension that can disrupt cultural practices. The role of animals as social actors in this context thus needs to be articulated, before this disruptiveness can be masked by the mechanisms of capital, in line with her earlier argument that the role of activists is to prevent non-human actors becoming reduced to 'ground and matrix' for other human actors. However, despite this valuable argument, this same chapter reveals how certain problematic humanist assumptions are retained in Haraway's work.

Initially the chapter intersects with *Beasts of Burden* and *Animal Capital*, in citing the role of meat production as integral to capitalism and inscribed in its founding moments:

> Chicken, right along with his overreaching companion, *Homo sapiens*, has been witness to and participant in all the big events of civilisation. Chicken laboured on the Egyptian pyramids, when barley-pinching pharoahs started the world's first mass egg industry to feed the avians' co-conscripted human workers. (2008: 265)

As well as relating to *Beasts of Burden*'s account of the domestication of animals being intrinsic to capitalist processes, this approach also creates space for a critique of these processes, suggesting that chicken might provide a productive position for situated knowledge. This is in line with the argument in 'Situated Knowledges' that some sort of lens needs to be found for perceiving the networks and revealing their power relations, a lens that is not from the perspective of dominant, unmarked, actors: Chicken ostensibly provides this lens.

Despite this promising start, Haraway then – in a manner that is almost shockingly out of joint with the rest of *When Species Meet* – engages in the very act of political ventriloquism she condemns elsewhere. She essentially performs a politics of semiotics, in attempting to speak for the chicken (albeit in an ironic, humorous manner), and assuming the role of 'Chicken Little'. Initially this figure
might be the type of situated witness that Haraway espouses in *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™*, who 'is about telling the truth, giving reliable testimony, guaranteeing important things, providing good enough grounding – while eschewing the addictive narcotic of transcendental foundations' (1997: 22). Yet Chicken is then represented as a witness that seems strangely accepting of its role as 'ground and matrix' for the action of other actors (1992: 311). In other words, Haraway seems to speak for the chicken, in order to make it appear as though the chicken itself is agreeing with the mechanisms that render it 'killable'. For instance, in a key passage from the chapter, Haraway (in the guise of 'Chicken Little') suggests that:

> Contrary to her pesky friends in the transnational animal rights movement, our Opportunistic Bird in not against surrendering a pound of flesh in exchange for pecking rights in the natural-cultural contractual arrangements that domesticated both bipedal hominids and winged gallinaceous avians. (2008: 267)

Putting aside the deliberate puns, literary allusions and playfulness of this chapter, the personification of the chicken sees Haraway engage in a politics of semiotics that serves purely to ground human exceptionalism. Even though she strongly argues for improved conditions for chickens, as 'something is seriously foul in current versions of multispecies global contact theory' (2008: 267), this approach still supports the concept that chickens are killable (and willingly so). This is deeply problematic in light of the ethical approach advocated by Haraway elsewhere in the text, as well as the themes that run throughout her body of work, in being deeply 'un-cosmopolitan'. The failure of this chapter to adhere to any form of cosmopolitics is flagged up in her discussion of the Rare Breeds Survival Trust, a group that she argues:

> works against the premises and practices of factory farming on many levels, none of
them reducible to keeping animals as museum specimens of a lost past or as wards in a permanent guardianship, in which utilitarian relations between animals and people, including eating meat, are always defined as abuse. (2008: 273)

As discussed previously, this simplistic implication that meat eating is 'always defined as abuse' by animal rights groups in a straightforward sense, is not necessarily the case. To begin with, as will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, numerous animal rights movements engage in a complex politics of articulation to problematise these 'utilitarian' relations rather than condemn them on the basis of the inviolable rights of the animal. This is the point that Adams reiterates, whilst also foregrounding the necessity of taking this relationship seriously in any ethical account of human-animal relations. For Adams, any attempt to legitimise a relation where the animal is killed for meat – in the West at least – cannot be a cosmopolitical engagement with the animal, as:

If we agree to one of the points I propose in the vegan-feminist manifesto, that at least three beings are involved in a discourse about flesh eating (the speaker, the hearer and the animal being eaten), then we see that there is an a priori deprivation within these critiques that needs to be acknowledged: the death of the animal. (2006: 126)

As with Haraway's Hawaiian tree snail example, therefore, any serious attempt to engage in a cosmopolitical relation with the animal is shut down by its necessary absence in contexts such as meat-eating. Within these contexts the animal simply disappears, as with Adams' earlier argument in the Sexual Politics of Meat, in the context of discourses about meat consumption the animal can only function as an 'absent referent', as 'meat' only exists when it is both literally and metaphorically detached from the animal. Maintaining this category, therefore, inhibits any serious political or ethical response to this animal. For Adams even the term meat equates to the very category of 'killable' that Haraway condemns, and for this reason she argues that:
Haraway protects the dominance that ontologises animals as edible just as the sheepdogs she celebrates protect the ontologised ‘livestock’. She renders unto the renderers the bodies of animals. ‘Livestock’ become the untouchable natureculture intersection and not because of the prions from rendered ‘mad’ cows that cannot be destroyed, but because she cannot or will not acknowledge the possibility that livestock might also be companion species. (2006: 126)

This critique was in relation to the *Companion Species Manifesto* and thus is not wholly applicable to *When Species Meet*: as Haraway does make attempts in 'Chicken' to understand livestock as having the potential to be companion species too. However, as the ventriloquism of 'Chicken Little' suggests, this engagement is not nearly extensive enough and the category of 'meat' remains in place: inhibiting any cosmopolitical engagement before it can begin. As Adams infers, how can the animal form part of this conversation if it is absent from the outset due to being regarded as a potential source of meat?

Even while Haraway raises some vital issues, particularly in flagging up the dangers of launching a critique of practices such as vivisection and meat consumption on the basis of humanist values, overall her discussion of these practises reflect a failure to turn her cosmopolitical approach against her own examples. More fundamentally, the underlying assumptions retained in these examples stem from broader problems arising from Haraway's overall approach in the chapter 'Chicken', which make it – arguably – the most problematic section of *When Species Meet*. Indeed, it is not only theorists perceived as radical vegans who raise this point. For instance, even Duncan Wilson's hugely positive review of the text suggests Haraway 'skirts around' fundamental questions relating to the consumption of animals: *When Species Meet* only briefly considers the practices of killing and eating nonhumans that exemplify exceptionalist instrumentalism. Rather than confront this
“huge and complicated” topic head on, Haraway skirts around it by recollecting the views and practices of some academic colleagues’ (2009: 151).

As Wilson suggests, these problems fundamentally stem from a failure to interrogate the consumption of animals in any degree of depth. Whilst Haraway posits that animals can be consumed in contexts that do not equate to 'utilitarian relations of abuse', she provides no evidence for, or detailed discussion of how this could happen in practice. While there is a brief reference to an anecdotal example of her university hog roast later on in the text, which touches on these issues, again it is an all too brief engagement that establishes a false dichotomy between hunted meat and factory farmed supermarket meat, without ultimately unsettling the category of meat. Referring to her colleague Gary Lease's annual hog roast, she describes how his serving of hunted meat at a faculty function caused controversy, with many university colleagues arguing that 'the department should adopt a vegan practice [...] or at least a practice that did not include the community's facing the body of a whole animal for collective consumption' (2008: 298). However, 'what actually happened is that Lease did not again hunt and cook a pig for the department. We all avoided conflict. Sliced deli meats seemed tolerable, if barely, and no real collective engagement on the ways of life and death at stake took place' (2008: 299). Haraway argues that: 'If one knows hunting is theologically right or wrong, or that animal rights positions are dogmatically correct or incorrect, then there is no cosmopolitical engagement' (2008: 299). Yet, immediately after establishing this opposition, she goes on to foreground the work of Adams, stating that she respects 'friends and colleagues such as Carol Adams [...] all of whom are scholars and activists whose love of animals leads them to oppose meat eating and hunting of all sorts, not just factory farming' (299). Indeed, in her end-note to this reference to Adams' critique of the Companion Species Manifesto, Haraway states 'I hope I have met Adams in this book, not convinced her, but respected her crucial truths as well as my own in a nonrelativistic way. I am not sure it can be done, but the stakes are collective and not only personal' (2008: 391, n.21).
Whilst this is a vital engagement with animal rights discourses that, finally, acknowledges their capacity to engage in cosmopolitics and their potential to explore the issues lying at the core of *When Species Meet*, her reference to these discourses falls short of fully addressing the issues raised by them. Firstly, Haraway seems to fall into the trap of positing the work of animal rights movements as purely based on subjective sentiment; even in describing Adams’ stance, she ascribes it to her love of animals, as opposed to any commitment to undermining the political and metaphysical structures that render the animal subaltern. This is particularly problematic due to Adams’ most prominent work (*The Sexual Politics of Meat*) seeking to foreground the way in which these structures impact upon both women and animals: hence her stance is not purely based on love, but on a keen awareness of the problems of humanist metaphysics and a political commitment to challenging the social relations sanctioned by possessive individualism. Likewise, Haraway states she hopes she has met Adams in *When Species Meet*, yet the text still retains the same key examples Adams is critical of in *Companion Species Manifesto* – particularly pure-bred animal breeding and meat eating. For instance (aside from the issues raised above in relation to meat) Haraway does not answer Adams’ questions about why ‘She condemns “impulse buyers” of special breeds of dogs who then dump their dogs’, whereas ‘the breeders for whom the “whole dog” is both a kind and an individual [...] and continue to produce these “pure-breds”, escape this critique’ (2006: 125). For Adams this is particularly problematic in light of the question ‘Where do the impulse buyers get their dogs?’ (125). Haraway’s development of these themes becomes even more troubling when, in defence of her position, she dedicates a whole chapter to elaborate on her arguments in *The Companion Species Manifesto* and likens criticisms of pure-bred animal breeding to ‘genocide’ (2008: 106). Whilst being a hugely controversial comparison in itself, such a comparison also seems shockingly inaccurate in the sense that the very purpose of pure-bred dog breeding is to produce animals conforming to particular genetic traits deemed ‘desirable’: with animals failing to conform to these characteristics (often due to congenital diseases) frequently killed. Somewhat worryingly,
in order to deal with the traits caused by inbreeding (such as epilepsy), Haraway describes the work of breed activists who seek to rectify these problems through genetic screening, citing this as a potential 'happy ending' to these problems and a solution that respects diversity (2008:128-9). It seems somewhat problematic, however, to be drawing a neat conclusion about practices that effectively increase biopolitical control over animal bodies in order to guarantee certain traits are reproduced and others are not, whilst claiming this preserves diversity.

In all of these examples, Haraway might be raising some vital points about the nature of human-animal relations, but fundamentally seems to be taking a welfarist approach – suggesting there is 'something seriously foul in current versions of multispecies global concrete theory' (2008: 267), in terms of the treatment of chickens, but not going so far as to question the framework that unproblematically legitimises their consumption, or arguing that some forms of dog breeding might be disreputable, but there is nothing wrong with these practices in and of themselves. In line with her own arguments, this approach does not adhere to the principles of cosmopolitics or to the commandment 'thou shalt not make killable'; ultimately failing to engage in a politics of articulation due to casting certain roles for animals as ethically acceptable without fully interrogating these roles. For instance, in casting the animal as legitimately consumable, it is – by extension – rendered killable. In sustaining this category, therefore, neither its material nor symbolic role in perpetuating the relations of capitalism is challenged. By insisting on the ultimate killability of the animal Haraway appears to be arguing that her approach does not fall into the trap of appealing to metaphysical absolutes (such as the inviolable rights of the animal): the position she claims animal rights activists fall into. However, the opposite is true, as Haraway simultaneously shuts down debate regarding whether it is possible to understand the animal as anything other than potentially killable, in the last instance.

This is not to say Adams dismisses Haraway's approach entirely, indeed, she acknowledges the
necessity of moving away from a humanist political framework and also illustrates an understanding of why Haraway is so critical of animal liberation perspectives, stating: ‘I know Haraway is not alone in viewing “animal rights” discourse as proscriptive and ideological, that some people believe a certain possibility of becoming is denied when one tells another what not to do, that we deprive another when we speak or make demands, that activists are dictating to others’ (2006: 126). Ultimately though, for Adams, this threat of veganism becoming some sort of totalising framework is tempered by the fact that refusing to criticise the existence of the category of meat is to itself deny the possibility of the animal having a 'right' to life; to deny its existence as an actor in a conversation it is automatically excluded from so long as the category of 'meat' exists. In other words, Haraway equates a rejection of meat eating with an appeal to a totalising discourse, but for Adams eating meat is an equally totalising discourse and – moreover – it makes cosmopolitical engagement with the animal impossible. In this sense, whilst neither perspective is without risk of becoming a totalising discourse, Adams’ is a more productive perspective for unsettling the pre-existing categories that determine human-animal relations. In contrast, Haraway’s perspective falls back onto a liberal humanist stance, where the rights of certain subjects to act as they choose is given precedence over the rights of the actors the actions of the liberal subject impinges upon.

Similar problems affect the majority of Haraway's examples, most of her accounts of 'becoming with' necessitate that the animal is somehow in the 'killable' category, even if the decision to kill (or not to kill) is contingent on the specific material-semiotic conditions of each particular context. Killing might be non-innocent, it might be unacceptable in certain circumstances, but ultimately the animal is still 'killable': for food, medical research, for preserving the integrity of a breed. Ultimately, therefore, despite Haraway's critique of the commodification of the animal, the autopoietic mechanisms that secure the flow of capital by rendering the animal killable are still retained. Nonetheless, despite all of this, her work still provides openings for understanding
alternative ways of thinking through human-animal relations, particularly if read in line with the perspectives of animal rights groups.

Whilst Haraway raises some valuable points regarding the dangers of animal rights perspectives that rely on rights as a framework, activist literature similarly attempts to understand alternative forms of politics that do not draw on rights discourses. The way to enact this form of politics in practice is akin to the risky assemblages that Haraway describes in laboratory practice, but it is only by turning to the work of activists themselves that it is possible to fully understand how to develop practical strategies that both acknowledge the problems and contradictions of practising a form of animal rights politics whilst moving away from conventional understandings of rights. Negotiating these problems is something activists have to grapple with in order to act at all, thus in order to understand how these issues are dealt with, perhaps it is more informative to turn to activism itself. As Adams argues:

Perhaps an academic finds ambivalences more acceptable than the activist, who desires something more tangible: non-ambivalent action. And perhaps it is an ‘easy out’ - sweeping away difficult questions because it appears the answer, i.e. ‘rights language’, is wrong (2006: 126)

This criticism does not do Haraway's nuanced and often sympathetic arguments justice, but it does foreground that even though metaphysical ambiguity might remain, it is vital for activists to find a way of acting despite these problems. As the following chapter will illustrate, this does not necessarily mean providing easy answers to these issues by appealing to transcendent Reason, it is simply a case of finding context-specific practical strategies for negotiating these problems. This is where the real risk lies: in experimenting with effective ways of realising this form of non-humanist
politics in practice. The question is, therefore, in what ways do activists seek to practice cosmopolitics in their animal rights activism and to what extent do they succeed in doing so? This issue will be the central question of the following two chapters, which will focus on animal rights movements engaged in the vivisection debate, in order to explore ways in which a politics of articulation, or practical cosmopolitics, have been emerging in the work of animal rights movements in the UK.
Notes

1 The phrase 'Beasts of Burden' is taken from the title of the activist pamphlet *Beasts of Burden: Capitalism, Animals and Communism* (2004).

2 The 'and' separating theory and activism here is slightly misleading, as within such arguments there is often no clear-cut distinction between theory and practice, with theory decisively shaped by practice. For instance, when describing her influential text the *Sexual Politics of Meat*, Carol Adams states: 'I can establish that this book evolved from an activist. I am an activist immersed in theory to be sure. But I am still an *activist* (2006: 15). Likewise activist pamphlets from *Beasts of Burden* itself to Brian Dominick's *Animal Liberation and Social Revolution* (2008, originally published 1995) display a commitment to theory as a tool for foregrounding and challenging the social relations that lead to animal exploitation (both human and non-human). Hence any 'ands' between theory and practice should not be taken as a water-tight distinction between the two but more evocative of the relation between these areas and the way they can inform one another.

3 Indeed, Haraway herself cites this interview at the end of *When Species Meet* and describes her respect for Adams' position. Despite this, her reference to Adams' criticisms of the *Companion Species Manifesto* are too brief to fully get to grips with the core of Adams' critique: that rendering an animal killable for meat, or sanctioning the breeding of purebred animals, are essentialist positions with their roots in humanist logic. Although Adams' criticisms are made in reference to the *Companion Species Manifesto*, with the subsequent *When Species Meet* providing a more nuanced perspective, even in her later work Haraway is still prone to falling back onto humanist rhetoric in order to justify the existence of these practices. This debate, along with a more sustained account of why the examples Haraway uses to support her argument are so problematic, will be developed in more detail throughout this chapter.

4 Communism in this context is in reference to 'the movement towards the abolition of states, classes, private property, money and hierarchies of power, and the collective creation of the means to satisfy our needs and desires' (2004: 18); denoting a form of anarcho-communism, as opposed to statist or vanguardist communism.

5 A claim Hadfield acknowledges, with apparent irony, is 'not very scientific, is it?' (Haraway, 2008: 91).

6 Whilst Shukin seems to be working more within the framework of Laclau and Mouffe's concept of articulation (which differs from Haraway in certain respects, as outlined in chapter one) her arguments are equally applicable to articulation in Haraway's sense of the term. This is because her overall approach is to foreground the role of the animal as actor, tracing ways in which capitalist relations have worked to mask the symbolic and literal currency of the animal whilst simultaneously making use of these currencies. In doing this, space is created for understanding the animals themselves as actors: which would be a key stage in developing Haraway's *Biopolitics* book I.

7 In the *Sexual Politics of Meat* Adams uses this concept to link the oppression of animals and the objectification of women, arguing that:

The absent referent is that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the referent is to keep our “meat” separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal [...] meat becomes unanchored by its original referent (the animal), becoming instead a free-floating image, often used to reflect women's status as well as animals'. Animals are the absent referent in the act of meat eating; they also become the absent referent in images of women


butchered, fragmented, or consumable' (2006: 14-15)
As argued in chapters one and two, a politics of articulation (or cosmopolitical approach to animal rights) can provide a useful means of engaging with animal rights issues without appealing to humanist rights discourses. The problem foregrounded in the previous chapter was how this form of ethics could be related to political practice, a difficulty accentuated by the failure of Haraway's own practical examples to meet the cosmopolitical agenda she set for herself. The following three chapters will aim to overcome this problem by illustrating that Haraway's politics can be realised in a practical sense, arguing that a politics of articulation is already emerging in the work of animal rights movements and is valuable in guarding against a regressive politics of semiotics. In order to develop this argument, this chapter will relate Haraway's arguments to the work of UK anti-vivisection groups; focusing on a particular aspect of her politics of articulation, which is integral in the move away from anthropocentrism: the articulation of hybridity.

In doing this, the chapter will focus on two processes, each developing themes drawn from the previous chapters: the significance of the conceptual articulation of hybridity for animal rights movements, and the value of activist networks, using ICTs, in foregrounding this hybridity. In doing so, essentially the chapter will be enacting its own politics of articulation, by tracing the actor-networks being mapped out between the various actors embroiled in the debate, as these actors seek to open what Latour would describe as the 'black box' of vivisection in order to reveal its inner workings and open them to critique.

It is in relation to this task, that the chapter takes its name: 'performing vivisection's stories' being a direct reference to Law and Singleton's 'Performing Technology's Stories', in which they foreground
how even something with a clearly defined function (such as a technological artefact) can be enacted or understood in a different way, in a manner that challenges its apparently pre-defined function. Singleton conveys this argument through a description of how a small tractor on her family's farm existed as a farming tool, the function ostensibly determined by its design, but could potentially be enacted in a different way, as she foregrounds after finding her two-year old son playing in it:

For something to work takes work: a performance. In this particular case, all the materials and people that enter the scene are doing work. They are performing. The combination of elements – the skill of the boy, the size of the tractor in relation to the boy, the fact that it's relatively robust, the way the shed's door is open, the fact that Vicky can keep an eye on him as he plays – all of these elements work together, perform. The tractor is working as a safe child's toy. (2000: 771)

As referred to in the introduction, for Law and Singleton the political value of theoretical texts is in this very process of articulating a technological 'black box' in a new way, arguing that: 'The stories we tell work to reinforce (extend, undermine, celebrate) arrangements that are explicitly political' (2000: 770). In this sense, the process of articulating a particular actor-network is political because: 'our stories aren't simply innocent descriptions. They may make a difference, introduce changes, or, alternatively, bring aid and comfort to the existing performances of technological reality while it could be otherwise. Technologies could be enacted in other ways – imagined and enacted' (2000: 769).

This description that could equally apply to work of the activists focused on within this chapter, with its title being in reference to activists' attempts to re-articulate vivisection as a practice that does not lead to medical progress in the straight forward manner that pro-vivisection arguments
suggest. Moreover, in foregrounding the work of these activists, the chapter is itself re-articulating the complexity of the issue at stake, by emphasising contexts in which the tactics adopted by animal rights activists work to unsettle the hierarchical metaphysical dichotomies that often short-circuit the vivisection debate and inhibit cosmopolitical engagement with the ethical questions it raises: as embodied by the arguments that Haraway maligns such as 'the greater human good trumps animal pain' (2008: 89).

Drawing on Bourdieu, the work of the activists in re-articulating the debate will be conceptualised more specifically as the process of exposing doxa, the underlying metaphysical frameworks that impact upon lived reality but are naturalised to the extent that their existence is not even acknowledged. The process of mapping out particular actor-networks that relate to vivisection, will therefore simultaneously be understood as a means for the activists to reveal the conceptual framework that legitimises these networks, which are contingent on implicit distinctions between human and non-human actors. As will be illustrated throughout the chapter, the process of foregrounding the intrinsic hybridity of actor-networks such as this – a hybridity that is explicit in a context where human physiology is constantly being understood in relation to animal bodies – works to disrupt the simplistic humanist framework that is used to justify the practice.

These processes of mapping out actor-networks in order to reveal doxa, also entail the practical question of how activists can compile sufficient information to articulate the actor-networks at stake. This is a particular difficulty for activists involved in the vivisection debate, in which the practice is characterised as belonging to a scientific domain, governed by expert-knowledge. It is in overcoming this problem that, like the anti-McDonald's activists discussed in chapter one, the value of literal (ICT enhanced) networks emerges. For this reason, the chapter will also focus on the way that animal rights movements are collaborating with other anti-vivisection groups in order to map out the vivisection actor-network; as documented in an online context through the anti-vivisection
issue-network that can be traced between the websites of SPEAK, the Safer Medicines Campaign and Pro-Test.

As touched on in the introduction, the explicit relation between anti-vivisection movements (such as SPEAK) and pro-vivisection groups (such as Pro-Test – who were established in critical response to SPEAK), suggests that these networks do not necessarily have to be composed of actors working towards the same ends. While collaboration can occur (as in the relation between SPEAK and Safer Medicines), this chapter will illustrate that the involvement of more antagonistic movements in the debate has proved productive in tracing some of the complexities of the issue that were formerly hidden. For instance, in regard to SPEAK's allegations that certain experiments were 'meaningless' and 'barbaric' (SPEAK: Primate Research at Oxford), Pro-Test were forced to go into detail regarding the intricacies of experimental research – drawing issues perceived as belonging to an expert domain into the realm of debate.

Marres' conception of an online issue network is particularly useful in capturing the antagonistic aspect of this process, as well as its value in developing knowledge in a more collaborative sense. She highlights problems with certain conceptualisations of ICT networks (such as the 'info-network', or the 'social-network') due to casting 'exchanges among actors in terms of collaboration', which makes these concepts:

ill-suited if we want to acknowledge the antagonistic relations in which CSOs [civil society organisations] are implicated, especially where their politics are concerned. The info-network highlights the proliferation of information through networks, and for this reason it is not a very helpful notion if we want to attend to the important work of articulation – of issues – that CSOs perform. (Marres, 2006: 4)
These arguments are made primarily in relation to larger and more formalised civil-society organisations, but are equally relevant to smaller activist movements, particularly Marres' account of how:

in policy studies the issue network is defined as a relatively open network of antagonistic actors that configure around a controversial issue. The issue network is here opposed to the policy-network, which is defined as closed, standing in for the service of the de-politicization of issues, and prone to achieve consensus... (2006: 8).

This characterisation of the issue network, therefore, provides an apt description of the emerging online network developing between disparate actors involved in the debate surrounding the 2008 Oxford University animal laboratory. Pro-Test for instance, were directly set up to criticise the way that 'groups like SPEAK had been protesting the University of Oxford's construction of a new Biomedical Research Facility' (Pro-Test, 2006: About Us). As a result the Pro-Test website frequently cite SPEAK's arguments, likewise (although they do not refer to Pro-Test by name) SPEAK continually refer to criticisms made against them by pro-vivisection groups. Similarly, Pro-Test and the Safer Medicines Campaign have an explicitly antagonistic relationship, with the former being openly critical of the latter's work and even casting aspersions against some of its members, such as its claims that being an 'anti-vivisectionist' damaged Professor Claude Reiss' (a member of the Safer Medicines Campaign) neutrality as a peer-reviewer (Pro-Test, 2006: FAQs). Conversely, SPEAK regularly cite and link to Safer Medicine's website, in order to support their arguments with knowledge provided by anti-vivisection members of the scientific community and Pro-Test have a similar relationship with pro-vivisection site Understanding Animal Research (which constitutes two of the nine hyperlinks in Pro-Test's links page).

These online interrelations also reflect the relationship between these groups in offline settings, for instance, representatives from SPEAK, Pro-Test and the Safer Medicines Campaign appeared in a
Newsnight episode discussing the laboratory (broadcast on 24th July 2006), and Pro-Test have also engaged in various debates with Safer Medicines in contexts including parliamentary settings (such as the Associate Parliamentary Group for Animal Welfare). The issue network formed between these groups, as they explicitly position themselves in relation to one another in the process of articulating the issues at stake, thus has both collaborative and antagonistic elements to it.

This concept of the issue-network is valuable in relation to this context of political articulation as, when such groups 'engage in issue formation, we must expect them to become implicated in actor configurations in which the definitions of issues are contested. So spreading information about the matter at hand is not enough; issue framings put into circulation by antagonistic actors must be actively countered' (Marres, 2006: 11-12). A key component of such networks, therefore, as reflected in this vivisection issue network is the 'active (re-)formatting of issues, and contestation of divergent issue-formattings, that are circulating in the issue-network' (2006: 12). This understanding of such networks is valuable, as the notion of constant contestation over issue formation provides practical support to Haraway's politics of articulation, in the sense that in such contexts articulation can never be a hegemonic or complete process – and can always potentially be disrupted by the intervention of other antagonistic actors. In examining aspects of the vivisection issue-network, therefore, this chapter will foreground the value of activists' participation in issue networks for developing a politics of articulation, as it prevents the activists instating new 'black boxes' to replace those they are attempting to unpack.

The value of this form of network politics is therefore two-fold: on one level it enables the collaborative production of knowledge that works to map out specific intricacies of the vivisection actor-network (with even antagonistic actors contributing to this process); on a theoretical level it supports the development of a politics that seeks to articulate such a network without the activists' perspective becoming transcendental or undisputed. In other words, issue networks such as this can
play a vital role in enhancing the activists' work of articulating complex actor-networks.

Overall, therefore, this chapter will explore this interrelation between issue- and actor-networks, in order to understand how the work of activist movements, in this online context, has foregrounded the hybridity of vivisection actor-networks and unsettled the doxa that perpetuates these networks. Before focusing on the practicalities of this approach, however, it is necessary to go into a little more detail regarding the nature of the vivisection debate and Haraway's relationship to it, in order to comprehend problems faced by activists that are specific to this context.

**Haraway and Vivisection**

The rationale behind focusing on the vivisection debate in particular, in both this and the following chapter, is primarily because it concerns an issue that has been discussed extensively by Haraway herself. For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, the first five chapters of *When Species Meet* map out the intricacies of research on creatures ranging from snails to tigers, in order to develop a cosmopolitical engagement with the issues involved in this laboratory work. Similarly, one of the witnesses from which *Modest_Witness* derives its title is OncoMouse™, a rodent trademarked due to being genetically engineered to develop cancer, which is used as a sighting device for exploring the complex actor-network at stake in scientific research. Akin to Haraway's Cyborg, this genetically modified mouse provides a means of 'boundary crossing' as: 'OncoMouse and its transgenic kin are composite organisms, tailored tools [which] force a revaluation of what may count as nature and artifact' (1997: 119). As suggested by the continuity between these figurations and Haraway's earlier cyborgs, her mice and companion species are also prefigured by the stories she articulates in both *Primate Visions* and *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, which analyse the complex interplay between science and culture in primatology – both in the field and the laboratory.
What is evident upon even a cursory overview of these figurations, is their subversion of cultural boundaries, through embodying aspects of fields that – in humanist terms – are treated as distinct; challenging distinctions between what counts as science or nature, human or non-human. In this sense, within all of these figurations, Haraway establishes the articulation of hybridity as central to the task of developing a cosmopolitical approach to animal research. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is precisely this cosmopolitical engagement that Haraway argues animal rights movements lack, due to doggedly grounding their arguments in pre-defined notions of humanist rights, which are predicated on notions of possessive individualism, and so precludes such boundary crossing.

This is certainly true of a particular tradition within animal rights movement, as embodied by Peter Singer who seems to be the unnamed spectre that looms over Haraway's characterisation of animal rights groups. For instance, the influential *Animal Liberation* (1975) quotes Jeremy Bentham in arguing that 'the question is not, can they reason? Nor can they talk? But, can they suffer?' (1975: 4). This question is pivotal in developing Singer's argument that animal rights should be defended on the basis that inflicting deliberate suffering is unethical and – as animals cannot speak – it is the responsibility of humans to uphold and represent these rights.

It is apparently in direct opposition to this stance that Haraway draws upon the same Benthan quote and states: 'I would not for a minute deny the importance of the question of human suffering and the criminal disregard of it throughout human orders, but I do not think that is the decisive question, the one that turns the order of things around, the one that promises an *autre-mondialisation*¹ (2008: 22). In other words whilst animal suffering should not be neglected, for Haraway, focusing on suffering itself is not sufficient to reconfigure the relations that cause it. In addition, chapter three of *When Species Meet*, 'Sharing Suffering' lambasts: 'the tendency to condemn all relations of
instrumentality between animals and people as necessarily involving objectification and oppression of a kind similar to the objectifications and oppressions of sexism, colonialism and racism' (2008: 74). For this reason (as discussed in the previous chapters) she is constantly critical of attempts to 'stand in' for animals and represent their rights through drawing upon humanist values (2008: 76).

In line with this, as part of Haraway's argument for cosmpolitical engagement by moving away from pre-defined metaphysical categories, she argues that:

Neither 'the greater human good trumps animal pain' camp nor the 'sentient animals are always ends in themselves and so cannot be used that way' camp sees that the claim to have Sufficient Reasons is a dangerous fantasy rooted in the dualisms and misplaced concreteness of religious and secular humanism. (2008: 89)

The reason why neither appeal to reason is adequate, for Haraway, is again that this reason is rooted in the binary oppositions that structure western metaphysics: specifically the subject/object distinction that grounds the humanist subject and the rights attributed to that subject. For this reason, in line with Hayles' and Latour's arguments, as discussed in the previous chapters, Haraway claims that 'entities with fully secured boundaries called possessive individuals (imagined as human or animal) are the wrong units for understanding what is going on' (2008: 70). In this context, the problem with both of the approaches that Haraway criticises is that they objectify the animal; the former argument treats animals as a scientific tool for human use, the latter approach is the same form of representational politics of semiotics that Haraway criticises in her earlier work, which deprives non-human actors of their mediating capacity by positing them as entities that can only be spoken for. Not only this but, in evoking rights predicated upon the possessive individual, anti-vivisection groups are perpetuating the same metaphysical distinctions that result in the objectification of the non-human.
To a certain extent, these tendencies do emerge in the work of anti-vivisection groups, with groups such as SPEAK explicitly appealing to rights-discourse. For instance, in their criticisms of the new primate laboratory at Oxford University, SPEAK refer to specific animals that have been experimented upon: 'Remember George, blinded by and mocked by an Oxford vivisector; the same vivisector who had been investigated by the police for cruelty to a macaque called Jez. Remember Bjee, another victim of Oxford University's vivisectors' (SPEAK, 2004: Felix Campaign). They then proceed to refer to another macaque, Felix, in order to argue that:

Felix was not a number. He was an individual, just like all the other animals being held and abused at Oxford University. Until now, SPEAK's fight to end Oxford University's plans to build a new animal lab had been a fight against a concept, bricks and mortar if you like. Felix brings the individual living being into this fight. (SPEAK, 2004: Felix Campaign)

On a theoretical level, these perspectives epitomise Haraway's criticisms of animal rights groups, being particularly problematic because (as foregrounded by Adams): 'When postmodernism supplanted the idea of the individual, autonomous subject with the idea of multiple selves and the fluid subject' any attempt to 'claim consciousness and biography for animals [...] seemed to lose its relevance' (2006: 127). This meant that: 'The animal rights movement that traces itself back to Regan or Singer has the misfortune of articulating a modernist aim just as postmodernism absorbs and displaces modernist thinking' (2006: 127). However, as referred to previously, Adams goes on to highlight that another strand of animal rights theory and practice co-exists with and is highly critical of the Regan/Singer school of thought, referring to the existence of the numerous 'animal advocates who dismiss “rights language”' (2006: 125), whom Haraway overlooks.
In line with these arguments, certain animal rights claims might appeal to an ethics grounded in possessive individualism, but to assert that this is the sole, or even the primary, form of politics enacted by these activists is a mistake. As the rest of the chapter will illustrate, examining the work of groups such as SPEAK in greater depth demonstrates that even while claims regarding animal rights are made, they are supplemented by a more comprehensive politics of articulation which prevents possessive individualism functioning as the unacknowledged, implicit, ethical horizon of these claims. Indeed, focusing on the anti-vivisection issue-network that SPEAK are part of will illustrate that the way these collectives work to articulate the actor-networks at stake necessarily foregrounds how they are composed of actors from fields that – in humanist terms – are perceived as separate. In exposing this hybridity, therefore, these movements challenge the humanist metaphysical framework that prohibits this boundary crossing; highlighting the inapplicability of this framework to scientific practice. In Bourdieu's terms, this politics thus constitutes the process of mapping out and revealing doxa: exposing the underlying metaphysical frameworks that shape reality but are not consciously recognised.

From Doxa to Orthodox: Exposing the Hybridity of Scientific Networks

Grasping the mechanics of exposing doxa is essential in understanding the implications of the activists' politics of articulation, so before going into greater depth regarding the specifics of how this form of politics is realised in practice, and what the nature of these metaphysical dichotomies are in this context, it will be necessary to understand what is implicated in this process. Bourdieu defines the doxa as:

Systems of classification which reproduce, in their own specific logic, the objective classes, i.e. the divisions by sex, age, or position in the relations of production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power relations of which they are
the product, by securing the misrecognition and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based. (2008: 164)

In this instance, Bourdieu is referring to the way in which the power relations that produce class relations, are reproduced by these class positions themselves due to the link between class and power being unacknowledged as such. This is explicated by Beverley Skeggs' analysis of class relations in *Formations of Class and Gender* (1997), in which she describes how:

class is a discursive, historically specific construction, a product of middle-class political consolidation, which includes elements of fantasy and projection. The historical generation of classed categorizations provide discursive frameworks which enable, legitimate and map onto material inequalities. Class conceptualizations are tautological in that positioning by categorizations and representation influence access to economic and cultural resources. (1997: 13)

This reiterates Bourdieu's arguments: whilst class might be discursively constituted and contingent upon particular historical, social and cultural relations, it is 'tautological' in the sense that the class structure reproduces itself because existing class positions determine access to the 'economic and cultural resources' necessary to change class positions. In addition, these class relations have been internalised as those within them 'have been positioned by the historical discursive construct of class and this has an effect on how they understand themselves and others' (Skeggs, 1997: 13). As opposed to being understood as the consequence of power relations, therefore, class relations are naturalised and perceived as inevitable, due to being the way those embedded in these structures understand or identify themselves: in line with Bourdieu's argument that 'every established order tends to produce [...] the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness' (2008: 164).
A similar form of tautological reproduction is present in arguments that implicitly use a hierarchical distinction between man and animal, which goes on to reflexively support this distinction. This is exemplified by pro-vivisection website *Understanding Animal Research*, which claims that: 'animals are used in research and testing when it is necessary to see what happens in the whole living body, but the use of human subjects would not be ethically acceptable' (2009: The Research Process). The logic underlying this claim is that there is a clear epistemological distinction between man and animal, as it is appropriate to test on animals in contexts where it is unethical to test on humans.

In this sense, treating the appropriateness of testing on animals in these contexts as unquestionable renders the hierarchical man/animal distinction implicit. This distinction is normative to the extent that it is not even acknowledged, as it is treated as a logical statement rather than a point that needs to be justified. However, the argument is tautological in Skeggs’ terms, as in this context it is the objectification of the animal (in this instance as scientific tool) that produces the hierarchical relations between man and animal, which serve to reflexively support the animal's objectification. This reflexive process is even more explicit on the website *Pro-Test*, (which was established by an Oxford student and supported by specific researchers at the university), in which the use of animals in vivisection is directly used to substantiate ethical distinctions between man and animal, at the same time as this distinction is drawn upon to legitimise vivisection:

Just as animals cannot give their consent regarding their life or death, they cannot give it in terms of medical research [...] Following the argument that consent and the ability to give it is the most important factor, the controversial implications are that in the case of non-autonomous humans it can be morally justified to undertake experiments. (Pro-Test, 2006: Ethics)
In this context, therefore, the *ability* to objectify the animal (due to the animal's inability to consent or dissent from being objectified) is used as a basis for arguing it is ethical to do so: the current use of animals in vivisection creates a man/animal distinction that legitimises their subsequent use. In other words, this argument, or understanding of the relations between man and animal, is then used to reproduce the processes that continuously reiterate this distinction, with these relations becoming naturalised to the extent that the rationale behind them is beyond debate. In a similar manner to Skeggs' account of class, therefore, the way in which the category of object is demarcated by dominant actors (in this instance as entities that cannot literally speak for themselves) means it is impossible for these non-human actors to move out of this metaphysical categorisation, due to a lack of the predefined attributes (such as speech) necessary to do this. In other words, their categorisation itself deprives them of the attributes necessary to move out of this categorisation, as these attributes are defined in advance as the elements that are not held by these actors.

As discussed in the previous chapter, while some of the arguments Haraway herself uses to legitimise vivisection fall into this trap of appealing to pre-defined categories that render the animal 'killable', her arguments are still valuable in foregrounding how animal rights groups can overcome these difficulties. This is because Haraway's arguments foreground the necessity of developing an understanding of the tautological brand of humanist reason, which constitutes the cultural doxa legitimising the human/animal distinction, in order to expose it to critique. This process of foregrounding doxa, such as these unspoken humanist relations, is therefore vital for animal rights movements, as it the first step in undermining the relations that render the animal permanently subaltern.

In Bourdieu's terms, once they are exposed, doxic relations can no longer assume their 'self evident' relation to the social network and so no longer exist as doxa but become orthodox. Orthodox in this sense, refers to the way in which these relations are still treated as the norm, but are a norm that has
been exposed and therefore requires justification; orthodoxy for Bourdieu: 'aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal state of innocence of doxa, exists only in the objective relationship which opposes it to heterodoxy' (2008: 165). In other words, as something can only become orthodox due to being exposed to debate, the orthodox is only ever constituted through its relation to the opposing discourses against which it attempts to establish itself as the norm (discourses which he terms heterodox). This means that when something becomes normative rather than treated as a priori reality, this has necessarily been due to the emergence of competing heterodox discourses that seek to challenge its normative status.

It is this task of exposing doxa, and opening space for the emergence of heterodox perspectives, that animal rights activists must undertake, but this is particularly difficult to achieved due to vivisection's role in specialised scientific contexts that are difficult for the non-scientist to develop in-depth knowledge about. This problem is at the heart of activists' attempts to develop a politics of articulation with anti-vivisection scientists, as will become evident on examining the productive relationship between SPEAK and the Safer Medicines Campaign. This collaborative approach is absolutely vital for these activists, due to the specific barriers they face in attempting to expose the doxa of what is often perceived as a relatively autonomous expert domain, where the exclusion of the non-scientist is itself an unspoken norm, due to the underlying structures of this field often being masked by technical arguments and information that it is difficult for the non-scientist to penetrate. Not only does this exclusion of the non-scientist make it difficult for activists to articulate the aspects of the vivisection actor-network necessary to foreground the doxa that sustain it, but it opens the activists to what Bourdieu describes as 'symbolic violence'.

This form of violence exists wherever individuals or institutions with greater social influence use their positions of privilege to undermine and disparage those whose social position afford them a lesser degree of cultural recognition. Moreover, due to the naturalisation of these social hierarchies,
such disparagements are mis-recognised as valid and legitimate criticisms, as opposed to the acts of violence that they actually are. In Bourdieu's terms, therefore, it is 'censored, euphamized, i.e. unrecognizable, socially recognized violence' (2008: 191).

In historical terms this has occurred throughout the UK anti-vivisection movement's history, for instance in the Victorian era key members of the movement were woman (including Frances Cobbe, founder of the British Union Against Vivisection), leading to the issue often being undermined by the (predominantly male) medical establishment as a women's cause and even: 'male anti-vivisectionists, especially clergymen, had their masculinity impunged by critics' (Elston, 1987: 264). As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, this dynamic of symbolic violence remains in contemporary manifestations of the debate, with prominent pro-vivisection scientists labelling opposition to vivisection as 'irrational' and grounded in a 'cartoonlike perception of animals' (Jeffries, 2006). Similarly, arguments put forward by scientists are rarely questioned whilst anti-vivisectionists are portrayed as morally dubious, for instance frequent emphasis is placed on the fact that a prominent member of SPEAK has served a prison sentence (as in Jha, 2004).

In this sense, similar mechanisms that enable the doxa to reproduce existing social relations are at play in the exertion of symbolic violence, which in Toril Moi’s terms is 'deeply doxic' (1999: 280). The power of symbolic violence is thus in deriving its legitimacy from normative social structures, which means it is perceived as a 'legitimate' exertion of power or authority that is 'therefore literally unrecognizable as violence' (Moi, 1999: 280). Again, this process is tautological, as this violence both derives its legitimacy from and legitimises existing normative relations. For instance, as will be discussed more extensively in chapter four, texts such as Distinction (1984) foreground how taste is created by existing hierarchical social relations that legitimise the values of those in a privileged social position, allowing these powerful agents to dismiss and undermine tastes, values and
perspectives dissimilar to theirs as illegitimate. For this reason Moi characterises 'taste or judgement as the heavy artillery of symbolic violence' (1999: 276). Similar relations are reflected in the vivisection debate, wherever symbolically violent criticisms of activists are used to supplement pro-vivisection actors' appeal to normative social relations to consolidate their own powerful cultural position.

In line with these arguments, the value of the websites such as SPEAK's will emerge as two-fold: firstly, the way these sites engage with other sources to map out previously hidden aspects of the vivisection actor-network, helps to expose the doxa that perpetuate it. Secondly, this process of exposing the doxa helps the activists to resist the symbolically violent criticisms used to undermine the validity of their arguments. As will be argued in the subsequent discussion of the SPEAK network, a key way for activists to achieve these aims is in foregrounding the hybridity that is intrinsic to the actor-networks at stake. Before exploring how these websites attempt to do this, however, it is necessary to understand the implications of articulating this hybridity in the context of scientific actor-networks

**Monstrous Hybridity**

In line with Latour's *We Have Never Been Modern*, the very process of mapping out the vivisection actor-network entails the articulation of hybridity, because hybridity in Latour's definition of the term, refers to the mixtures of 'science, politics, economy, law, religion, technology, fiction' that occur in techno-scientific reality:

The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, tissue cultures, DNA and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, journalists, decision-makers will slice the delicate network traced by the virus for you into tidy compartments
where you will find only science, only economics, only social phenomena, only local news, only sentiment, only sex [...] On the left, they have put knowledge of things; on the right, power and human politics. (1993: 2-3)

Articulating these relations therefore, would necessitate foregrounding the role of animals as social actors within a complex network of entities from apparently disparate cultural fields. Furthermore, Latour argues that this form of politics is simply exposing a hybridity that has always existed – even between areas that are conventionally treated as separate from one another. This is because in his account of the modern paradigm Latour argues that the metaphysical dichotomies established between entities (such as the subject/object distinction) are what lead, paradoxically, to the production of hybrids:

Modernity is often defined in terms of humanism [...] It overlooks the simultaneous birth of 'nonhumanity' – things, or objects, or beasts [...] Modernity arises first from the conjoined creation of these entities, and then from the masking of the conjoined birth and the separate treatment of the three communities while, underneath, hybrids continue to multiply as an effect of this separate treatment. (1993: 13)

What Latour means by his argument that the separation of human and non-human creates hybridity will be explored in greater detail subsequently in the chapter, but the fundamentals of his perspective can be elucidated by relating its principles to vivisection itself. This production of hybridity is demonstrated by vivisection as, on the one hand, vivisection assumes the physiological similarity of the animal to the human (as otherwise the animal body would be incomparable to the human), but on the other it posits an epistemological distinction between man and animal (as with the claims set out on Understanding Animal Research). Hence, in vivisection, human physiology is understood as related to – and even dependent on – the animal body, whilst simultaneously being
placed in epistemological opposition to the animal. This physical hybridity (with understandings of the human body irrevocably entwined with the animal, due to pro-vivisection discourses establishing human physiology and medical practice as contingent upon the animal), is therefore produced by the epistemological distinction between man and animal, as this distinction is what allows vivisection to be socially and legally sanctioned. In other words, this metaphysical divide between man and animal legitimises a practice that produces hybridity. Foregrounding this hybridity, therefore, can pose a challenge to the doxa of scientific reason that is reliant upon unacknowledged binary oppositions, such as animal/human, nature/culture and subjective/objective, in order to ground its practice.

This epistemologically disruptive role attributed to the hybrid has a distinct theoretical lineage that needs to be mapped out in order to understand the political ramifications of this process. Tom Tyler, for instance, argues that representations of hybrids as monstrous are in line with the etymological roots of the term monster (from the Latin *monstare*, meaning to show), due to the monstrous frequently being used as a motif to show or demonstrate a particular threat: in this instance the horror of hybridity as that which ‘transgresses natural limits and classifications’ (2008: 120). Margaret Shildrick shares this perspective, arguing that:

> Even in those historical moments where the issues of monstrous corporeality may seem to be primarily about form, about the difficulty of reconciling in a single body these things which should not go together, what can be read there too are all sorts of ontological anxieties about what exactly the human subject consists in. These dislocations of hybridity are, then, surface manifestations of a much deeper uncertainty and vulnerability of the self. (2002: 17)

In such accounts of the hybrid body, the danger lies in the human-animal mixture threatening the
ontological status of man as separate from and privileged above the animal. In other words, the hybrid body collapses a series of metaphysical dichotomies such as nature/culture and animal/man, with this incorporation of oppositional concepts within the body of the monster threatening the status of the privileged term by 'polluting' it with the identity of the subaltern.

It is this theoretical and historical context that is embodied by Haraway's 'Cyborg Manifesto', in which the cyborg is a figure for the hybrid who challenges Western metaphysics and patriarchal social order. The implications of Haraway's cyborg are that: 'Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world' (1991a: 151). In other words, within the cyborg body, terms formerly understood as mutually exclusive and organised only in hierarchical opposition to one another, are placed in a co-constitutive relation, each term contingent upon the other. In this sense, the cyborg's hybridity enables it to resist definition within hierarchical epistemological distinctions, with the impossibility of categorising it in metaphysical terms meaning that it poses a challenge to the perception of these categories as having an ontological basis. Hence Haraway's claim: 'The cyborg appears in myth precisely where the boundary between human and animal is transgressed. Far from signalling a walling off of people from other living beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling' (1991: 152). In other words, the cyborg is the figure that challenges possessive individualism by threatening its ontological foundations. Following this theoretical lineage, When Species Meet is the apex of this use of hybridity, as Haraway no longer uses single figures to embody hybridity, but demonstrates how every actor is hybrid due to their co-constitutive relations with one another.

As alluded to earlier, the value of the hybrid in understanding the role of activist networks, is that these figures are emerging in political practice as well as in theoretical texts. This is demonstrated
by the vivisection issue-network at stake, which poses a challenge to the human/non-human dichotomy through focusing on the role of the animal as actor within scientific actor-networks.

**SPEAK: Activism Meets Science?**

The SPEAK campaigns website, for example, was established by the controversial movement who, after a successful campaign against the construction of a primate laboratory at Cambridge University (when they were known as SPEAC, or Stop Primate Experiments at Cambridge), had turned their attentions to a similar project at Oxford. Their website, however, is indicative of attempts to move away from controversy by focusing on the scientific arguments against vivisection as well as the ethical issues. Nonetheless, while they are moving away from controversy in the conventional use of the term, they are actually attempting to foreground scientific controversy in the ANT sense, which surrounds vivisection. In line with Latour, this usage of 'controversy' refers to the processes of debate that occur before a piece of scientific research becomes constructed as an undisputed fact (Latour, 1987: 4), and it is in enabling activists to articulate this controversy that the internet proves particularly valuable. Whilst activist groups might not have access to this information themselves, SPEAK's website demonstrates how these groups can use the internet in order to provide access to virtual sources that do have this specialised knowledge.

This engagement with scientific actors is not necessarily a novel development in the work of animal rights groups, having historical precedents dating back to the origins of the UK anti-vivisection movement. For instance, in 1907 there were a series of clashes between medical students and the residents of Battersea (known as the 'brown dog riots'), due to conflict over a memorial statue of a dog that had been erected in the London borough, which was dedicated to an animal that had been killed during experiments at University College London. Preceding the statue, the dog in question was at the centre of another controversy, being the focus of a libel trial against Stephen Coleridge,
the secretary of the National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS), who had made a prominent public speech outlining the experiments that had led to the animal's death, which named certain researchers at the University College.

As with the contemporary animal rights groups discussed in this chapter, Coleridge's speech was developed through working with individuals from a scientific context. In this instance, his main source was a text called the *Shambles of Science: Extracts From the Diary of Two Students of Physiology*, written by two ex-medical students who had attended experiments at the university, Louise Lind-af-Hageby and Leisa Schartau. The duo had undertaken a physiology degree in order to witness for themselves the role that animal research played, and these eyewitness accounts combined with their scientific background formed the basis of the *Shambles of Science*. In consultation with the two women, particularly Lind-af-Hageby (who continued to have a prominent role in anti-vivisection movements and women's rights campaigns until her death in 1963), Coleridge based his speech on a particular case study from the book: an experiment that took place on a little brown dog.⁴ Thus even in this comparatively early controversy, there was a perceived need to have a scientific understanding of vivisection, as well as an ethical objection to it; as Peter Mason points out, Lind-af-Hageby and Schartau were: 'Determined to fight the vivisectionists on their own scientific ground' (1997: 8).

NAVS was founded in 1975, so was twenty-eight years old at the time of the trial, but its membership expanded rapidly due to the levels of publicity the trial generated and the British Union of Vivisection (or BUAV, who will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter), was founded in 1898.⁵ In this sense, relations between scientific and activist movements were forged right from the beginnings of the contemporary anti-vivisection movement in the UK and the more recent engagement of groups such as SPEAK with scientific arguments, therefore, does not mark a break with past strategies of the movement(s), but progresses from and strengthens these strategies.
Despite these continuities, however, SPEAK face a slightly different set of difficulties to those confronting anti-vivisection groups in the earlier stages of the movement because, culturally, vivisection has gradually become what Latour describes as an impenetrable 'black box' or indisputable fact (an argument that will be examined in more detail shortly). For instance, as the BUAV describe:

In 1947 the legal status of all anti-vivisectionist organisations suffered a severe blow when the courts ruled that they were no longer to be regarded as charitable. It was argued that the advantages of the continuation of vivisection outweighed its abolition and an anti-vivisectionist stance was against public interest and therefore not charitable.

(BUAV, 2010: Our History)

In other words, in legislative terms, from 1947 the benefits of vivisection were treated as an indisputable fact that could not be challenged.

What is emerging in the work of groups such as SPEAK, is the value of ICTs in creating connections with other movements critical of vivisection, in order to open this black box and map out the actor-network that lies inside it. Whilst going into the specific debates surrounding ICTs is not possible here, as it is a vast area of research, a number of theorists have argued that though the process of drawing upon other sources is not unique to online activism, the internet offers opportunity for faster, cheaper and potentially further-reaching modes of communication and publishing than more conventional forms of consciousness-raising (such as pamphleteering) that preceded it (Surman and Reilly, 2003: 4-5; Pickerill, 2003: 24). Similarly, the increased capacity for the low-cost sharing of information from other sources (Shirky, 2008: 49-51), in its most basic form via hyperlinks, helps to overcome the spatial restriction of pamphlets. Indeed, the value of this
approach to activism has been made explicit. Dan Gillmor for instance uses pamphleteer Tom Paine as a counterpoint to foreground the comparative ease with which ICTs enable contemporary activist movements' dissemination and compilation of knowledge (Gillmor, 2006: 2); whilst a pamphlet might contain footnotes, activist websites enable users to navigate a comprehensive network of different groups involved in the issue-network via the use of hyperlinks. Moreover, as Joss Hands suggests:

The hyperlinking of websites, the cross-posting of mailing lists, the conversations and conflicts of the 'blogsphere', and all the attendant exchanges between various networks and fora, organise the structure of inter-subjective and inter-community association online in a way that supports cooperation and affinity without hegemony. (2007: 97).

As will be illustrated shortly, this is reflected by the way in which this vivisection issue network provides maps out aspects of the vivisection actor-network. In such contexts disparate actors can contribute to articulating the relations within a particular actor-network, without needing to develop a hegemonic articulation; hence this form of politics does not necessitate consensus but leaves space for antagonism.

This issue of forging relations with alternative sources to draw upon their research, is important in the context of the vivisection debate in particular, due to the difficulties for activists in developing the knowledge of specific scientific relations that is necessary in order to map out the actor-network at stake. This problem is alluded to by Latour's claim, in *Science In Action* (1987), that a distinguishing feature of scientific actor-networks is the way they deploy black boxes, or statements that are treated as undisputed fact, in order to provide an empirical basis for their arguments. These black boxes are not necessarily *a priori* truths but are constructed through a process of controversies being resolved, theories being accepted over competitors, certain areas of research or projects
receiving funding while their rivals do not and other contextual influences. For Latour, it is this network of factors and influences, even in the context of pure, ostensibly unbiased scientific research, which determines the nature of fact construction. Nonetheless, after all controversies have been settled in order to produce a definitive black box, in the form of a scientific fact or definitive technological design, it becomes difficult to accept this black box as anything other than an undisputed truth as opposed to one of many potential outcomes of a process of construction. Indeed, Latour argues that the only viable means for groups to dissent from an accepted scientific claim is to be in possession of a 'counter-laboratory' that produces dissenting evidence, which can challenge the scientific evidence upon which this black box is founded (1987: 79).

This relatively simplistic account of scientific actor-networks is expanded upon in *We Have Never Been Modern*, which treats the epistemological change that occurs when a controversy is settled and a black box comes into existence, as product of the modern paradigm. This is because the production of information with an epistemological status as undisputed fact, can only occur once science has been established as a privileged domain, set apart from any form of social bias. Again, therefore, this relates to the issue of hybridity as, for Latour, the modern paradigm that gives rise to this realisation of science is structured around the separation of nature and culture which he regards as a dichotomy of metaphysical convenience, but argues that science treats as an ontological difference. Ironically, as discussed earlier, for Latour it is this very distinction that leads to the proliferation of hybrid nature-cultures within scientific actor-networks, the production of which are masked by the epistemological distinction that denies the possibility of hybridity.

Robert Boyle's 17th century development of the air pump is cited as the founding moment of this modern paradox, in establishing the laboratory as the privileged space of pure science, divorced from subjective and cultural bias (1993: 15-18). For Latour, Boyle's work marks a Copernian Revolution (in a Kuhnian sense) from pre-modern cultures to Western modernity, signifying a
break from the influence of nature upon scientific praxis:

The past was the confusion of things and men; the future is what will no longer confuse them. Modernization consists in continually exiting from an age that mingled the needs of society with scientific truth, in order to enter a new age that will finally distinguish clearly what belongs to atemporal nature and what comes from humans. (1993: 71)

What Latour argues, however, is that this epistemological break, and corresponding 'Great Divide' between nature and culture, does not negate hybridity but increases the production of hybrids. The reason for this is explicated by Latour's discussion of Boyle as, through his privileging of the laboratory space as productive of unbiased truths of nature, things and animals are endowed with agency as they become witnesses to empirical study, which derives its evidence from the 'testimony of things' (1993: 22). In other words, the evidence or data collated from laboratory apparatus is what provides scientific truth, transforming these laboratory entities into actors with a mediating influence over the nature of the evidence produced. This effectively means that: 'Humans are better off appealing to nonhumans. Endowed with their new scientific powers, the latter contribute to a new form of text, the experimental science article, a hybrid between the age old style of Biblical exegesis [...] and the new instrument that produces new inscriptions' (1993: 23).

This account of scientific development and the methodology outlined by both of these Latour texts leads to two particular problems for activist groups. For Latour, the difficulty with the task of opening a black box for those seeking to challenge it, is its status as part of an expert domain couched in increasingly technical language that deters the lay-dissenter and means that: 'dissent or consent is not possible without a huge accumulation of resources which permits the collection of relevant inscriptions' (1987: 70). Coupled with this, a second problem arises: the human/nonhuman 'Great Divide' described in We Have Never Been Modern divorces objective science from subjective
social and cultural bias; this divide, therefore, makes animal rights objections to vivisection appear subjective and irrational. However, contemporary animal rights movements have attempted to address both of these problems, as evident on activist websites such as SPEAK and the Safer Medicines Campaign.

The first problem, that of the black box as set out in *Science In Action*, is that black boxes can only be opened by using a counter-laboratory to build an alternative body of evidence. The difficulty with this is that activist groups with comparatively low monetary resources and often no scientific background are unlikely to have access to such resources: which is where the collaborative value of the online issue-network emerges, in allowing activists to have virtual access to such a laboratory. This is evident in SPEAK's use of resources derived from groups who provide scientific evidence that questions the treatment of vivisection as an uncontroversial tool, (such as the Safer Medicines Campaign and the Dr Hadwen Trust).

Latour suggests that 'the impossible task of opening the black box is made feasible (if not easy) by moving in time and space until one finds the controversial topic on which scientists and engineers are busy at work' (1987: 4). While activists might lack the specialised knowledge to 'move back in time' themselves, other sources do provide this information. For example, hyperlinks to the Safer Medicines Campaign exist throughout the SPEAK website, with a link even embedded in the navigation bar at the top of the site. Their website is significant for SPEAK, due to the campaign demonstrating how animal welfare concerns are not necessarily in opposition to medical progress, as these issues can interrelate, with the group describing themselves as: 'an independent patient safety organisation of doctors and scientists whose concern is whether animal testing, today, is more harmful than helpful to public health and safety' (N.D.). These aims are reflected by the site's content, with the charity providing arguments against vivisection that use scientific case studies as evidence and, like SPEAK, support their claims by directly hyperlinking to these other sources. As
well as drawing upon prominent historical case studies where dangerous drugs came to market after testing safe on animals (such as Vioxx and thalidomide), the site refers to more recent research, themselves hyperlinking to articles in scientific journals to substantiate their claims. For instance, arguments about thalidomide are supported by an article in Science Daily that describes research which 'found in mice cells advanced antioxidant defenses compared to those in humans and other thalidomide-susceptible species' (Science Daily, 2008).

In addition the campaign has facilitated scientific debate regarding alternatives to vivisection, for instance, organising their own symposium at the Royal Society where scientists presented papers discussing their own work in developing alternatives to animal research, with links to the event and academic journal in which conference proceedings were recorded again provided on the website. Like anti-vivisectionists' engagement with scientific arguments, such conferences are not novel developments but reflect the value of movements such as the Safer Medicines Campaign in acting as a bridge between animal rights and scientific movements. As Elston foregrounds, when the possibility of alternatives first emerged the formation of similar groups throughout the 1960s and 70s – whose focus was replacing animal research with alternatives – resulted in 'some of the most constructive dialogue' in what was formerly a polarised debate (1987: 316). Although, subsequent to this period, the debate has again reverted to extremes, the possibility of bridging these apparently irreconcilable arguments has re-emerged in sites such as Safer Medicines. However, in this context, this bridge is not necessarily in the promise of alternatives to 'offer a kind of neutral platform where anti-vivisectionists and scientists could share a common goal' (Elston, 1987: 316), but in providing scope for articulating the intricacies of the vivisection actor-network in order that the interrelation between ethical and scientific arguments can be foregrounded.

The role this website plays in creating space for articulating these interrelations is complex, but on the most basic level it is reflected in the way that hyperlinking to the Campaign's site enables
SPEAK to access (and provide access to) an extensive body of information regarding the use and history of vivisection, including an account of its origins:

When western Catholicism prevailed, papal decree forbade autopsy. In the second century AD, a Roman physician named Galen performed endless animal experiments [...] Galen's false hypotheses - declaring that animals possess the same physiology as humans - helped dim the light throughout the Dark Ages, but the Renaissance offered a slight reprieve. When competitive intellectual inquiry overwhelmed Church injunctions, autopsies revealed animal-based inaccuracies and shed light on the true nature of human disease.

This outline continues, before concluding with a discussion of twentieth century uses of vivisection, claiming that:

The disaster of thalidomide, a drug for morning sickness that led to over 10,000 babies with birth defects, spurred governments to mandate animal testing as a supposed guarantee of drug safety. Never mind that animal tests had failed to predict the thalidomide tragedy itself. (Safer Medicines Campaign, N.D.: 'FAQs')

This is effectively an attempt to examine how this particular black box has become closed, or fact, by situating vivisection as an historically contingent research method, assuming its privileged status from the specific power configuration arising from (and perpetuated by) certain scientific actor-networks. In this quote, the networks that sustain vivisection's scientific status are portrayed not as inevitable but as grounded in the power relations arising within particular historical contexts. Significantly, all of these claims are contextualised in order to foreground controversy surrounding the use of animal research in these contexts: for instance, suggesting that Galen's hypothesis was
inaccurate, or highlighting how the thalidomide disaster was – in part – caused by vivisection as the drug had passed animal tests before going to market. Likewise, the site does not deny the role of animal research in early testing, foregrounding that 'In the 1600's - 1800's, when so little was known about physiology, one could learn basic things from animals, because all mammals have things in common at the gross level', but argues that it has become increasingly problematic in contemporary research due to its focus 'on the molecular level' (Safer Medicines Campaign, N.D.: History). In this way, the role of animal testing is contextualised so that controversy is foregrounded at key points in its historical usage, with the intention of problematising its contemporary use as an uncontroversial component of medical research.

This specific example of attempting to find a point in the past when controversy existed reflects the overarching strategy of SPEAK's site; of drawing upon and hyperlinking to other sources to illustrate the complexity of the debate. This enables SPEAK to not only uncover past controversy, but helps them foreground existing scientific debate regarding the use of laboratory animals. The site is divided into eleven sections exploring the intricacies of the vivisection debate, three of which are dedicated to communicating the scientific controversies surrounding vivisection, entitled 'Bad Science', 'Primate Research at Oxford' and 'Science Fiction vs Fact'.

In 'Bad Science', for example, SPEAK map out some basic arguments against vivisection, quoting hyperlinked sources to substantiate their claims (see Fig.2: 291). For instance, the following claim culminates in a hyperlink to the Dr Hadwen Trust (a charity formed by the BUAV in recognition of the need to develop alternatives to vivisection as well as criticise existing practices), who pioneer the non-animal research SPEAK are referring to: 'There are more reliable methods to predict the safety and effectiveness of drugs for people. These include in vitro (test tube) tests using human cells and tissues and sophisticated computer simulations designed to mimic human metabolism. See Dr Hadwen Trust.' The Trust themselves literally embody Latour's notion of a counter-laboratory,
conducting research in: ‘A range of fields including epilepsy, cancer, meningitis, asthma, Multiple sclerosis, diabetes, drug testing, arthritis, Parkinson’s disease, lung injury, whooping cough, vaccine testing, dentistry, heart disease, tropical illness, fetal development and pregnancy, brain tumours and AIDS’ (Dr Hadwen Trust, 2007: About Us).

Their sister site the *Science Room* documents their research as well as making their findings accessible to those with no access to laboratory resources themselves. The *Science Room* also provides detailed information of the Trust’s publications and current research, including the universities in which the research is being conducted, with a separate page of ‘FAQs’ explaining this work in language accessible to the non-scientist. For instance, in this portion of the site, the Trust attempt to unpack elements of the argument that are often impenetrable for the non-scientist, such as explaining the significance of statistics about animal research:

> As with any statistics, those for animal experiments are not as clear as they seem. Some though not all countries’ statistics, for example, only include experiments and animals in the year the procedures start. Experiments lasting more than 12 months do not appear in subsequent years’ statistics, even though they continue. Of particular concern is the failure to record the animals that are bred for research but not needed and are killed, or are bred and killed for their tissues. Their exclusion leads to a considerable under-representation of the number of animals killed for scientific purposes. Several other countries such as the Netherlands, Australia, Germany, France and Sweden do count animals killed for their tissues in their national statistics. (Dr Hadwen Trust, 2007: FAQs)

Developing such an understanding is particularly important in light of Latour’s account of the role of statistics in scientific literature in *Science in Action*, where technical terms and statistical
evidence function as 'resources' that the author can draw upon in order to cement the factual status of their research (1987: 62). For instance, if a scientific text inserts a diagram or refers to empirical evidence then: 'This figure shows what the text says, but is not quite transparent for all readers, even for the few that are left in the controversy' (1987: 47). This is problematic for would-be dissenters, as 'each reader is totally isolated by a scientific article that links itself to masses of new resources', resources that a reader with a non-scientific background might not be able to comprehend (1987: 50). This is demonstrated by the website Understanding Animal Research, a site drawn on extensively by Pro-Test, which features a section dedicated to explaining the number of animals used in experiments. After few sentences explaining the number of procedures using animals in 2008 – just over three million – the reader is confronted with a graph to elaborate on this statement. The number of animals used, therefore, seems to be an undisputed fact, supported by statistical evidence.

As the Dr Hadwen Trust foreground, despite the apparently self-evident nature of these statistics, these figures are more complex than they seem. Understanding Animal Research's graph initially displays the number of animal experiments taking place in the UK from 1960 to the present day and shows a decline in the early 1980s, but after 1985 it becomes more complex, with the experiments divided into procedures on 'normal' animals and experiments on genetically modified animals, which is explained with the statement: 'The recent rises in animal procedures are mainly due to the increased production and use of animals with genetic modifications or defects' (2009: Numbers of Animals).

These figures, then, still seem to reflect an undisputed fact (that precisely 3,656,080 experiments took place in 2008), which is supported by a graph. However, rather than simply reinforcing the claim as to the number of animal experiments that took place, the graph makes the issue more complex by dividing the animals used into two types, without explaining the ramifications of this
process. Following Latour, this approach is both a strength and a weakness of *Understanding Animal Research*’s arguments; while referring to statistics might strengthen their argument by supporting it with apparently clear-cut facts, they also 'show the reader what a statement is tied to, which also means the reader knows where to pull if he or she wishes to unravel the statement' (1997: 50). For instance, in presenting a graph to show where they derived their statistic of 3,656,080 animals being used in procedures, the figures presented on the *Understanding Animal Research* website can be unpacked by groups with an in depth knowledge of how these particular statistics are complied.

For instance, if these figures are read against the Dr Hadwen Trust’s claims, it is possible to unpack these statistics, with the Trust pointing out that all animals that are bred for research are killed whether they are used in experiments or not and these animals would not feature in statistics. This is significant in terms of understanding the implications of the graph, as even though it includes the genetically modified animals used in experiments, genetically modified animals could still be bred without featuring in these statistics. This is particularly problematic when – as Haraway foregrounds – certain animals are genetically modified to have birth defects, as demonstrated by her discussion of OncoMouse™, a creature specifically bred to 'get many kinds of cancer' (1997: 80). In this sense, certain animals might not feature in official statistics because they were not directly used in experiments, but they might still have been bred to suffer cancers or to have other defects.

Therefore, even though animal rights groups such as SPEAK might lack access to the necessary techno-scientific knowledge to unpack these statistics, the groups that they hyperlink to do: as demonstrated by the Dr Hadwen Trust’s arguments. This highlights how websites of groups such as the Dr Hadwen Trust and the Safer Medicines Campaign are useful in explaining statistics that, on first appearance, seem self-evident and transparent. Through strategically linking to these sites, therefore, the activists can work to increase the accessibility of scientific data, meaning that it is not
solely available to those with the necessary resources to undergo scientific training.

This tactic is also reflected by SPEAK's use of quotes and citations to support its argument, drawing upon scientists such as Professor Claude Reiss, who is also a member of Safer Medicines, and has worked with human patients with Parkinson's using Deep Brain Stimulation – the same procedure being tested on primates at Oxford. Professor Reiss' claims are used to contribute to SPEAK's scientific counter-arguments, such as his assertion: 'no species can function as a reliable biological model for another species. Even the chimpanzee, our closest relative in evolutionary terms, is no model for research on the human brain' (SPEAK, 2004: Bad Science). For example, the short article 'Parkinson's The Truth', that is embedded in the site, builds upon the claims put forward by Professor Reiss to portray the treatment Deep Brain Stimulation not as something that was a product of research that used vivisection, but that was pioneered through working with humans with Parkinson's:

Animals don’t get it, and the best animal experimenters have managed to do is recreate some of the symptoms. The favourite way of doing this is to apply MPTP (1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine) to the brains of animals. MPTP is a by-product of synthetic heroin. The problem with this method is that it doesn’t cause PD – it just causes illness which shares some of the symptoms. Even the animal experimenters who practice it [...] criticise it and they don’t claim animals with it have Parkinson’s. Jay Schneider, one such experimenter, calls it ‘parkinsonism’, and writes: 'Some monkeys had cognitive deficits and no motor deficits. Other monkeys had full parkinsonism that was produced after short-term high dose MPTP exposure, and some monkeys had full parkinsonism after long-term low-dose MPTP exposure'. (2004: Parkinson's the Truth)

The article is then followed by links to recommended websites for readers to find further
information to support these claims, including the Safer Medicines Campaign's website. This strategy, therefore, makes the simplistic equation (that vivisection equates to progress) more complex, by highlighting disparities between human and animal physiology, with macaque monkeys induced to have 'parkinsonianism'. Furthermore, this process of giving monkeys parkinsonianism was itself complex, with individual animal bodies often challenging attempts to regulate their responses. As will be foregrounded later on in the chapter, this is not to say these practices are not an established part of the scientific process, but it does challenge the notion of vivisection as a predictable black box that works in a particular set way.

The use of quotes and hyperlinks provides a framework for the construction of SPEAK's own arguments that, firstly, attempt to cast doubt on the effectiveness of vivisection as a research tool, before going on to present alternatives to vivisection. This leads to another tactic SPEAK employ in developing their argument, which is again related to their use of references; this time not the inclusion of direct quotations, but their tactic of supporting their criticisms of vivisection by referring and hyperlinking to prestigious groups who have opted to develop alternatives to animal research, such as the Wolfson Institute at Cambridge University that specialises in computer brain imaging, and the Neurosciences research Institute at Aston. This approach thus works to cast the most common argument in favour of vivisection as a false dichotomy, namely the framing of the issue as a choice between human or animal life: an argument which (as referred to in the introduction) has persisted throughout the history of the modern anti-vivisection movement, from Joseph Lister's, question 'shall we save a rabbit and allow a man to die?' (cited in Paget, 1903), to contemporary rhetoric on websites such as Pro-Test and Understanding Animal Research. It works to do this by highlighting that alternative options exist, aside from the two choices put forward in this dichotomy. Moreover, SPEAK respond to claims that these alternatives are not in the position to replace animal research (as made by Pro-Test), by arguing that these alternatives would be more viable if they received comparable levels of funding to animal research:
Last year, the Government made a derisory £650,000 available towards developing alternative methods of research. Barely enough to cover the wages of a few researchers and a small office space! That figure contrasted with the millions being poured into the development of the Oxford lab alone - not to mention all the other research facilities in this country. (SPEAK: Science Fiction v Fact)

In this sense they are not only foregrounding the existence of alternatives, but the economic inequalities built into the network that perpetuate existing uses of animal research and render these alternatives less common than their counterparts: making the network itself resistant to change.

This attempt to open the black box of vivisection is also supplemented by SPEAK's use of multimedia from external sources; for instance, embedded in the site’s top navigation bar, which lists the site’s web-pages, is a short film called Safer Medicines (see Fig.1: 291). Upon accessing this page, the reader is navigated to the Safer Medicines Campaign's external website which hosts the film. Once accessed, the short documentary elaborates upon SPEAK's arguments, explaining what some of the alternative methods described by SPEAK actually involve as well as questioning the scientific value of vivisection. The film is a series of interviews with scientists working with alternatives such as human tissue testing, micro-dosing, DNA chips, virtual organs and microfluidics, with these scientists providing easily comprehensible explanations of what these alternatives entail. In addition, this multimedia counterpart to SPEAK's arguments has been produced by an external source – not only enhancing their perspective by showing how the alternatives they reference could potentially work in practice, but demonstrating that it is not just animal rights activists who have concerns regarding vivisection. Indeed, scientists interviewed in the documentary make explicit their concerns, a Dr Bob Coleman for instance describes how he worked for over thirty years in a major pharmaceutical company, but was concerned about 'the lack
of predictivity in much of the data [...] generated', which resulted in him focusing on human tissue testing (Safer Medicines Campaign, 2006).

What is significant about the way in which this source is drawn upon in particular, is that a link to the film is incorporated into navigational structure of the website: appearing in the site's main menu itself, as opposed to simply being referred to on the links page or hyperlinked to in the course of SPEAK's other arguments (in the same way that they refer to the Wolfson institute for instance). This incorporation of these sources into the very architecture of the website means that not only do websites by groups such as the Safer Medicines Campaign and the Dr Hadwen Trust enable activists to access material formerly unavailable to them, they also allow the public to easily gain access to this material as it is cited.

All of these tactics, therefore, provide a framework to structure SPEAK's own arguments and counter the perspective put forward by pro-vivisection websites. In other areas of the site, this approach is developed further as SPEAK work to articulate a new story of vivisection – not as an unproblematic scientific tool, but a research method that has implications for human health as well as animal welfare. For example, SPEAK analyse claims made regarding the role of animal testing by sites like Pro-Test, such as the list of vaccines whose development they attribute to animal research:

Smallpox (cow) has now been eradicated from earth, Polio has been eradicated from North America and people in countries all over the world are being successfully treated (mouse and monkey). Insulin is now able to help control diabetes (dog, fish). There are vaccines for tetanus (horse), rubella (monkey), anthrax (sheep), and rabies (dog, rabbit).

(Pro-Test, 2006: 'Benefits')

With no additional information, this description of the use of vivisection seems to support the
existing performance of animals being used for the purposes of medical research. SPEAK counter these arguments by focusing on different aspects of the development of these vaccines and the specific role of animals in this development. With regards to the polio vaccine, for instance, SPEAK argue that the role vivisection played was complex, and animal testing was not simply an unproblematic tool that led to its development. They state that 'in developing vaccines, it's crucial to determine how the infection enters the body and pathologists discovered the polio virus in human intestines as early as 1912, suggesting entrance through the digestive tract' (SPEAK, 2004: Science Fiction v. Fact). The reason for foregrounding this issue, was that in the case of the polio vaccine animal experimentation alone was inadequate because the means by which polio was contracted varied across species: 'Monkeys contract polio nasally rather than orally [...which] postponed the development of an effective vaccine for decades'. SPEAK’s conclusion attempted to further interrogate the fact that animal testing was integral in developing the polio vaccine, concluding that:

It is true that a 'vaccine' was derived from animal experimentation. Manufactured from monkey tissue, this 'cure' resulted in six human deaths and 12 cases of paralysis. It was abandoned. Further animal experimentation led to the development of a nasal treatment, which only caused permanent olfactory damage to the children tested. In 1941, Dr. Albert Sabin studied human autopsies to finally disprove the nasal theory. He found the virus confined to the gastrointestinal tract, as had been documented nearly 30 years earlier. (2004: Science Fiction v. Fact).

Overall, therefore, this approach has worked to articulate some of the complex internal relations of this particular black box, foregrounding the existence of (allegedly) underfunded alternatives; the difficulties in drawing comparison between human and animal bodies; and previous controversies surrounding the use of vivisection. This approach thus replaces simplistic assertions as to the value of vivisection, with a complex network of relations in which the animal is a social actor that might enable the actions of human actors, but could also inhibit or disrupt this action.
This strategy is therefore vital for activist groups, creating a defence against the symbolic violence that casts their argument as irrational, whilst also enabling activists to move away from simply mimicking the authoritarian, technocratic, forms of politics that has marginalised the activists in the first place. This is because, crucially, by including these hyperlinks on their websites the activists are providing any potential audience with instantaneous access to the same sources they themselves use to develop their arguments: opening space for criticism of these sources as well as enabling access to the information provided by them. This approach may be derived from a pamphleteering lineage within anti-vivisection movements, in which footnotes frequently provided to substantiate claims made in the leaflets, but the direct access to the sources at stake afforded by hyperlinks, enables the user to navigate between a network of different sources, making the activists' approach more transparent.

Therefore, whilst the contemporary tactics of activist groups – particularly in the context of their websites – belong to an established tradition of anti-vivisection campaigning and pamphleteering, websites are a more efficient means of achieving what was previously a more difficult and complex task. This is not to say that these sites in themselves are sufficient (as subsequent chapters will argue), but the extensive collaborative bodies of knowledge developed by and between these sites provides a valuable electronic archive of information to support other forms of activism. Ultimately these sites enable activists to engage in a more comprehensive politics of articulation, due to an increased ability to network with other organisations, thus decreasing the economic burden and increasing the research capacity of activist groups. This approach gives the activists greater scope to – in Law and Singleton's terms – tell a different story of vivisection, that dissents from scientific doxa: the network formed frames and enacts vivisection in a new way.

What is valuable about this approach is also that it does not simply reinstate the hierarchical relation
between activists and scientists by attempting to simply replicate scientific discourse because these arguments are explicitly articulated from the perspective of an actor that is *invested* in this network, rather than presenting a neutral view of it. For instance, SPEAK describe themselves as 'against all animal experiments on ethical grounds' (SPEAK, 2004: About Us). Likewise, the Dr Hadwen Trust make their ethical stance clear throughout their website, as evident in their discussion of the 'three Rs' principle (the argument that the scientific community should aim to replace, refine and reduce animal research) a model initially put forward by medical research group FRAME, who had a key role in developing the framework for the 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act that currently legislates the use of vivisection in the UK (Elston, 1987: 316-319). Like the Dr Hadwen Trust, FRAME work to develop alternatives, but with the caveat that it is not possible to replace all animal research straight away, hence their proposal of refining and reducing this research, before replacing it:

FRAME’s long-term goal is the total elimination of the need for any laboratory animal procedures, through the development, validation and acceptance of replacement alternative methods. Until this goal is reached, FRAME supports efforts to reduce the numbers of animals used, through better experimental design and data analysis, and to refine procedures, so that the suffering of any animals necessarily used is minimised. (FRAME, 2006: About Us)

It is this approach that the Dr Hadwen Trust distance themselves from in stating that they do not fund research into the 'three Rs' because:

All research projects funded by the DHT are aimed solely at replacing animal experiments, in part or in full, by developing advanced non-animal techniques. The DHT does not fund research aimed at refinement or reduction of animal experiments.
Replacement is the only one of the 3 R’s that provides an alternative to laboratory animals. (Dr Hadwen Trust, 2010: FAQs)

In this sense, therefore, the ethical perspective that grounds their research is made explicit.

**Subjective Activists Versus Modest Witnesses?**

Even though the situated nature of the knowledge produced in such contexts could be understood as situated knowledge, this approach is still problematic in line with the second problem raised by Latour: that of the perceived objectivity of science being incompatible with ethical concerns. The problem facing the activists’ tactics in this context, is that their ethical grounding could seem at odds with the concept of scientific research requiring a neutral basis. Indeed, this notion of neutrality is the primary difference between pro- and anti-vivisection websites, for instance the *Pro-Test* website has entirely separate sections dedicated to the moral and scientific strands of the debate, that disavow the relation between the two, stating:

> Science is a study based in empirical evidence of the world around us. Right and wrong is thus shown by testing hypotheses ('Grass is green, 'animals are biologically similar to humans', 'giving a guinea pig thalidomide while it is pregnant will cause deformity among its litter'). Scientists will gather evidence relevant to their hypothesis before deciding whether the weight of evidence confirms or denies such a hypothesis (or leaves it inconclusive). In philosophy, or more importantly ethics, the question of what makes an argument 'right or 'wrong' lies in its assumptions and consistency. (2006: Ethics)

In this sense, the processes involved in testing a hypothesis are not directly linked to the ethical implications of these acts, which means the issue is reduced simply to questions of effectiveness as
a research method. This argument, therefore, epitomises Haraway's characterisation of un-cosmopolitical science as governed by 'unidirectional relations of use, ruled by practices of calculation and self-sure of hierarchy' (2008: 71).

In contrast to Pro-Test, the possibility of ethical and scientific issues intersecting is made explicit by groups such as the Dr Hadwen Trust who make the ethical grounding of their research explicit in stating 'we believe that excellence in medical research can and should be pursued without animal experiments because they are morally unjustified' (Dr Hadwen Trust, 2007: About Us), indeed the Trust itself was formed by the BUAV in 1970. Rather than understanding this lack of 'neutrality' as problematic, therefore, perhaps it would be more productive to understand it in line with Haraway's discussion of situated knowledge: as a prerequisite for science.

This value of non-innocent sociological approaches is outlined in Haraway's *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™* (1997) and is a development of her earlier account of situated knowledge, in being a response to the humanist notion of objectivity that she argues was derived from an exclusionary conception of the objective scientific witness developed in the 18th century. Like Latour, she draws upon Robert Boyle's experiments with the air pump as a founding moment of the modern scientific paradigm, but her focus is different. Instead of exploring the production of hybridity through the 'testimony of things', Haraway deals with the other half of this equation and analyses the way in which the reliance upon empirical data led directly to certain actors being excluded from the position of objective witness. This was because, through elevating and making credible the status of science, laboratory work had to be legitimised by objective witnesses, but what counted as an objective witness was shaped by patriarchal social structures that excluded certain social groupings from being able to assume an 'objective' subject-position: 'the exclusion of women and laboring men was instrumental to managing a critical boundary between watching and witnessing, between who is a scientist and who
is not, and between popular culture and scientific fact' (1997: 33).

Hence what it was to be a neutral human witness was predicated upon the exclusion of the irrational, a concept mapped onto the unpredictability of nature and by extension women, children, the uncultivated, the animal. Not only this, but whilst objects became actors through their necessary role in empirical research, the scientist collating this evidence masked their active role due to assuming the position of neutral witness who was seen as essential in interpreting the objective meaning of this evidence. The role of the scientist, therefore, was to speak for these other (human and non-human) actors. Thus, in a double exclusion, not only were certain actors (women, workers) explicitly precluded from the position of objective witness, the way in which this witness acted as a spokesperson for the non-human actors that provided empirical data, also implicitly excluded these actors from bearing witness. In this light, scientific practice was governed by representative forms of politics that were cast as the only means of gaining objectivity.

These forms of scientific witnesses are, for Haraway, actors that presume to be neutral due to maintaining a veneer of objectivity, or removal from social and cultural bias, which she describes as 'self-invisibility'; 'the specifically modern, European, masculine, scientific form of the virtue of modesty' (1997: 23). This invisibility is what:

guarantees that the modest witness is the legitimate and authorized ventriloquist for the object world, adding nothing from his mere opinions, from his biasing embodiment. And so he is endowed with the remarkable power to establish the facts. He bears witness: he is objective; he guarantees the purity and clarity of objects. (1997: 24)

In other words, this witness embodies everything that Haraway criticises in earlier essays such as 'Inappropriate/d Others' and 'Situated Knowledges'; solely practising a politics of semiotics, in
continuously objectifying actors by treating them as entities that can only be represented by an appropriately disinterested actor (namely, himself).

Likewise, the form of research engaged in by this witness is the antithesis of situated knowledge, in seeking to deny any form of cultural, political or social bias that might frame it: 'His narratives have a magical power – they lose all trace of their history as stories, as products of partisan projects, as contestable representations, or as constructed documents in their potent capacity to define the facts' (1997: 24). In line with the previous chapter, therefore, such forms of objectivity are deeply un-cosmopolitical and, in an equivalent argument to Latour's claim that the subject/object distinction founded modernity, Haraway suggests that:

This separation of expert knowledge from mere opinion as the legitimating knowledge for ways of life, without appeal to transcendent authority or to abstract certainty of any kind, is a founding gesture of what we call modernity. It is the founding gesture of the separation of the technical and political. (1997: 24)

This form of witness is understood as hugely problematic in embodying the same form of Sufficient Reason that Haraway criticises in *When Species Meet* as a means of unproblematically legitimising vivisection. This brand of reason can only derive from a position of neutrality that denies its own cultural and political situatedness. In line with 'Situated Knowledges', *Modest Witness* elucidates the political problems of this position by exploring how the metaphysical dichotomies it instated forced certain groups into subaltern roles, with Haraway stating that her 'focus is [...] to ask if gender, with all its tangled knots with their systems of stratified relationships, was at stake in key reconfigurations of knowledge and practice that constituted modern science' (1997: 28). This leads her to ask questions such as:
How did gender-in-the-making become part of negotiating the continually vexed boundary/between the 'inside' and 'outside' of science? How did gender-in-the-making relate to establishing what counted as objective and subjective, political and technical, abstract and concrete, credible and ridiculous? (1997: 29)

In a similar manner to Latour's account of the significance of the subject/object distinction, for Haraway the role of gender in this context was to demarcate the boundary between what was and was not considered scientific. It fulfilled this role through functioning as a key binary opposition through which other 'entwined, barely analytically separable, highly protean, relational categories' could be figured (1997: 30). However, this was not simply a semiotic construction of oppositional categories that could be mapped on to gender, as the material exclusion of women from scientific practice was also a constituent moment in defining scientific objectivity: 'The issue was whether women had the independent status to be modest witnesses and they did not. Technicians, who were physically present, were also epistemologically invisible persons in the experimental way of life; women were invisible in both physical and epistemological senses' (1997: 27).

Haraway is careful to foreground that it was not simply 'gender' that played this role, but 'gender-in-the-making', as the former term would presuppose an essentialised form of gender. Gender itself, therefore, did not simply constitute this series of material-semiotic structures, but was constituted by them in a co-production of normative structures. This means that gender-in-the-making, along with all of the other relational oppositions that follow from it, are doxic structures in Bourdieu's sense; as Haraway reiterates:

Enhancing their agency through their masculine virtue exercised in carefully regulated 'public' spaces, modest men were to be self invisible, transparent, so their reports would not be polluted by the body. Only in that way could they give credibility to their
descriptions of other bodies and minimize critical attention to their own. This is a crucial epistemological move in the grounding of several centuries of race, sex, and class discourses as objective 'scientific reports'. (1997: 32)

In other words, the relations produced by this particular social and cultural configuration served to produce understandings of gender relations that were understood (and enacted) as natural or inevitable. The enactment and embodiment of these relations then served to reflexively legitimise the material-semiotic structures that produced them, to the extent that these structures became unspoken, unacknowledged norms. This is because, in a similar manner to Skeggs' account of the formation of class, once a certain social position has been assumed, the material-semiotic structures that have constructed this position make it difficult to gain the necessary cultural attributes to move away from it. In the case of gender, therefore, women were historically precluded from assuming the position of modest witness, or from engaging with the forms of objective knowledge that this position privileged; however, due to this structural exclusion being unacknowledged, the appearance was maintained that women were simply unable to fulfil this role due to their intrinsic subjectivity, or even irrationality. Thus this particular set of social relations were normalised as inevitable, rather than the product of a modern paradigm.

This brings things full circle to the problem mapped out in Haraway's criticisms of both pro- and anti-vivisection discourses in *When Species Meet*, as set out throughout the previous chapter, when she argues that both are appealing to Sufficient Reason in developing their arguments. The former is resolutely humanist due to appealing to a discourse that is structured by dichotomies such as male/female, man/animal, culture/nature; the latter retains the vestige of humanism because it is attempting to ground animal rights in the same possessive individualism that underpins this humanist reason. However, as evident upon contrasting pro- and anti-vivisection websites, it is a mistake to argue that all anti-vivisection websites use this form of reason.
Indeed, in explicitly stating their own subjective perspective and demonstrating how that perspective informs their research, certain animal rights groups practice the same form of situated knowledge advocated by Haraway. Rather than understand the explicit ethical positions of the Dr Hadwen Trust and its relation to the BUAV as problematic, therefore, perhaps it would be more productive to understand it as a powerful situated vantage point from which to critique the separation of scientific and social issues, along with the anthropocentric rationale that provides ethical sanction to animal research. What this does not mean, is that empirical evidence is distorted by being forced to fit into a predefined agenda. Instead, in line with Latour, they are simply acknowledging the 'outside' of scientific practice: the ethical decisions and funding processes necessary for research to happen at all, which in this instance is the rationale that vivisection is unethical and replacements should be sought.

In other words, these sites' acknowledgement of their 'subjectivity' could be seen as central to them contributing to the more 'objective' approach to the issue of vivisection produced by the issue-network as a whole; in forcing pro-vivisection sites to elaborate on their own arguments and respond adequately to the more complex engagement taken by the activists. This is evident upon examining how anti-vivisection sites are attempting to foreground the role of animals as social actors within these networks, and pro-vivisection sites responses to these articulations.

**Introducing Monsters to the Network**

What is valuable about sites such as SPEAK is that they go beyond simply re-articulating an alternative scientific perspective, instead effectively undertaking what Latour asserts should be added to the paradigm of modernity to overcome its problems: the task of developing an understanding of the production of hybridity within this network, in other words, unmasking the
process that is disguised by modernity. It is in this way that, despite websites such as SPEAK claiming to be 'the voice for the rights of animals', they are not simply (to use Haraway's term) engaging a 'politics of semiotics'—speaking for the animal— but instead articulating the animal test subject's active role in shaping its actor-network. In a sense, therefore, the organisation of these sites has epistemological significance that goes beyond the activists' explicit intentions in serving to expose the unacknowledged doxa that perpetuate existing scientific relations. Whilst these sites occasionally employ a discourse predicated upon a humanist conception of human rights, the structural and epistemological rejection of binary oppositions through their articulation of complex networks of relations, means that their value is in stepping away from rights-based arguments.

This treatment of the animal as actor is apparent in SPEAK's description of a particular experiment that took place at Oxford university: 'As part of a long-term study at Oxford University involving at least 20 monkeys, three macaques had part of their brains' visual cortex removed and were then tested at various times on a variety of visual tasks' (2004: Primate Research at Oxford). SPEAK use this experiment to illustrate that, despite adhering to strict methodological guidelines to perform a uniform operation that removed an equal part of each monkey's visual cortex, the results varied from animal to animal. Echoing groups such at the Dr Hadwen Trust, SPEAK go on to describe how this disparity indicated that: 'The size of key parts of the brain are different in individual monkeys and different again in humans. Age when the surgical damage is inflicted and length of post-operative survival time also have an impact on the extent of the visual damage found' ('Primate Research at Oxford'). In this sense, despite the experiments being conducted in accordance with rigorous laboratory protocol, the physiology of the monkeys themselves subverted the results, due to biological variables that undermined the possibility of affirming any hypothesis that could yield positive results for human medical progress. This is not to say the scientists themselves learned nothing from these results at all, indeed SPEAK suggest that:
The researchers believed their experiments confirmed what had been already concluded from experiments by other research teams: namely, that the visual damage being studied in these surgically mutilated monkeys probably arose from differences in the number of cells in the different regions of the brain. (2004: Primate Research at Oxford)

In emphasising the animal's role in experimental science, where results are unpredictable, the vivisected animal cannot be understood as an unproblematic 'black box' as the specific biology of each animal resists being objectified in this manner. In this context, therefore, the animal can be understood as an actor, due to its role within this particular actor-network having an influence on the overall performance of the network. Instead of the animals being an unproblematic part of a performance that contributes directly to medical progress, the test-subjects resist the uniform function posited for them by this laboratory actor network, altering its performance in such a way that the network fails to produce any conclusive results. What is foregrounded, therefore, is that the intricacies of scientific process do not yield the simple conclusion that vivisection leads directly to medical progress.

What SPEAK highlight, therefore, is that the nature of scientific process is such that many of the experiments that take place might provide inconclusive evidence, which does not directly lead to cures for human diseases. While this form of research might be a well-established part of scientific practice, vivisection's use in experimental science (as opposed to applied medical research) is rarely foregrounded, or even acknowledged, in other contexts – particularly when the value of research is advocated in the mass media. This is demonstrated by claims made by Professor Aziz to Adam Wishart, director of a BBC documentary about vivisection called *Monkeys, Rats and Me*, where he focuses solely on the direct benefits of such research, inferring a linear causal relationship between research and treatments: 'You take someone who was bound to a wheelchair or unable to move and suddenly they have surgery based on conclusions drawn from my primate research and they are up
again' (cited in Wishart, *Mail On Sunday*: 2006). The activists' focus on the role of the marginalised in specific contexts thus serves not to speak on behalf of animal test subjects, instead allowing primates to enter into the vivisection actor-network as actors: demonstrating that they have a more contentious, more problematic, role than is suggested by Professor Aziz.

Despite their slogan 'the voice of the animals', therefore, the science-focused sections of SPEAK's website display how, through analysing the role of the animal within scientific actor-networks, SPEAK are not acting as ventriloquists for laboratory animals, but are engaging in Haraway's politics of articulation. They are effectively mapping out specific manifestations of the vivisection actor-network in order to foreground the animal’s role as actor within it, challenging simplistic accounts of the animal as black box (as with Professor Aziz's claims). This focus on the node of relations that the animal sustains within the vivisection actor-network embodies Haraway's politics of articulation through tracing a complex set of inter-dependent relationships that are irreducible to simplistic ethical conclusions. In accordance with this politics of articulation, SPEAK’s approach enables the animals to (metaphorically) speak for themselves: existing not as a resource to be drawn upon by scientists, but an actor resisting determination and capable of modifying the performance of vivisection as a predictable tool within the medical actor-network. In this way, to refer back to Haraway's earlier claim, SPEAK allow the animals to 'resist reductions', increasing the failure rate of the dominant actors' attempts to reduce the animal 'to resources – to mere ground and matrix for their action' (1992: 311).

**Productive Antagonism**

Interrelating these perspectives, therefore, has illustrated that productive forms of antagonism can emerge within these online contexts. As suggested by Marres' focus on the antagonistic, as well as the collaborative dimension of ICTs, examining these sites builds up a picture of an issue where
antagonism proves as productive as collaboration in forcing a more comprehensive articulation of the actor-network at stake and making explicit the situated perspectives of the actors involved. What is particularly significant about the activist sites – especially the Safer Medicines Campaign – is the way in which they embrace this debate.

This is evident upon analysing the argument between the Safer Medicines Campaign and the BBC over the documentary *Monkeys, Rats and Me* (see Figs 3-5: 292). The campaign, then called Europeans for Medical Progress (EMP), made complaints to the BBC regarding statements made as to the value of vivisection to medical progress and regarding the omission of interviews made with a member of EMP from the documentary. They provide an in-depth account of the controversy, with separate web-pages dedicated to their original complaint over the documentary, the BBC’s initial response, their own appeal, the programme maker's response and a response from a Professor Page criticising the Safer Medicine Campaign's stance. By including critical sources, *as well as* those adhering to their own stance, the campaign mapped out the critical terrain of the debate, taking into account scientific arguments against vivisection that rarely received media attention as well as the pro-vivisection arguments that appeared in documentaries such as *Monkeys, Rats and Me*. In contrast, the Safer Medicines Campaign worked to map out the networks at stake and articulate the complexity of the debate, both engaging with actors articulating a position antithetical to their perspective and criticising these articulations by enacting the debate in a more comprehensive manner. Extensive arguments that attempt to justify their complaints are set out on the site:

It is more than unfortunate that most of the facts in a supposedly factual programme were wrong. For example, the claim was made many times that all medical breakthroughs have come from animal research, without which medical progress would be impossible. This is a ludicrous claim, which is patently false. The Advertising Standards Authority recently ruled that the milder claim 'Some of the major advances in
the last century would have been impossible without animal research' is misleading and should not be repeated. (Safer Medicines Campaign, N.D.: Latest News)

This argument is then followed by a corroborative hyperlink to the Advertising Standards Authority's website, which contains their ruling on the statement in full. However, what is particularly important is that in their attempts to map out this debate they also include opposing sources, embedding these antagonistic perspectives in their own site. These sources are not simply quoted selectively then criticised, but are hosted on the website in their entirety, as a virtual appendix of the debate (see fig.3). This allows the reader to gain access to critical as well as corroborative arguments within the debate. In contrast to this, complaints made by the programme makers seem to be attempting to shut down the debate, for example, they state that: 'It was our contention that the argument of Europeans for Medical Progress was not a “significant” strand of the debate, in particular because they misrepresented their views as an important part of the debate within the scientific community, whereas this was clearly not the case' (Wishart, 2008). This attempt to shut down debate is in contrast to the Safer Medicines Campaign's attempts to articulate the specificities of certain aspects of the vivisection actor-network: as is evident in this critical quote being included in their own website. This is also exemplified by the contrast in approach between the Safer Medicines Campaign and the programme makers' assertion that 'This is not a matter of controversy. There is no significant dissension within the scientific community' (Wishart, 2008). Therefore, while the programme makers only reveal an aspect of the scientific network – where the animal functions as an unproblematic research tool – the Safer Medicines Campaign reveal a network riddled with controversy, where the animal can assume a role as a disruptive actor.

The attitude of the programme makers is perhaps an extreme counterpoint to these activist sites, with other pro-vivisection websites providing a more productive form of debate than that put forward by Wishart, such as Pro-Test. As opposed to the complete rejection of anti-vivisection
arguments evidenced by programme makers in the *Monkeys, Rats and Me* debate, a more politically significant result of the attempts by SPEAK and the Safer Medicines Campaign to trace scientific actor-networks, is their direct effect on the pro-vivisection discourse: an effect that became evident with the launch of *Pro-Test*. As outlined above, *Monkeys, Rats and Me* omitted the Safer Medicines Campaign's arguments against vivisection, while scientists at Oxford such as Professor Tipu Aziz dismissed criticism of vivisection as stemming from 'a humanoid perception of animals that's almost cartoon-like' (cited in Jeffries, 2006). In contrast with this, *Pro-Test* is a direct response to the claims made by anti-vivisectionists as to the scientific value of vivisection, arguing that the site aims 'to dispel the irrational myths promoted by anti-vivisectionists' (Pro-Test: Home).

While, on a certain level, the site deploys the black boxes characteristic of discourses that attempt to end a debate with undisputed 'facts', in much the same way that SPEAK's mission-statement is at odds with the account of vivisection actually performed by the site (claiming to represent the animals but actually instigating a politics of articulation that allows animals to emerge as actors), the statements in *Pro-Test* that infer debate is being shut down are at odds with its content. Instead, like SPEAK, the *Pro-Test* site engages in mapping out scientific actor-networks in order to counter the manner in which anti-vivisectionists articulate these same networks. For example, in the case of Vioxx, an anti-arthritis drug that was trialled on animals, but was later discovered to cause cardiac arrests in humans, leading to '88,000 to 139,000 heart attacks, 30 to 40 per cent of which were fatal' (Pro-Test, 2006: FAQs), Pro-Test argue that:

> The number of animals used in trials was limited for ethical reasons - only a few hundred were used. This made it impossible to detect a side effect that would only show up in every 1 in 400 cases. To detect a 1 in 400 incidence of a side effect would require the use of at least 5,000 animals to be sure the data was statistically significant (p = 0.005) rather than just a chance occurrence. (Pro-Test, 2006: FAQs)
The difference between Pro-Test and SPEAK's sites, therefore, does not stem from their methodological approaches, but in the value judgements superimposed upon each site's discussion of these actor-networks. This is made explicit in the sites' respective discussion of the use of animals in experimental research that is not for a specific purpose, but to garner general data pertaining to primate physiology. In their web-page 'Animal Testing at Oxford', for instance, SPEAK publish evidence that outlines eight experiments and questions the relevance of these studies to developing cures directly, describing them as 'painful and pointless'. In one such experiment:

Brain damage was produced either by the use of a toxic chemical or by surgical removal of parts of the cortex. According to the scientists, 'A frustration task was designed in which food was visible but unavailable to the monkey'. The experiments showed that in some cases, brain damage led to more violent and aggressive behaviour. (SPEAK, 2004)

However, Pro-Test describe these experiments as 'pure research', arguing that it is valuable because 'the nature of scientific discovery is such that not all experiments can be directed towards a directly-applicable goal, such as a cure for malaria. Instead, some research must develop our understanding of how bodies work' (2006: About the Research). In the same way as SPEAK, despite the difference in opinion regarding whether it is ethical to use animals for research that is not for a directly applicable goal, the site still articulates the roles of animals as actors; foregrounding their active role within the network and demonstrating that sometimes the animal bodies resist the role posited for them and redefine scientific predictions.

However, despite treating the animal as an actor in a certain sense – unlike SPEAK – Pro-Test's
politics of articulation is inhibited by the divorce of ethical and scientific issues. In other words, even whilst their analysis of scientific relations foregrounds the animal's role as actor, Pro-Test are still ultimately appealing to the same 'Great Divide' between nature and culture as described by Latour: where ethical issues are treated as separate from scientific issues. Nonetheless, whilst on the one hand they are separating science and ethics, on the other they are appealing to a humanist ethics to legitimise vivisection (as made explicit by the bibliography on their ethics section listing philosophers such as David Hume). This approach means that they are effectively ignoring the results of scientific practice itself, by failing to allow it to challenge their predefined epistemological frameworks. In this sense, the development of new forms of ethics, in line with their politics of articulation, is undermined by their insistence that only the human has rights, which are defined as such by being opposed to the animal, as evident by their 'Ethics' section which argues:

> When a living organism is killed it is deprived of potential life - there is obviously a huge difference between killing a young orangutan and swatting a fly. Not only will the orangutan probably live much longer but the quality of its life will almost certainly be better; it can interpret the world around it, enjoy pleasures, think and provide pleasure for others around it as a social being. A fly on the other hand will probably have far less substance to its life and the consequence of killing it is therefore less great (though this does not necessarily justify mindless fly swatting). The further corollary of this is that usually a human's life will have greater value than an animal. (Pro-Test, 2006: Ethics)

In this instance, it is only through comparing an orangutan with a fly, then a human with an orangutan, that differences are articulated between these different types of animal; relying on a constant deferral of meaning in order to ground its ethics; in line with Calerco's insight that *différence* is at play in contexts where the human can only define itself against the animal: 'we find
in *Of Grammatology* the claim that the term “human” gains sense only in relation to a set of excluded terms and identities' (2008: 104). Furthermore, Pro-Test's lack of establishing a firm epistemological distinction between human and animal is foregrounded by the appeal to undefined attributes such as 'quality of life' and what it means to be a 'social being'. In the context of the vivisection debate, these arguments are further problematised by Pro-Test's need to foreground similarities between man and animal, in order to argue for the relevance of experimental pure science pertaining to monkey physiology and neurology to the human body. This focus on the similarities between man and animal problematises ethical arguments predicated upon their separation, which means their only way of legitimising their argument that 'right to life must be based on whether an organism is capable of making a meaningful reflection on whether it should live or die', is in making theological parallels (even though they then attempt to distance themselves from these parallels):

Faith based groups in particular often argue that man is sacred – to be set apart. Without invocation of a particular doctrine it is hard to defend this stance and strikes many, perhaps not unreasonably, as no more than speciesism. It is not my place to comment on the nature of certain faiths and the validity of their beliefs, but interesting to note that this sense of humans being set apart in certain relevant ways is intrinsic to many ethical systems. (2006: Ethics)

Thus their allusion to ethical perspectives predicated on a transcendent moral framework is akin to their continued appeals to an overarching rational framework that informs their arguments, even whilst the politics of articulation enacted by their website moves away from this. In this context, therefore, the tenuous grounding of the doxic structures that perpetuate the status quo that Pro-Test are defending, have been exposed due to the emergence of heterodox counter-arguments by groups such as SPEAK. This is explicit in this instance, due to Pro-Test's assertion that their site was
directly in response to arguments made by anti-vivisection groups. In this way, the antagonistic nature of this issue-network has been productive in forcing unacknowledged doxa to become orthodox and opened to debate, because of the emergence of effective counter-arguments that succeed in exposing the doxa as being merely orthodox: socially normative rather than *a priori* truth. In this light, rather than understanding the value of these sites as crafting a hegemonic articulation of vivisection as a tool that does not work, or is intrinsically unethical, perhaps it would be more productive to understand them in line with Haraway's politics of articulation – focusing on their capacity to map out actor-networks and expose the doxa to critique. It is testament to the success of sites such as SPEAK, the Dr Hadwen Trust and Safer Medicines that, through enacting a politics that exposes these structures, relations integral to the vivisection actor-network have been opened to debate.

**Conclusion**

Despite this chapter's attempts to recuperate the work of animal rights groups from Haraway's critique, this is not to say that the politics of articulation focused on in this chapter is fully formed: it is more of a tentative – even at times unconscious – move away from representational politics. As referred to earlier, this politics sometimes emerges almost in spite of what SPEAK allege – indeed, in a sense their insistence that the animal is of no use as a scientific tool leads to the development of an equally reductive position for the animal as the pro-vivisection groups' insistence that animals are simply tools. The mapping out of controversies does challenge these fixed roles, but not necessarily extensively enough to be regarded as a comprehensive politics of articulation.

Nonetheless, it does point toward a much more complex picture of animal rights than Haraway suggests, and one that illustrates certain shared values and tactics with alter-globalisation groups; with its use of literal networks (both virtual and material) to create space for thinking about
objectified entities as actors. What this illustrates is that even in groups seemingly embodying Haraway's politics of semiotics, a far more complex mode of political action is also taking place and subsequent chapters will show that in other animal rights groups this similarity to alter-globalisation groups is more deliberate, with a conscious engagement in non-humanist politics.

Therefore, whilst this chapter has foregrounded how certain animal rights groups have engaged in a politics of articulation in order to render the doxa orthodox, it has not resolved all of the political issues stemming from these processes of de-naturalising doxa. Whilst these groups articulate animals' roles as actors within the vivisection actor-network, there is still a need to develop a more comprehensive ethics, in order to understand – after criticising existing relations – how the network could be reconfigured in a less exploitative manner. Indeed, the problem of how to move away from humanism whilst engaging in animal rights activism (with 'rights' itself being a contradiction in terms in this context) is evident in the tensions between the claims made by groups such as SPEAK, with regard to speaking for animals, and the politics of articulation emerging in a virtual setting. This is an overarching difficulty that will be focused on in chapter five, which will explore how animal rights groups are developing an ethical approach more suited to this form of non-humanist politics.

The second problem area is the broader political impact of engaging in a politics of articulation; while it might be epistemologically significant, what is its influence on how vivisection is enacted in practice? Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's criticism of Latour is pertinent at this juncture: in their attempt to undermine Science In Action, they suggest that emphasising elements of science such as its situatedness and its continuous rejection of older 'truths' as newer truths are discovered, is a 'true but banal' part of scientific practice and not as radical as Latour implies (1998: 92). However this criticism fails to consider that what might be a mundane part of scientific practice is not necessarily understood as such by the broader public; hence scientific claims are treated as
undisputed fact by the media when they might be, for example, an as yet unfalsified hypothesis or a personal opinion. This is made explicit in the controversy surrounding *Monkeys, Rats and Me*, in which complaints made to the BBC by Safer Medicines Campaign were upheld by the BBC, namely that pro-vivisection claims made by Professor Tipu Aziz were allowed to remain unchallenged because anti-vivisection arguments that were filmed failed to be included in the programme. The issue mapped out by the BBC was that ‘whether or not Professor Aziz was expressing his “personal view” seems [...] irrelevant; it was the view of a scientist, speaking about an area in which he professes expertise’ (Steel, 2007). In this sense, even though the scientific community may have understood this claim as an opinion or potentially falsifiable, in the context of a documentary intended for the public sphere, the Professor's argument would be understood as a definitive expert opinion or fact. This is particularly the case due to the controversial nature of the claim being unapparent, with information and interviews that dissented from this claim being edited from the final documentary, a complaint again upheld by the BBC, who stated: 'There are others, some scientists included, who would challenge or at least qualify that view, and it is to that extent a matter of controversy' (Steel, 2007). It is this public dimension that Sokal and Bricmont fail to consider: Latour's work seems mundane in the context of a scientific community, because its value lies in developing a broader, public, understanding of scientific practice.

This is absolutely essential in understanding the role of activist networks, in terms of their engagement with scientific discourse. The Pro-Test website takes a similar tactic to Sokal and Bricmont, suggesting that in the scientific community it is common knowledge that animal testing does not always succeed, as 'this stage of testing is never foolproof’ (Pro-Test, 2006: About the Research), and merely part of an ongoing process of (potentially falsifiable) scientific investigation, and thus anti-vivisection websites that foreground this point are effectively emphasising something that, in Sokal's words is 'true but banal'. However, like Sokal and Bricmont with Latour, this argument is missing the point of what the SPEAK website is actually doing. In a similar manner to
Latour’s act of describing scientific actor-networks to reveal their, often banal, reality, anti-vivisection websites are foregrounding vivisection’s complex role in scientific practice to reveal a reality that might seem banal in scientific terms, but rarely features in the media framing of the debate – as demonstrated by *Monkeys, Rats and Me*. In other words, the significance of the websites in mapping out the vivisection actor-network is not in telling a unique or novel story of vivisection, but in adding a new dimension to how the story is relayed in the public sphere. Such re-articulations of vivisection are vital to activists, as they can impact upon how vivisection is enacted in practice – and this practical impact will be the focus of the following chapter.
Notes

1 As touched on earlier, autre-mondialisation, or alter-globalisation, is for Haraway 'about nurturing a more just and peaceful other-globalization', a process (in relation to human-animal interaction) that necessitates: 'retying some of the knots of ordinary multispecies living on earth' (2008: 3).

2 Despite SPEAK distancing themselves from direct action tactics, the movement (along with other high profile groups such as Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty, or SHAC) are frequently referenced in the media in relation to debates regarding animal rights extremism, which often explicitly link such movements with terrorism: as reflected by articles such as the Times' 'Terror Laws Will Apply to Animal Rights Lobby' (Ford, Woolcock and Irving, 2005).

3 The statue's inscription actually read: 'In memory of the brown terrier dog done to death in the laboratories of University College in February 1903, after having endured vivisection extending over more than two months and having been handed over from one vivisector to another till death came to his release. Also in memory of the 232 dogs vivisected at the same place during the year 1902. Men and women of England, how long shall these things be?' (cited in Mason, 1997: 23).

4 The specific implications of this eyewitness account was that this particular experiment had contravened the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, with a clear indication that two laws in particular had been ignored. The animal was 'already sporting a wound from what they believed was a previous experment' and 'did not appear [...] to have been properly anaesthetised' (Mason, 1997: 10). In line with the 1876 Act, both conducting more than one experiment on the same animal and failing to properly anaesthetise an animal undergoing an experiment were both illegal practices.

5 The BUAV were actually formed after an internal conflict within NAVS, between those (such as Coleridge) who wanted gradual legislative change, and those who demanded the complete abolition of animal experimentation. This led to a split within the organisation, when those arguing for the latter stance broke off to form the BUAV.

6 Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) developed the concept of the scientific paradigm, which is essentially an epistemological framework grounded in a particular understanding of the universe that – for a time – frames subsequent scientific endeavour. In Kuhn's terms, therefore, paradigms are 'universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners' (1962:8). However, at specific junctures certain theories and experimental results emerge that are at odds with the existing scientific paradigm, providing new evidence that throws the existing paradigm into crisis, and leading to the formation of a new paradigm; for Kuhn: 'the resulting transition to a new paradigm is scientific revolution' (1962: 90). This process of scientific revolution, or paradigm shift, occurred for instance when the Copernican revolution led to the revelation that the Earth orbits the Sun (rather than vice versa) or when Einstein's theory or relativity displaced Newtonian physics.

7 At present, the Dr Hadwen Trust's existing portfolio of university research includes: research into epilepsy at Newcastle University; bone disease at Cardiff; nanotoxity testing at Nottingham; abdominal pain studies at Queen Mary's; brain cell imaging at Birmingham; Huntington's disease at Sheffield; breast cancer at Leeds; cystic fibrosis at Liverpool; viral encephalitis at Liverpool; and neuroscience at Durham.
Chapter 4

Power, Permanence and Political Transformation: Reconciling Bourdieu and Latour

Whereas chapter one sketched out what a politics of articulation was and how it relates to the work of alter-globalisation groups, and the previous chapter described the emergence of a tentative politics of articulation in anti-vivisection groups, this chapter will provide a more detailed account of the mechanisms by which the work of these groups can challenge existing networks of relations. In other words, it will focus on the minutiae of how a form of networked politics that seeks to transform an actor-network could work in practice. Whilst this approach will still draw upon the virtual networks deployed by anti-vivisection groups to enhance their politics of articulation, it will also explore how these networks relate to the forms of practical action engaged in by groups such as the British Union Against Vivisection (BUAV). This is because, as with the anti-McDonald's campaign discussed in chapter one, whilst online activism is valuable in extending a network and communicating on a global scale, it needs to be re-territorialised in order to have direct interventional impact on the network. For this reason the chapter will begin to trace ways in which these forms of politics can come together in the politics of articulation created by animal rights activists.

However, before discussing these new networks, some of the theoretical arguments put forward by Haraway, which have provided a framework in previous chapters, need to be developed. The comparative brevity of 'Promises of Monsters' in relation to her longer texts and the slight lack of clarity in When Species Meet as to the practical application of her ethics, means that the mechanisms of how the politics she advocates can be enacted needs to be made more explicit: particularly with regard to the issue of political change. In order to understand more clearly how a politics of articulation can be used to instigate political change this chapter will have a greater focus on ANT, as the work of Latour and other ANT theorists is a significant theoretical influence on
Haraway and using ANT to develop some of her arguments provides a means of understanding how Haraway's work can function in practice. However, somewhat problematically, ANT in itself cannot solve these problems, and requires certain conceptual tools in order to address this problem of change in more detail; tools that can be found in the work of a theorist vehemently critical of Latour, Pierre Bourdieu, who claims that:

Latour [...] gives an enlarged picture of all the aberrations of the new sociology of science [...] 'The artificial reality that the participants describe as an objective entity, has in fact been constructed'. Starting from this observation, which for anyone familiar with Bachelard is hardly stunning, it is possible, by playing on words or letting words play, to move to apparently radical propositions (calculated to make big waves on American campuses dominated by the logical-positivist vision). (Bourdieu, 2004: 26)

In his account of Latour's work as, one the one hand, 'hardly stunning' whilst, on the other, putting forward 'radical propositions', Bourdieu's criticisms dovetail with Sokal's, characterisation of Latour as 'either true but banal, or else surprising but manifestly false' (1998: 92). Like Sokal he is thus asserting his own position of privilege in the sociological field to undermine Latour's perspective via an act of symbolic violence that both lambasts the entire US philosophical tradition and then falsely infers Latour is rooted in that tradition. However, unlike Sokal and despite his own criticisms, Bourdieu's account of scientific practice can interrelate with ANT's. Indeed, this chapter will argue that such an interrelation is necessary in order to address the pivotal problem raised at the end of the previous chapter, as to whether a politics of articulation can have a practical impact on scientific practice and fundamentally transform scientific relations.

The value of Bourdieu is in the capacity of his theoretical concepts to interrogate and de-naturalise the formation of normative social relations (as illustrated by his notion of the doxa in the previous
chapter), which means they are effective in highlighting certain assumptions that are grounded in humanism and in opening space for questioning whether these relations could be reconfigured. However, due to antagonism between Latour and Bourdieu — principally centred around the implicit anthropocentrism of Bourdieu's work in comparison with Latour's disintegration of ontological differences between human and nonhuman actors — there are difficulties in developing a Latour-Bourdieu relation, as certain elements of their work are seemingly incompatible. For this reason, other ANT theorists will also be drawn upon, particularly the more performative understandings of ANT that is foregrounded in the work of Annemarie Mol, as her work provides a more effective route into interrelating these theorists. This approach might seem complex, but it is also valuable in terms of unearthing certain theoretical tools, which are provided by all of these theorists but need to be combined to develop a means of conceptualising transformational political action that does not rely on a humanist framework.

This problem not only needs to be resolved for ANT; the issue of change is also a crucial question that needs to be addressed in relation to Bourdieu's work itself, as suggested by Toril Moi who asks whether: 'Bourdieu’s theories, with their insistence on the way in which social agents internalize dominant social values [are] capable of theorizing change? Is Bourdieu implying that social power structures always win out?' (2001: 269). This chapter will argue that Bourdieu's work does have the capacity to show how change can occur in a network of relations, but it is also valuable in understanding why creating this change is so difficult. In again drawing upon anti-vivisection networks, this time predominantly those surrounding the contemporary manifestation of the BUAV, the chapter will demonstrate that only through combining insights from Bourdieu's account of science with ANT is it possible to understand the means by which these activist groups have instigated changes in scientific practice and the problems they face in doing so.

This framework will enable an exploration of how these animal rights groups are enacting the form
of politics Haraway advocates, but it will again foreground a disparity between the politics enacted by these groups and the humanist social structures they still tend to appeal to. However, this tension will prove to be a productive one as it is effectively a mirror-image of the contradictions contained in *When Species Meet*, which explicitly advocates a rejection of humanism whilst unintentionally maintaining humanist values in the practical case studies it provides. This and the previous chapter, therefore, illustrate how animal rights activism itself needs to be turned to in order to realise Haraway's theoretical arguments in a practical sense whilst, conversely, her work proves valuable in foregrounding tensions within animal rights discourse.

**Can Bourdieu's structuring structures be reconciled with Latour's networks?**

Due to Bourdieu's symbolically violent dismissal of Latour, it is necessary to map out the nature of their respective arguments and whether they are in any way compatible, before relating the theorists to the BUAV to understand how the group have challenged existing political structures. Key to conceptualising a relation between Bourdieu and ANT, is drawing certain similarities between the concept of the field and that of the network. To cite Moi's succinct account of Bourdieu's concept, the field is 'a competitive system of social relations which function according to its own specific logic or rules' (2001: 269). However, in *Science of Science and Reflexivity* (2004), Bourdieu argues that what characterises the scientific field in particular is its comparative autonomy from socio-economic forces:

> To say that the field is relatively autonomous with respect to the encompassing social universe is to say that the system of the field (tension) is relatively independent of the forces exerted on the field (pressure). It has, as it were, the 'freedom' it needs to develop its own necessity, its own logic, its own *nomos*. (Bourdieu, 2004: 47)
What he means by this, is that the internal structures of the field are not shaped by external forces, an idea that seems in opposition to Latour's arguments in *Science in Action*, in which he argues that pure science is inextricable from the socio-economic relations that enable it to take place (1987: 145-176). However, this difference is not as profound as it initially appears to be; Latour is not necessarily suggesting that every aspect of “pure” science is directly shaped by economic imperatives. He does suggest that the process of, for instance, obtaining funding allows research to take place at all, but this is not necessarily incompatible with Bourdieu who only claims that the scientific field is relatively independent from these pressures. Indeed, even this relative autonomy does not mean that the field as a whole is detached from socio-economic influence, merely that its *internal organisation* is comparatively independent and organised according to a different set of norms and values than the economic.

In this way, Bourdieu's argument is not necessarily incompatible with Latour, who is simply foregrounding that science is not a straight-forward teleological process of discovery, but a competitive field in which factors other than 'purely' scientific imperatives impact upon scientific practice. These imperatives do not have to be external 'forces exerted on the field' or the 'Machiavellian strategies' that Bourdieu accuses him of attributing to scientists (2004: 28), instead these factors could be the distribution of specifically scientific cultural capital or influence of scientific doxa on its practice. In other words, the reason why Latour suggests that the social and the scientific cannot be separated could be due to the same social factors that Bourdieu argues have a key role in organising the scientific field. For instance, Bourdieu claims that even for the scientific field: 'Autonomy is not a given, but a historical conquest [...] this is easily forgotten in the natural sciences' (2004: 47). This understanding of autonomy as the product of social relations (whose origin is then forgotten), is not dissimilar to Latour's argument that:

*Technoscience has an inside because it has an outside. There is a positive feedback loop*
in this innocuous definition: the bigger, the harder, the purer science is inside, the further outside other scientists have to go. It is because of this feedback that, if you get inside a laboratory, you see no public relations, no politics, no class struggle, no lawyers; you see science isolated from society. (1987: 156)

For Latour, therefore, as for Bourdieu, the internal structures of scientific practice are not directly shaped by external factors: but the only reason this autonomy is possible is because of the external relations that secure it.

It is these key attributes of the field, being a competitive system with a relatively autonomous internal logic (even if the power of this logic is secured by external relations), that are asserted by Bourdieu as setting his account of scientific practice apart from other sociologies of science: 'the concept of the field [...] emphasises the structures which orient scientific practices and whose efficacy is exerted at the micro-sociological level' (2004: 32). In this sense, every mundane, everyday action that occurs within the context of this field, on the micro-sociological scale, is the product of the overall field and how it is organised at that point in time. In other words, this field of relations is – on a certain level – akin to the concept of the scientific actor-network, in the sense that the relations of the overarching network mediate and determine the lived reality of the actors within it. This is because each actor is a node in the network whose ontology is contingent upon and reflects the overall network: whether it is in terms of the relations that structure laboratory work itself, or the broader set of relations that enable this work to be organised relatively autonomously, apparently in accordance with purely scientific norms. Likewise, Bourdieu uses the concept of the field to foreground how:

A laboratory is a social microcosm, itself situated in space containing other laboratories, these together constituting a discipline itself situated in a hierarchized
space, that of the disciplines), and [...] it occupies a major part of its properties from the position it occupies within that space. (2004: 32)

Therefore, just as it is necessary to analyse the overall network in order to understand why the lived reality of a specific actor has been shaped and ultimately realised in a particular way, or in order to unpack and understand how a particular black box has been established as fact:

Only through an overall theory of the scientific space, which understands it as a space structured according to both generic and specific logics, is it possible truly to understand a given point in this space, whether a particular laboratory or an individual researcher. (Bourdieu, 2004: 33)

In other words, the field is organised according to a self-generated logic that operates on a general level but becomes more specific in specialised or localised contexts, and through analysing how the field is organised by these structures of logic, it is possible to understand the actions of the agents or particular contexts within the scientific field. Where this bears particular relevance to ANT, is the self-generated nature of these structures. As discussed in chapter two, for Bourdieu, the reason why social power structures tend to 'always win out' is due to these relations giving rise to certain structures (doxa), which go on to shape subsequent practice. Hence the relations that structure the field and need to be understood in order to grasp it, are generated by it. Likewise, for ANT, the network itself gives rise to certain relations that shape subsequent interaction within the network: as with Mol's ontological politics, the network produces a certain performance that – whilst it is being enacted – is perceived as a priori reality that necessarily structures interaction.

However, despite these similarities, Bourdieu's account of science diverges from ANT in its focus on the role of human 'agents' in the field, who function as its source:
The agents, isolated scientists, teams or laboratories, create, through their relationships, the very space that determines them, although it only exists through the agents placed in it, who, to use the language of physics 'distort the space in their neighbourhood', conferring a certain structure upon it. It is in the relationship between the various agents (conceived as 'field sources') that the field and the relations of force that characterise it are generated. (Bourdieu, 2004: 33)

For Bourdieu, therefore, non-human actors have no role either in defining the structure of the field or perpetuating this structure, setting his concept apart from that of the network.

In addition, Bourdieu himself distances his work from ANT, foregrounding problems in terms of it lacking the capacity to understand pre-existing relations of power that might influence the structure and configuration of relations within scientific actor-networks. For this reason, he launches into a critique of Latour's allegedly cynical attitude toward scientific development, with 'cynicism' in this context referring to Bourdieu's argument that central to Latour's work is 'a naively Machiavellian view of scientists' strategies' (2004: 28), particularly within Science in Action (1987) and Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1989), which both characterise techno-scientific research as a competitive arena in which scientists deploy particular strategies to consecrate their own work as fact. Bourdieu's dispositionalist approach rejects the concept of scientists as employing conscious strategies in this process of consecration, instead positing that any apparently 'strategic' behaviour on the part of scientists simply arises from the particular disposition of individuals, which is directly related to their position within the field. Their respective dispositions enable them to have a correspondingly adept grasp of the implicit rules that structure practice and take advantage of these rules in such a way that benefits their own status and that of their work.
Related to this, Bourdieu criticises what he describes as 'interactionist' approaches to scientific networks. This criticism is in relation to sociologist Harry Collins, however, he regards Collins' work as problematic due to:

remaining enclosed in an interactionist vision which seeks the principle of agents’ actions in the interaction between them and ignores the structures (or objective relationships) and the dispositions (generally connected with the position occupied within these structures) that are the real principle of action and, among other things, of the interactions themselves. (2004: 20)

In citing a lack of structures as the key problem within interactionist perspectives, due to neglecting to account for the structures that govern interaction, Bourdieu thus paves the way for his subsequent criticism of Latour. This sets up his argument that Latour's understanding of scientific networks as constructed through and sustained solely through interaction, is what results in his recourse to a 'Machiavellian' account of science: where scientists consciously try to interact in specific ways to suit their best interests and promote their work, as opposed to their interactions being governed by existing structures.

However, as discussed previously, actor-networks are not incompatible with Bourdieu's conception of the structures that influence interaction, indeed, his account of doxa can actually help to explain why certain relations within a network are perpetuated and difficult to change. For instance, as outlined in chapter one, just as for Latour the terms 'power and domination' are used to describe certain 'stabilizations' within a network that influence subsequent interaction (1991: 128), Bourdieu's doxa are unacknowledged power structures that reproduce the social relations which give rise to them (as with Skeggs' account of class). In line with the previous chapter, the concept of doxa actually provides a useful means of explaining how Latour's processes of stabilisation actually
occur, in the sense that an existing performance creates certain power relations (such as class relations) that influence subsequent interaction within the network by being the means through which the actors within it conceptualise themselves, leading them to go on to re-enact these relations. Alternatively, this existing performance can be understood as having created certain relations within the network that position particular actors in such a way that they lack the mediating power necessary to alter or challenge these relations: as with the animal in scientific actor networks. In other words, both theorists develop understandings of how an existing performance of a network, or field of relations, gives rise to certain structures that ensure this performance is perpetuated. Despite the problem of non-human actors remaining (although this point will be addressed shortly), the existence of semi-permanent relations in actor-networks that structure interaction, shows potential for how, rather than being in opposition to one another, these theories have points of overlap.

These tentative similarities between Bourdieu’s concept of the field of relations and the ANT use of ‘network’ are important because concepts derived from Bourdieu can be employed to resolve ANT’s problems. Indeed, using these similarities as a starting point, this chapter will foreground how developing ANT in line with Bourdieu can enable an exploration of how the politics enacted by anti-vivisection websites has the capability of transforming this network, or field, of relations. The sites achieve this by altering the positions of the actors within it – positions which shape its power relations by determining which actors have access to resources or mediating power within the field – making the activists less vulnerable to acts of symbolic violence.

In line with Bourdieu, a possible means of transforming these relations is through a process of extending the field at stake, as the transformation of a field of relations arises from its extension as new agents are permitted entrance or included within it, thus altering its internal organisation. In *The Field of Cultural Reproduction* (1993) he focuses on this in relation to literature, arguing that:
'the established definition of the writer may be radically transformed by an enlargement of the set of people who have a legitimate voice in literary matters' (1993: 42). This transformational potential stems from his argument that 'the boundary of the field is a stake of struggles' (42) in the sense that 'the characteristics of this boundary [may be] protected by conditions of entry that are tacitly and practically required' (43). However, if the field is enlarged due to the entrance of new agents, change can occur on two levels; on the one hand, new entrants 'endeavour to impose new modes of thought and expression, out of key with the prevailing modes of thought and with the doxa', whilst on the other hand fundamental structural changes arise as 'every new position, in asserting itself as such, determines a displacement of the whole structure and that, by the logic of action and reaction, it leads to all sorts of changes in the position-takings of the occupants of the other positions' (1993: 58). Hence once new agents gain entrance to the field their very existence within it alters its structure, as in assuming their own position within it they displace the position of others. Not only does this alter the structures of the field, it impacts upon how power is distributed in the field and whose 'voice' is understood as legitimate – which, in ANT terms, can be understood as the relations in a network shifting in such a way that actors formerly disconnected or poorly connected within the network increase the quality of their connections and, in turn, their mediating power.

This concept is re-worked by Bourdieu in reference to scientific practice in Science of Science, where the concept of the field is significant to science for the same reasons: 'Changes within fields are often determined by redefinitions of the frontiers between fields, linked (as cause or effect) to the sudden arrival of new entrants endowed with new resources' (2004: 38). In other words, when new entities enter a field, its internal relations change to accommodate this new actor. Understood in ANT terms, any actor is necessarily something that 'makes a difference' through mediating other entities; upon entering the network it must have some impact on it. In this sense, the implicit rules that govern that field, and determine its hierarchy, shift as is it enlarged due to its agents being forced to assume new positions in the field. For Bourdieu, this change assumes particular
significance due to his account of how the specific dispositions of the agents that are positioned within the field (and also give rise to it), relate to the habitus or 'the totality of general dispositions acquired through practical experience in the field' (Moi, 2001: 271). The way in which each agent's position in the field determines their relation to the habitus means that: 'To the extent that different agents have different social backgrounds [...] their habitus cannot be identical' (Moi, 2001: 272). Defined in this way, the habitus is akin to doxa that are internalised by individual agents within the field, whose specific manifestation in these agents is contingent upon their position within it. Thus the entrance of new agents not only changes the make-up of the field, but – in turn – transforms the 'totality of general dispositions' that constitute the habitus and hence the suitedness of individual dispositions to the habitus.

Understanding the role of the habitus is essential in conceptualising how change can occur, as the difficulty in transforming the field lies in this relation of the agents' dispositions to the habitus. With the agents themselves giving rise to the field, and this field subsequently determining their dispositions, the social relations that constitute the field are internalised. As with Skeggs' account of class, therefore, this is a cyclical process – the field constituted by the disposition of its agents gives rise to habitus that in turn reproduce the structures of the field – a process akin to creating static in the network that inhibits it from changing. In Bourdieu's words:

The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment [...] produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (2008: 72)

This helps to elucidate Bourdieu's argument in relation to science, in the sense that the orchestration or structuring of practices within a field are not due to any conscious or 'Machiavellian' strategy on behalf of the agents within it, but is simply due to the habitus which is both structured by and structures their dispositions.

This tautological process is secured through what Moi describes as the way in which: 'a field is a particular structure of distribution of a specific type of capital' (2001: 271), namely 'the number of culturally, economically or politically useful relations accumulated by a given person', which is shaped by their position in the field (275). In line with Skeggs' discussion of class in the previous chapter, therefore, the structures of the field determine the level of capital (or mediating power) each actor has within it, and actors positioned to lack this capital have no means of challenging the structures that have positioned them to not have it. The concept of capital is particularly valuable for ANT in terms of providing a more nuanced account of how actors can develop the mediating power necessary to alter the dynamic of a network of relations.

What 'capital' means in this context, for Bourdieu, is something which:

in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed into the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible. (Bourdieu, 1986: 241)

Out of the forms of capital he demarcates in his essay 'Forms of Capital' (1986), it is cultural capital that he initially brings to bear on scientific networks. This form of capital:
can exist in the embodied state, i.e. the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state in the form of cultural goods [...] and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the form of capital which it is presumed to guarantee. (1986: 243)

The crucial social role of this form of capital is mapped out in *Distinction*, being related to the agents' positions in the cultural field and how it impacts upon their ability to take advantage of – for instance – the education system, which works advantageously for those who have had access to certain forms of cultural capital in their upbringing. For instance, he argues that 'at equivalent levels of educational capital, differences in social origin [...] are associated with important differences in competence' (1984: 63). Competence in this context relates to a form of taste, which distinguishes the agent's position within the (class) structures of the field, whilst its link to these structures is unacknowledged: 'The ideology of natural taste owes its plausibility and its efficacy to the fact that, like all the ideological struggles generated in the everyday class struggle, it naturalises real differences, converting differences in the mode of acquisition of culture into differences in nature' (1984: 68). Agents with an advantageous position in the field thus have an implicit grasp of what is 'tasteful', a taste deriving from the structures of the field and manifesting itself in the habitus, but the origin of this taste is masked due to the structures it derives from always being unacknowledged.

For Bourdieu, what is significant about this cultural capital is that, particularly 'in the academic market place' it can 'yield high symbolic profit' (1984: 63). Ironically, even though he has written entire texts that are critical of the misuse of symbolic power in academia (such as *Pascalian Meditations*), a demonstration of how this capital can work in practice is illustrated by Bourdieu himself, where he deploys his own symbolic capital – accrued from his privileged position in the
sociological field – to launch the symbolically violent attack on Latour referred to at the beginning of the chapter. In line with his account of symbolic violence, however, the violent nature of this attack could be misrecognised and treated as a valid criticism, due to the cultural capital accrued by his own position of privilege in the field.

Nonetheless, despite this dismissal of Latour, cultural capital in this context can still be reconciled with ANT and understood as mediating power within the network. This is particularly true in terms of Bourdieu's account of scientific networks in *Science of Science*, where he argues that a key means for an agent to gain entrance to the field is their possession of cultural capital, which in scientific terms he dubs 'competence' or 'a sense of the game' (2004: 50). In the scientific field, this competence manifests itself as a theoretical-experimental resource “embodied”, turned into a sense of the game, in other words the scientific habitus as a practical mastery of several centuries of research and gains from research' (2004: 51). However, what is crucial about this concept (and where it intersects with Latour) is that: 'in the scientific field, strategies have two sides to them. They have a pure – purely scientific – function and a social function within the field, that is to say, in relation to other agents engaged in the field' (2004: 54).

While cultural capital might give agents initial access to this field, therefore, what actually gives them power within the field is not simply cultural capital derived from an agent's accumulation of theoretical knowledge, as in order for the agent to truly have mediating power, this capital must be recognised by other agents: it must be consecrated as a specific form of *symbolic* capital. In Bourdieu's terms: 'scientific capital is the product of recognition by competitors [and] functions as a symbolic capital of recognition' (2004: 55). This has particular significance in relation to the vivisection debate, as:

Symbolic power of the scientific kind can be exerted more widely, among 'lay persons'
(as a power to make them see and believe), only if it has been ratified by other scientists – who tacitly control access to the 'public', particularly through the 'popularization' of science. (2004: 56)

Therefore, the symbolic power of scientists potentially leads to technocratic politics due to its symbolic value outside of the scientific field – in the social realm that it is ostensibly autonomous from. The power of this form of capital outside of the scientific field would therefore seem to support activist demands for an analysis of the ethical and social implications of scientific practice, due to its broader ramifications, as foregrounding this technocratic power reveals that the autonomy of the field is not as complete as calls for scientific independence suggest. However, even while it demonstrates the relation between science and society, the way that symbolic capital is accumulated makes it problematic for activists to challenge scientific norms and values, because this power can only be accrued from peer-recognition within the field. This recognition of the scientist's expertise being beyond debate, is effectively what leads to ethical concerns being dismissed as unscientific, even at points where the social and the political explicitly intersect. Hence the symbolic capital of the scientist is what enables criticisms made by animal rights groups to be dismissed as subjective or irrational without being fully analysed. This form of science, therefore, treats the scientist as Haraway's 'modest witness'; a neutral figure whose status as such is grounded in humanist notions of objectivity.

The task for activist groups is therefore to challenge this perceived autonomy of the scientific field, as this is what affords the scientists such a degree of symbolic power. However, in order to do this, a degree of cultural capital, or awareness of scientific theory, needs to be possessed by activist groups, in order to enter the field in the first place. It is in developing this capital that the significance of the work of the activist groups touched on in the previous chapter becomes apparent. However, this chapter will focus more on the process of altering the power distribution of the field,
by developing an account of vivisection that draws actors from the pharmaceutical industry into the network and alters the habitus in the process: through introducing actors with dispositions at odds with the existing habitus to the field and enabling their voices to be acknowledged as legitimate. The introduction of these actors alters the distribution of the symbolic capital of recognition in the field, due to foregrounding that the field is not as autonomous as pro-vivisection groups allege. In other words, in line with Bourdieu's argument that 'the more autonomous a field is, the more the hierarchy according to the distribution of scientific capital is differentiated' (2004: 57), by attempting to undermine some of this autonomy the distribution of capital is re-structured in such a way that it does not favour the scientist to the same extent. The task for the activists is, therefore, to foreground the relative lack of autonomy of the field of scientific practice associated with medical research. In the case of the anti-vivisection groups discussed in this chapter, online activism is itself not sufficient to fulfil this task; although it still plays a significant communicative role, it needs to be combined with practical forms of activism such as the BUAV's undercover laboratory investigations, which are a key component in their subsequent politics of articulation.

Aside from its role in these mechanisms of change, the other value of the habitus as a concept is that if this understanding is mapped onto ANT then it can be used to rectify the tendency toward description that arises from Latour downplaying the political relevance of ANT. A problem often associated with ANT is Latour's insistence that it is 'a tool to help describe something', as opposed to a theory that can be applied to an object of study in order to understand it (2005: 130). The negative connotations associated with the term description, however, lead to it being regarded as precluding critical analysis, hence the criticisms of ANT made by theorists such as Winner (1993) who (mistakenly)2 conflates ANT with social constructivism before claiming that 'the most obvious lack in social constructivist writing is an almost total disregard for the social consequences of technical choice' (1993: 368). To begin with this is a mis-characterisation of social constructivism, which from the early stages of the movement focused on interrelations between politics, social
structures and technology (see Bijker, et al, 1989). Moreover, the simplistic conflation of ANT and constructivism is problematic, as evident by the contentious relationship between different theorists that would be categorised as 'social constructivists' in Winner's terms (such as the Bloor/Latour debate referred to previously).

Despite this, Winner's criticisms still illustrate how the repeated use of the term 'description' leaves ANT open to such criticisms as – taken out of context – this infers that the theory offers no scope for critically analysing power relations arising from specific networks. However, this focus on descriptiveness is misleading and other aspects of *Reassembling the Social* illustrate that arguments such as Winner's are unfounded as, for Latour, ANT's very capacity to describe the relations between actors is key to explaining *how* power is exerted, as it is through these relations that power operates – it is not an autonomous entity that can be analysed in itself. This focus on the relations themselves, for Latour, is thus testament to the fact that ANT is not: 'content to have power and domination themselves be the mysterious container that holds inside of it that which makes the many participants in the action move' (2005: 83), and instead seeks to describe how power and domination arise through understanding the relations that generate them.

**SPEAK: redistributing symbolic capital**

The particular problem for animal rights groups in overcoming existing power relations is that they not only have to demonstrate alternative scientific options available, but overcome their own negative portrayal in the media, and lack of cultural capital, in order for these options to be articulated. SPEAK, for instance, as a controversial movement due to its alleged direct action tactics, have not only to overcome the culturally instituted nature/culture, activist/scientist distinction (as discussed in chapter two), but must combat the negative depiction of the movement in the media. For instance, a *Guardian* article focusing on the debate surrounding the Oxford
laboratory establishes a dichotomy between scientists and activists in its very title: 'Science v Animal Rights: battle over new vivisection lab at Oxford turns violent' (Jha, 2004). This divide between 'violent' activists and scientists is then substantiated in the main body of the article. SPEAK are initially described as claiming 'to be non-violent', but this is countered by references made by a scientist at Oxford stating 'terrorism does concern us', the inference being that SPEAK can be categorised in this manner. This is expounded when a key member of SPEAK, Mel Broughton, is quoted as stating: "We're a legal campaign, we do not encourage people to break the law. There are no links between us and these direct action groups". However the article goes on to cast aspersions on his reliability, asserting that 'Mr Broughton has served a prison sentence for smuggling incendiary devices into the premises of HLS, an animal-testing facility'.

In contrast, statements made by Professor Tipu Aziz are treated neutrally with the article outlining his belief that the 'Cambridge primate laboratory could have been a "national asset"' and his claim that "Any patient that's walked into a hospital today or buys a drug over the counter is using a service or product that has been tried out on animals". The groups are therefore faced with a disadvantage in lacking the symbolic capital required to have mediating power in their actor-network, in the sense that these arguments have not been consecrated officially by gaining official recognition in the field at stake, which leaves them open to symbolic violence, in marked contrast to scientists at Oxford University.

This foregrounds how well connected scientific actors have the greatest levels of mediating power within their actor-network and simply have to perpetuate the existing network in order to sustain this power, in Bourdieu's terms 'a dominant agent is one who occupies a place within the structure such that the structure works in his favour' (2004: 34). This is explicit in the aforementioned Guardian article, whereon the scientists' arguments were taken as undisputed truth, whereas the activist arguments are countered by allegations of violence: with the article sustaining the science
versus animal rights dichotomy. For this reason, these specific scientific actors are not simply legitimising in Castells' sense, but – in Bourdieu's terms – also have legitimating power. For instance, the scientists' claims are automatically afforded symbolic truth value due to their cultural capital, whereas symbolic violence is deployed upon the activists with implicit *ad hominem* arguments undermining the activists' assertions.

So long as the activists are operating within a field in which scientific actors have this advantage, therefore, this asymmetry will be reflected in the symbolic-value afforded to the arguments made by activists and scientists in the media, or indeed, whether they appear in the media at all: a problem brought to the fore in the failure to include the Safer Medicines Campaign in *Monkeys, Rats and Me*. The task faced by the activists is therefore to increase their own legitimating power within the field. However, this is problematic when the field is scientific, as the legitimating power of the expert-scientist inevitably surpasses that of the hybrid activist-scientist in this context, as this activist-scientist cannot grasp the habitus of neutral 'modest witness' necessary to gain recognition in the field. This lack of disinterestedness is problematic in the context of a framework that demands the scientist embodies the set of neutral behaviours that demarcates them as a modest witness, as Haraway argues in her critique of this form of 'neutrality' (outlined in the previous chapter). What emerges as essential, therefore, is to overcome the constraints of the objective/subjective dichotomy that sustains the field's boundary and secures its perceived autonomy from political practices, to afford situated ethical perspectives greater recognition.

Perhaps the most significant attempt to transform the field through altering its boundary is found in SPEAK's tactic of articulating the aspects of the scientific actor-network that relate to the pharmaceutical industry's role in scientific practice. This process of effectively extending the network at stake, through mapping out the way in which actors from the pharmaceutical industry impact upon research, alters the field from being structured by rules solely oriented toward
scientific values, to bringing a network of economic, industrial and new ethical factors into play, by foregrounding the scientific field's contingency on these elements. The attempt to extend the network, or field, through articulating the relation of pharmaceutical actors within it, is evident on the SPEAK website, with an entire section of the website (Bad Politics) dedicated to describing the alleged links between pharmaceutical companies and regulations governing animal research. For instance, they describe how 'the DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] opened up an account with the Bank of England on behalf of Huntingdon Life Sciences' and allege that an increase in animal research under the Labour government was:

A result of the heavy influence of one figure, an ex junior minister within the DTI, the ex science minister David (now Lord) Sainsbury, a billionaire who has extensive investments in the bio-tech industry, has donated over £11.5 million to the Labour party, which in effect bought him a life peerage and the influential role of science minister until he resigned just a few months after being questioned by police in the ‘cash for peerages’ inquiry. (2004: Bad Politics.)

These allegations are an attempt to foreground the link between pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries and animal research, a tactic that has advantages on two levels. Firstly it is designed to make the issue more complex, through foregrounding how vivisection is not simply an isolated process of research that leads to medical progress, as this progress has to be paid for. This is in line with Latour's argument that the 'purer' the science, the more non-scientific actors need to be mobilised to enable the research to proceed. For instance, he describes the various practices an observer would record upon following the work of various scientists in a laboratory and argues that 'depending on which scientist is followed, completely different pictures of technoscience will emerge' (1987: 155). He draws this conclusion because if the 'boss' of a laboratory was shadowed this would 'offer a businessman's view of science (mixture of politics, negotiation of contracts,
public relations); [whereas] shadowing the microkids or the collaborator will provide the classic view of hard-working white-coated scientists wrapped up in their experiments’ (1987: 155).

The crux of Latour's argument is that both perspectives are integral to scientific process as the scientist working in the laboratory ‘is able to be deeply involved in her bench work because the boss is constantly outside bringing in new resources and supports. The more she wants to do “just science”, the costlier and the longer are her experiments, the more the boss has to wheel around the world explaining to everyone that the most important thing on earth is her work’ (1987: 156). For Latour, therefore, external factors such as the means of funding are inextricable from scientific practice and – as referred to previously – are actually what secure Bourdieu's 'relative autonomy' of this field. This is essentially the same argument that SPEAK are attempting to construct in foregrounding relations between animal research at Oxford and the pharmaceutical industry. This tactic is ultimately designed to transform the concept of a 'cure' from an straightforward, causal, contribution to human welfare, to a product that has to be paid for in order to both develop it and, in some instances, to be paid for by the patient in order for them to use it.

This leads to the second advantage of this approach: as discussed earlier, in terms of media reputation, activists are generally portrayed more negatively than scientists. However, pharmaceutical companies are also heavily criticised in the media, with emphasis placed on their drive for profit above human well-being. This is evident in their portrayal in the recent debate regarding NHS top-up payments whereupon a key concern of the British Medical Association was that patients could be manipulated into spending money on unnecessary drugs, with headlines appearing such as the Telegraph's: ‘Dr Jackie Davis of the BMA Council said pharmaceutical companies would put pressure on vulnerable patients' (Smith, 2008). Likewise, governmental officials criticised pharmaceutical companies in the wake of the controversy, making claims pertaining to their use of “perverse incentives” to hike the prices of new drugs', suggesting that:
‘traditionally some companies charged what they thought they could get away with. “We are told we are being mean all the time, but what nobody mentions is why the drugs are so expensive”’ (Hinsliff, 2008). In drawing pharmaceutical companies into the actor-network, therefore, animal rights groups are effectively capitalising on the pharmaceutical complex's lack of legitimating power in the context of the media, giving greater weight to movements such as SPEAK’s criticism of companies such as Huntingdon Life Sciences.

The body of information produced by SPEAK thus articulates the role of pharmaceutical actors in the vivisection actor-network, in order to enlarge the field at stake in such a way that actors with vested interests are explicitly included within the scientific actor-network, posing a challenge to its perceived autonomy. This effective introduction of vested interests into the network works to undermine the subjective/objective dichotomy that formerly demarcated the boundary of the field by showing that ‘external' vested interests are what secure the scientific field's autonomy and enable it to function. In addition, the introduction of these new pharmaceutical actors re-frames the debate in a manner that attempts to overcome the epistemological structures of the original field that tried to reduce it to a question of medical progress versus animal welfare (as typified by the aforementioned Guardian article).

By foregrounding the role of pharmaceutical companies in this process of enabling medical progress, SPEAK effectively raise the question ‘progress for whom’? They demonstrate that – despite the intentions of the scientists themselves – the involvement of pharmaceutical companies means this progress is not necessarily altruistic. Unlike accounts within the media that often attempt to frame the debate in terms of scientists versus activists, where arguments put forward by activists tend to be portrayed negatively or omitted (as in Monkeys Rats and Me), their account of pharmaceutical companies is effectively adhering to that framed by the media. This is evident in the debate over top-up treatments, which brings class and wealth into play as factors determining who
can receive the most effective cures available. This approach by SPEAK, is therefore a valuable strategy in making accounts of medical research more complex by foregrounding that not everyone receives the benefit of this progress.

Unlike a field pertaining to applied medical research, therefore, the complex networks of relations articulated by sites such as SPEAK allow ethical discourses to re-emerge as appropriate practical strategies within the altered relations of the re-defined field. This is not, in this sense, an attempt to move 'outside' of the field, but to interrogate and subvert the existing relations that go on to structure its reality through foregrounding how actors apparently outside of the network (such as pharmaceutical companies) are in reality an integral part of securing its internal relations, thus posing a challenge to the field's pre-existing boundary. Tracing these relations is therefore in line with Bourdieu's account of how de-naturalising its norms (or doxa) means these norms require defense in order to legitimate them as orthodox. According to Bourdieu's line of reasoning, the very necessity of defending what was formerly treated as a fact of reality opens it up to critique. In other words, as outlined in the previous chapter, the activists are attempting to enact vivisection in a new way. However, this particular performance not only seeks to undermine the account of vivisection that secures it as scientific doxa, but enacts it as a political and economic issue as well as a scientific one – with these other socio-economic realities not necessarily conforming to the scientific performance of vivisection as a tool that unproblematically leads to progress. In order to understand the implications of this process, it is necessary to turn to the work of Mol, whose understanding of reality as consisting of multiple performances of the same realities that sometimes overlap, but can also clash, is valuable in understanding these tactics. Moreover, Mol's performative form of ANT is useful in reconciling concepts from Bourdieu (such as habitus) with ANT, to understand how alternative versions of reality could be enacted by these activist groups.
Reality Effects: Reconciling Habitus and Network

Related to actor-networks, the habitus can be used as a means to develop Latour's account of power further. It can be understood as that which shapes and mediates each actor's capacity to interact within the network, regulating which connections are possible or available for each actor and the degree of mediating power each has within the network, with mediating power functioning as capital. This approach means that the habitus is a structuring structure (which is stubborn to displace), but is not permanent, because this structure can change if agents with new dispositions enter the field and its boundaries change, as this leads to different forms of disposition being necessary to navigate the field:

Agents, with their systems of dispositions, their respective competence, their capital, their interests, confront one another within the space of a game, the field, in a struggle to impose recognition of a form of cognition [...] thereby helping to transform or conserve a field of forces. (2004: 62)

The habitus in this sense, is similar to the values internalised by legitimising actors (as exemplified by McDonald's, in chapter one), that structure (and legitimise) their actions, giving them the competence necessary to navigate the field. Like the values of legitimising actors, these structures are also self-reproducing, in that they structure subsequent action. This relation of the habitus to the network thus overcomes Bourdieu's principle criticism of Latour, as the relations forged by and between scientists in the actor-network can be understood as deriving from a disposition oriented toward adhering to the current configuration of relations within that network, as opposed to being attributed to a conscious political strategy.

However, even if these theories are compatible in certain senses, there are still further problems
with relating Latour to Bourdieu. For instance, another criticism Bourdieu levels at Latour is his erasure of 'the trivial difference between human and non-human agents' (Bourdieu, 2004: 30). For Bourdieu, the habitus would – by extension – be irrelevant to non-human actors, due to being derived from the set of dispositions of human agents in the field. In addition, non-human actors would not possess the dispositions enabling them to embody it. For ANT, in contrast, every actor is understood as having the potential to mediate other actors. If the habitus is related to networks, therefore, this could create a dichotomy between human and non-human actors (dependent on their grasp of habitus), which is problematic in ANT terms. This problem, however, is resolved through the work of ANT theorists such as Mol, who focuses on the structures that perpetuate actor networks in more detail than Latour.

Mol’s essay ‘Ontological Politics: A Word and Some Questions’ (1999), demonstrates the possibility of such structures existing within actor-networks as she describes how medical practice performs particular ailments (in this instance anaemia) in specific ways in accordance with pre-existing relations. In the case of anaemia, three – different yet related – performances of anaemia co-exist; clinical, statistical and pathophysiological diagnoses of the problem are all employed within medical practice. In theory, each means of diagnosis relates to the others, for example to paraphrase Mol, a patient clinically diagnosed as anaemic would be expected to have a haemoglobin count that would be statistically below the 'normal' range. The low haemoglobin count would therefore be seen as the cause of the clinical diagnosis. However, she argues that a conception of these three performances of anaemia as being different means of arriving at the same diagnosis, or three ways of enacting the same reality, is unfounded, as:

> In practice sometimes people don't get dizzy or have white eyelids and nevertheless have a haemoglobin level that (if it were measured) would appear to be deviant [...] In practice the three ways to diagnose 'anaemia' each diagnose something different. The
objects of each of the various diagnostic techniques do not necessarily overlap with others. (1999: 78)

Therefore Mol's understanding of ANT is that lived reality is produced by networks of interaction between actors, which mediate one another in specific ways to perform a particular account of reality. In this sense a particular version of reality is contingent upon being performatively reiterated by its actor-network. The significance of the three different diagnoses of anaemia that Mol describes as being performed, is therefore that each performance impacts upon lived reality in a different way, as the network of entities it draws together in its actor network and the way in which these actors interact, vary for each diagnosis.

The organisation of a deviance like anaemia is not a 'merely practical' matter. It also has reality effects. It makes a difference to the way anaemia 'itself' is performed. But it is not only the reality of anaemia that is at stake. Many other realities are involved too. For objects that are performed do not come alone: they carry nodes and modulations of other objects with them. (1999: 81; my emphasis)

The concept of 'reality effects' is valuable in political terms, as it shows how specific political consequences result from how a particular entity within an actor-network is enacted. To exemplify some of these political reality effects, Mol foregrounds how gender is performed differently by statistical and pathophysiological definitions of anaemia, respectively. Due to statistical differences in the level of haemoglobin considered 'normal' for men and women, different statistical ranges exist for each sex. 'This turns “women” into a group of people who have more in common with each other than with “men”, however much the two curves happen to overlap. It also performs the category “women” as one that is biological' (1999: 82). She argues that this form of diagnosis posits a form of biological gender essentialism that does not exist in pathophysiological diagnoses as:
'Pathophysiology knows only individuals. Thus it does not require differentiation between the sexes in order to distinguish between normal and abnormal haemoglobin levels [...] If medicine were to perform all deviances in individualized ways, a lot of “undeniable” sex differences would simply disappear' (1999: 82).

In these terms, gender is simply one instance of 'reality effects'; it is product of a particular organisation of an actor-network, but treated as biological 'reality'. The overall performance of the network, as guided by the relations developed through whichever diagnosis is enacted, thus effectively shapes the reality of all the actors embroiled in the network, whilst simultaneously being mediated by these actors. This is developed by Mol's subsequent text, *The Body Multiple* (2002), in which she engages in a detailed ethnographic study in a Dutch hospital, to discuss how a specific disease, atherosclerosis (or the thickening of artery walls), is diagnosed, treated and, fundamentally, enacted in practice.

The detection of atherosclerosis of the leg arteries is organized along clinical lines. You only ever become a vascular patient if you visit a doctor and say that you have pain on walking. Thus, the fact that pathology isn't the foundation of all medical practice, but that the clinic takes the lead when it comes to the diagnosis and detection of this disease, is not a merely practical matter. It touches reality all right. It doesn't make complaints more real than the size of vessel walls. But it does turn them into what will count as reality in a particular site. Not under a microscope, this time, but in the organization of the health care system. Under the microscope atherosclerosis of the leg arteries may be a thick intima of the vessel wall. In the organization of the health care system, however, it is pain. Pain that follows from walking and that nags patients suffering from it enough to make them decide to visit a doctor and ask what can be done about it. (2002: 48)
In this sense, atherosclerosis is simultaneously a physiological issue (‘a thick intima of the vessel wall’) and an a physical sensation experienced by the patient (‘pain on walking’). Whilst it could be argued that this is simply a matter of the disease itself causing a symptom, in other words that these are actually two distinct entities with a causal relation between them, Mol demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case as sometimes patients with severely narrowed arteries do not suffer from symptoms that would lead to a clinical diagnosis of the disease. For this patient, therefore, the lack of physical symptoms mean that the disease has failed to become ‘reality’ in the context of the clinic, which in this context is the privileged site of enacting the diagnosis that would make a disease reality. This is demonstrated by an interview Mol has with a pathologist who conducted a post-mortem on an elderly lady with no obvious symptoms of atherosclerosis:

It was unbelievable, her entire system was atherosclerotic. One of her renal arteries was closed off, the other almost. It was a wonder her kidneys still did anything at all. [...] And she’d never complained. Nothing. No chest pain, no claudication, nothing. We phoned her general practitioner to check it. He said she’d been visiting him for coughs and things. High blood pressure. But not with any complaint that made him think of atherosclerosis. (2002: 46)

In this sense, despite her blood flow being almost entirely obstructed, this patient did not suffer from the symptoms that allowed atherosclerosis to be enacted as clinical reality. Such examples lead to Mol arguing that: ‘If a relation between the atherosclerosis of pathology and the atherosclerosis of the clinic is made, in practice, their objects may happen to coincide. But this is not a law of nature’ (2002: 46). In other words, the object of the clinic (pain experienced by the patient) might coincide with the object of pathology (obstructed arteries), but this is not necessarily the case. This means that atherosclerosis is not simply one object, as in this particular instance, ‘the objects enacted in the clinic and in the pathology department don’t map. They clash’ (2002: 46). Conversely, in other
instances these two objects *do* coincide, which is the rationale behind the organisation of the healthcare system whereupon 'the detection of atherosclerosis does not proceed through screening the population but by waiting for patients', with the assumption that the patient will go to the clinic when they feel pain, which will lead to a correct diagnosis, followed by an appropriate treatment for the disease (2002: 49).

Bourdieu's account of the habitus is valuable in elucidating the powerful influence of such reality effects, particularly in terms of how – once they have initially shaped and mediated reality – the reality effects become embodied, with the actors that internalise them perpetuating the network.

The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment [...] produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules. (2008: 72)

This can be understood in line with Mol's accounts of anaemia and atherosclerosis, whereupon specific structures of relations arise from each diagnosis of anaemia, structures that determine (amongst other things) the 'reality' of a disease or the 'reality' of gender, with these structures then determining the actions of the actors engaged in the network due to becoming internalised by these actors. Bourdieu's account of the habitus can be used to develop Mol's argument and enable it to reach its logical conclusion, in describing how the structures of relations she describes can become 'structuring structures' or habitus, with this habitus governing future practice. In this sense, the 'reality effects' of an actor network can perhaps more effectively be understood as the habitus: as the lived reality produced by the network that simultaneously perpetuates the performance of the network itself, through being embodied by the actors engaged in it.
Crucially, this occurs through setting a structural model for subsequent relations (as with the account of the doxa in the previous chapter), which is reinforced by the material arrangement of key actors in the network (such as the material organisation of the healthcare system or the laboratory setting). Anni Dugdale gives an excellent analysis of what the significance of these arrangements are, in arguing that these relations work to enact a particular power dynamic within the network and seemingly incidental aspects of the material organisation of these processes – such as the arrangement of rooms, or activities taking place in certain buildings – are significant in perpetuating this dynamic. For instance, in describing her participation in a focus group compiling advice regarding to a new method of birth control being introduced to Australia, Dugdale argues that:

we are prone to treat such materials as background, as essentially unimportant to the business of making science policy [...] in conformity with much work in ANT and also with feminist work outlining the materiality of the body [...] I wish to suggest that such materials are crucial in producing the bodies that are assembled together as subjects. (Dugdale, 1999: 118)

Moreover, these material arrangements shape the very subject position she herself performs: 'Before entering the building I am already part of the web of relationships that constitute me as a government bureaucrat' (1999: 119). In the case of anaemia, therefore, the implicit rules within each mode of diagnosis that govern relations, but are simultaneously constituted by these relations, have a mediating effect upon how reality is subsequently ‘performed’ by the actors within the network, through being embodied by the actors engaged in this performance and in the material arrangement of the diagnostic process. These material arrangements then contribute to sustaining specific reality effects; for instance in the case of sexual difference, as alluded by Mol, not only does the statistical diagnosis of anaemia infer a biological difference between men and women, the biological
essentialism enacted by this account of anaemia goes on to validate further practices predicated on the male/female distinction through legitimising it within medical practice. Actors that act in accordance with this distinction are therefore legitimising actors that simply enact the existing relations within the network, establishing their behaviour as socially normative.

This approach resolves problems arising from Bourdieu's criticism of ANT for erasing the difference between human and non-human actors; the concepts of both the network and the field convey an understanding of power as arising through the relations an actor has with other actors within its field/network, so in these terms the difference between human and non-human is their respective position in the field. Human actors can be understood as having connections with other actors that enable them to develop dispositions suited to negotiating the relations of the network more effectively. Thus in the context of anaemia, a human actor such as a doctor has a disposition that possesses the cultural capital or mediating power capable of navigating the the field that enables them to mobilise certain non-human actors in order to perform a particular definition of anaemia. For instance, the doctor's act of testing the patient is what draws together all of the other equipment involved in each stage of this form of diagnosis, from the point at which 'blood is tapped from veins' until it is 'fed to machines which pour out numbers for each blood sample they receive' through to the final stage of the diagnosis when 'the number is then compared with a standard, a normal haemoglobin level [...] this depends on assembling data for a population', data which would have, again, been collated through mobilising further non-human actors to conduct further tests from which a mean level of haemoglobin could have been calculated (Mol, 1999: 78). This perspective therefore marries with Latour's account of scientific networks as being unique in their capacity to enrol non-human actors in order to stabilise the network, constructing material arrangements that work to maintain the network in its existing form.

A human actor can thus be understood – not as ontologically distinct from the non-human – but as
an actor with the capacity to internalise habitus and mobilise non-human actors in such a way that the network’s existing organisation is stabilised and the competence necessary to navigate it remains the same. This means that Bourdieu's concept can be related to ANT without imposing a human/non-human distinction. Indeed, defining the human's embodiment of habitus as deriving from their connections within the network, as opposed to through an account of ontological difference, is in line with (and helps to elucidate) Latour's definition of man as 'a weaver of morphisms' (1992: 137), or having a pivotal role in generating 'reality effects' due to the advantageous position of human actors in mobilising non-human actors, as with Mol's doctor.

As well as overcoming Bourdieu's criticism of ANT in demonstrating how it can overcome the problems of naïve interactionism by taking into account the existence of structuring structures, or the way in which reality effects impact upon subsequent interaction, Mol's approach embodies the form of sociological critique Bourdieu advocates in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. The effect of Mol's approach in exploring the reality effects of each method of diagnosis, is that she engages in a politics of articulation through tracing the underlying, or in Bourdieu's terms doxic, structures of the networks that realise specific accounts of anaemia in order to foreground their arbitrariness.

In mapping out the networks of relations that enable each account of anaemia to be performed, Mol demonstrates that no single version of anaemia is neutral and each has certain political 'reality effects' that are treated as *a priori* social truths within the context of the network enacting that version of the disease. However, in mapping out these underlying (doxic) structures, by Bourdieu's very definition of the doxic they can no longer be classed as such, because these structures are no longer beyond question or 'self-evident and undisputed' (1998: 165). In other words, this is similar to the approach of the activists in the McLibel trial who forced the corporation to map out the 'common sense' rationale behind their actions. Even though the corporation still treated their appeals to common sense as simply referring to unquestionable economic laws that were beyond debate, in
explicitly appealing to these laws they ceased to be beyond question and were merely orthodox. This is because this 'common sense' was no longer functioning as an unspoken basis for the corporation's actions, but was a basis they had to defend as being normative. In this way, even when they cited the laws of the free market as a normative force that legitimised their policies, the necessity of defending them meant they no longer – in Bourdieu's terms – went 'without saying'. Instead McDonald's were simply defending an orthodox position that might have been socially normative, but was now something explicit and out in the open that could be analysed, criticised and – potentially – opened to transformation.

Indeed, Mol's approach adheres to Bourdieu's account of how the doxic can be debated in political terms, due to making the underlying (doxic) structures of an instance of medical practice orthodox. In other words, she has acknowledged and exposed reality effects that are usually not recognised as the product of social relations. Furthermore, she has opened this orthodox form of knowledge to challenge from heterodox (alternative) definitions of anaemia, by contrasting the reality effects of statistical and pathophysiological enactions of the disease. In this manner, her approach demonstrates the contingency of medical knowledge upon its actor-network and illustrates that habitus and practice cannot be separated: as practice produces the structures or rules that are internalised by actors and go on to shape further practice.

Relating Mol's approach to Bourdieu's account of habitus and doxa foregrounds the political potential of ANT through demonstrating how expanding the range of relations perceived as 'internal' to the scientific network, by foregrounding their relation with apparently 'external' relations, can have subversive potential. This is because it challenges the reality – including the epistemological reality – generated by and reflexively perpetuating that network. In other words, through understanding the reality effects of a network as habitus, and tracing the field of relations that produce this habitus, these relations and the habitus they give rise to can be shown to be arbitrary.
The reason for Mol's essay’s culmination in the question ‘what are the options?’, therefore, is due to the bulk of the essay laying the foundations for that question to be asked at all: of creating space for the formation of heterodox discourses by foregrounding doxa. In the case of contexts (such as medicine) apparently governed by expert knowledge that might posit the existing solution to a problem as the end point of a teleological process of research, a black-box beyond dispute, or the only option, Mol’s argument is that by engaging in a politics of articulation other options can be revealed. Whilst not resolving the question of how to choose between these options, Mol poses a preliminary question that needs to be addressed: ‘what are the effects we should be seeking?’ (1999: 86). In this sense, while her essay does not resolve the problem of how to select a particular option (and even questions to what extent this is even possible), it suggests the starting point for beginning to make such a choice would be to look at the reality effects of each option upon the actors embroiled in the network.

Transforming the Field: the tactics of the BUAV

While SPEAK are a particularly marginalised movement seeking to challenge an orthodox discourse, other organisations have achieved different forms of recognition in their aims, in terms of instigating policy change. However, the process of achieving such change is not straightforward, as the debate regarding whether lobbying for legislative change has a genuine impact has waged since the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, with the BUAV forming due to disillusioned members of NAVS (who had campaigned for the act) breaking away from the society due to the Bill only being passed after substantial amendments had weakened it. As Judith Hampson outlines: 'a small group of experimental physiologists succeeded in mobilising almost the entire medical profession against it’, which led to 'amendments to the Bill which were so substantial as to change its fundamental nature. The objectives of the research and medical communities were to render the Bill “innocuous” so that it might serve the purpose of soothing the agitated public while imposing no real restrictions on
fundamental or medical research' (1987: 315). This led to members of NAVS becoming 'convinced that the practice of animal experimentation could not be controlled by law' and forming the BUAV which originally held an abolitionist stance. In this light, it is somewhat ironic that the BUAV are now one of the most prominent organisations lobbying for legislative change. However, Hampson argues that:

While legislative or voluntary systems do not address themselves to the fundamental question of whether or not it is morally justifiable to experiment on animals, they do change the moral climate. Moreover, they can provide a forum in which some of the essential questions, including moral ones, can be asked by researchers themselves. (1987: 335)

For instance, after the 1876 act, the legislation surrounding vivisection did not change until 20th May 1986, but this new Bill was valuable in foregrounding the interrelation between scientific and ethical issues by leading to the formation of a govermental body – the Animal Procedures Committee – who were responsible for regulating animal research. The formation of the Committee was significant in providing what Hampson describes as 'a chain of accountability' between scientific practice and the public, as: 'Ultimately the entire chain is responsible to the public through Parliament because the Home Secretary has a statutory obligation to justify what is licensed' (1987: 335). For this reason, despite the problems associated with working within legislation that supports the existing set of normative social relations, it is important not to discount movements that adopt these strategies, as they can still seek to transform the dynamic of the field through disrupting its autonomy and foregrounding the interrelation of social and scientific issues.

For instance, the BUAV and its European counterpart the European Coalition to End Animal Experiments (ECEAE) have had concrete political success in some of their aims through employing
the tactic of extending the vivisection actor-network or foregrounding the complex nature of its relations. Their recent focus on cosmetic and industrial testing in the European Union, for example, has led to the BUAV securing certain practical aims that have transformed the vivisection actor-network in terms of determining how animals could be used in research. For example, their work with the UK government helped to secure the 1998 ban on cosmetic testing in Britain, and lobbying in the EU with other organisations in the ECEAE led to the corresponding European Union ban on 11th March 2009. Significantly, their engagement with governmental actors gives the BUAV greater mediating power within the vivisection actor-network in scientific terms: due to government legislation ultimately securing the field's autonomy, with a restructuring of these legislative relations thus impacting upon this autonomy.

This is exemplified by the BUAV's connections with governmental bodies, which consecrates their cultural capital and knowledge by involving them in certain consultative contexts; giving their arguments greater symbolic power. Their engagement with government and commercial actors helps to legitimise the evidence regarding the condition of laboratory animals supplied by their undercover activism; evidence which predominantly takes the form of BUAV members working as laboratory technicians and secretly filming the conditions within UK laboratories. These reports and video evidence are then circulated to relevant governmental bodies (such as the Animal Procedures Committee) and to members of the public with an interest in animal welfare (predominantly via online email lists and social networking websites). However whilst, in the same manner as SPEAK, undercover BUAV reports often circulate in an online context, this online presence is complimented by an engagement with governmental actors who can directly transform the relations within the field through instigating legislative change that impacts upon its internal organisation.

For instance, a 2003 undercover BUAV report of a primate research facility at Cambridge led to an investigation into the facility by the APC, with the governmental body themselves articulating the
elements of the vivisection actor-network that the BUAV had attempted to foreground but which the laboratories themselves had, perhaps inadvertently, masked. This is the value of using the concept of habitus, as opposed to the 'Machiavellian' approach that Bourdieu accuses Latour of employing in his account of the strategies followed by scientists. The masking of certain aspects of the vivisection actor network, understood in relation to the habitus, can be understood not as a cynical attempt to disguise the 'truth' of vivisection, but merely the result of agents' dispositions predisposing them to behave in line with the existing rules of the game established by the field's structure. In this instance, the structures of the scientific field shape behaviour in accordance with the specific form of neutrality Haraway discusses in her account of the modest witness; a position intersecting with Bourdieu's account of the origins of experimental science, whereupon:

objectivity depends on the 'agreement of a class of observers about what is recorded by the measuring devices in a very precise experimental situation'. So one can say that there is no objective reality independent of the conditions of observation, without calling into question the fact that what manifests itself once these conditions are determined, retains a character of objectivity. (Bourdieu, 2004: 74)

This tactic of foregrounding the implicit rules that structure the network in practical terms, was thus a valuable means for the activists to make the doxa orthodox and open it to critique. For instance, a report produced in the wake of undercover evidence produced by the BUAV led to an acknowledgement by the APC that 'even among those who believe in the value of animal research there are those who believe it should not extend to primates. There is also a lively debate among scientists themselves regarding the validity of this research as is evidenced by the extensively referenced research cited in the BUAV investigation' (APC, 2003: 11). Thus the BUAV's attempts to map out the vivisection actor network and present this account of vivisection to the APC led to an acknowledgement of the existence of an alternative body of scientific knowledge that was anti-
vivisection; an acknowledgement from the very body responsible for legislating animal research.

The recognition of the *existence* of debate, in much the same manner as *Pro-Test's* acknowledgement of dissenting perspectives, had the effect of exposing the underlying doxa and making them orthodox, by opening them to debate. Through engaging with governmental actors, therefore, the BUAV facilitated the construction of this field of competing discourses – in other words they transformed the network of relations in such a way that the arguments put forward by anti-vivisection movements gained symbolic value. For instance, the APC report foregrounded the intersection of ethical and scientific issues, by challenging the factual status of certain definitions put forward by scientific groups, elucidating the unstable status of ostensibly 'factual' labels used in a scientific context. In this instance these labels included those used to designate whether the pain experienced by primates was 'substantial' 'moderate' or 'mild' due to the 'absence of a shared understanding of what the labels, mild, moderate and substantial mean in the classification of severity' (APC, 2005: 11). Of particular concern for the APC was the 'significant difference between the regulatory interpretation and how the “man in the street” might interpret such labels' (APC, 2005: 11). In this sense, the governmental report itself exemplifies the error in Sokal's dismissal of Latour for simply describing practices that were 'true but mundane': as such labels might have normative or 'mundane' meanings in scientific terms, but if the 'man on the street' does not share the same field of experience as scientists then these definitions require contextualisation and elucidation in order to understand their implications in the context of animal research.

The report shows this lack of shared understanding as particularly concerning from a governmental perspective because, as Latour foregrounds and SPEAK infer: research is never pure, as this purity has to be secured through economic and legal mechanisms; the autonomy of the research is contingent upon these elements. In this context, as the APC themselves have suggested, because laws governing vivisection are legislated by the government it is vital to understand why vivisection
is treated as a necessary component of medical research: 'a society that endorses animal research in its legislation needs to be assured that it is justified in continuing to do so. For this to happen, public understanding of the nature of this research needs to be as comprehensive and accurate as is possible' (APC, 2005: 12). Thus the APC report explicitly poses a challenge to the complete autonomy of the scientific field of vivisection, by foregrounding its dependence on state support for medical research. This connection between the 'inside' and 'outside' of scientific practice foregrounded by the APC means that the use of vivisection is not purely cast as a scientific question but a social and ethical one. In other words, this connection frames it as a democratic issue of public, as well as scientific concern, foregrounding how scientific autonomy is not a given, but a historically contingent process. In this sense, through engaging with the government, the BUAV has been assisted in its politics of articulation by an actor with extensive mediating power (the APC), which enables it to more comprehensively articulate the relations constituting the vivisection actor-network and question its perceived autonomy from social and ethical questions. For instance, the APC itself called for an investigation exploring 'all aspects relevant to the question of how such research, insofar as it involves animals, comes to merit the licence to proceed, including such matters as how the funding bodies, including the medical charities, assess and monitor the work that they fund' (2005: 11).

What is significant about the BUAV's analysis of the legislation of vivisection, therefore, is that it raises questions regarding how complex human-animal relations can be encompassed within the state's legal apparatus. In the 2003 APC report, the importance of addressing this problem was made explicit, specifically how to enable the public to participate in debate surrounding an issue ostensibly occurring within the scientific field, but which is legislated (and often funded) by the state and therefore also an issue of public concern. In the case of the BUAV's 2003 exposé of the Cambridge laboratory, the way in which this was addressed is through consultation between the government and animal rights or anti-vivisection movements as well as with scientific groups. In
this sense, despite the separation of scientific and ethical issues within pro-vivisection discourse, in practice these issues are interrelated via the legislative process. Indeed, this interrelation was a hard won victory by the anti-vivisection movement more broadly, due to being what led to the formation of the APC in the first place, in the wake of the 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act. It is the legislative and financial dependence upon government support, therefore, that always prevents the field of medical research from gaining complete autonomy and cements its social and ethical responsibilities (even if the internal relations of the field are not themselves structured by it).

Conclusion

In drawing upon Bourdieu and performative accounts of ANT, to conceptualise the problems of instigating political change and how to overcome these problems, the chapter has sought to construct a framework for examining the critique of vivisection provided by the groups such as SPEAK and BUAV. Firstly these groups' politics of articulation has been examined, with a focus on the way in which they trace the complex matrix of relations in the vivisection actor-network, in order to de-naturalise the doxic structures that legitimise the symbolically violent dismissal of their arguments from pro-vivisection quarters. The second element explored has been the practical attempts of the BUAV in particular to develop their own symbolic capital by engaging with actors that are seemingly non-scientific, but actually exert a huge influence on the scientific field.

The problem with this, is that by working within these existing systems, the BUAV are frequently accused of being part of the same system they are trying to undermine: which ironically were the same accusations that the organisation themselves levelled at NAVS when they splintered from the older society at the end of the 19th Century. In this sense, they could be perceived as falling into the trap of perpetuating, rather than attempting to transform, the existing system by focusing on
improving the welfare of animals through appealing to discourses of suffering, in line with Haraway's criticism of animal rights groups. However, such criticisms are slightly unfair: whilst it is true that the BUAV do work with governmental and commercial actors, on a practical level their activism creates a blurring between ethical, scientific, economic and legislative fields: with the very existence of the APC being a significant acknowledgement of this hybridity in legal terms. Thus, in a sense, they are articulating the hybridity of scientific actor-networks on a practical level, even though they are now working within the existing system.

Thus, whilst the previous chapter traced the tentative politics of articulation emerging in the work of groups such as SPEAK, this chapter has explored how the BUAV has used tactics designed to reframe existing accounts of vivisection on a practical level: attempting to transform it by introducing actors formerly precluded from it. Each activist group has approached this network at stake from a different angle; in Moi's terms tracing different sets of reality effects within it, with SPEAK allowing non-human animals to emerge as actors, whilst the BUAV actively engage with governmental actors in order to highlight their connection with the network whilst increasing their own mediating power in the process. Finally, both groups have worked to articulate the role of economic actors from the pharmaceutical industry in the network at stake, again foregrounding how its dynamic is not purely governed by scientific imperatives. In line with Mol, even though the version of vivisection enacted by these movements does not necessarily overlap, and – particularly in their characterisation of legal and political issues – often clashes, both strategies serve to foreground the structures that work to legitimise the practice (and sanction symbolic violence against themselves). In other words, both approaches create space to develop heterodox discourses that challenge the treatment of vivisection as a black box. In this sense, these groups are all engaging in a politics of articulation, to some degree, even though aspects of their work might still reflect the humanist discourse of rights they have descended from.
It is now necessary to develop these theoretical arguments further; with chapters three and four illustrating the impact of the articulation of hybridity in a discursive and legislative sense, respectively, the final chapter will focus on these issues more broadly – exploring how cultural relations can be unsettled. This approach will fulfil two purposes: firstly, it will broaden the arguments developed in previous chapters in order to illustrate their relevance to animal rights more generally and, secondly, it will look at more creative forms of activism that are working to directly intervene in public behaviour. More fundamentally, this approach will consolidate the relationship between Haraway's ethics and the work of animal rights groups, by arguing that it is only by attempting to intervene in cultural practices on a micro-sociological level that her ethics can be fully manifested in the work of activists.
Notes

1 Bourdieu also levels a similar – equally symbolically violent – criticism at Haraway, made all the more vicious due to not even referring to her by name, merely referencing her institution and most famous text, effectively rendering her invisible within the academic field he is demarcating:

The ideal-typical case, the University of California Santa Cruz, a focal point of the “postmodernist” movement, an archipelago of colleges scattered through the forest and communicating only through the Internet, was built in the 1960s, at the top of a hill, close to a seaside resort inhabited by well-heeled pensioners and with no industries. How could one not believe that capitalism has dissolved in a 'flux of signifiers detached from their signifieds', that the world is populated by 'cyborgs', 'cybernetic organisms', and that we have entered the age of the 'informatics of domination', when one lives in a little social and academic paradise from which all traces of work and exploitation has been effaced? (1997: 41)

2 As evident in the Bloor/Latour debate touched on in chapter one, it is highly problematic to conflate the two areas: due to social constructivism having an entirely different metaphysical framework to ANT.

3 In their words, 'the BUAV's leaping bunny logo' is the 'only globally recognised logo that guarantees products are cruelty free at every stage of development' (BUAV 2010:1). In order for brands or products to gain approval to use the logo: 'a company must no longer conduct or commission animal testing and must apply a verifiable fixed cut-off date – an unmoveable date after which none of its products or ingredients have been animal tested' (BUAV, 2007: FAQs). In this light, the logo itself can be understood as a form of symbolic capital in the field of ethical consumerism, with large companies – such as the Co-Operative group, Marks and Spenser and Argos – signing onto the scheme to consecrate the ethical value of their products. For a full list of companies and products involved with the scheme, see the BUAV-affiliated website Go Cruelty Free (BUAV, 2007).
Chapter 5

Samosas for Social Change

In order to understand the value of the theoretical approach developed in the previous chapter, with its synthesis of Bourdieu, ANT and Haraway, this chapter will relate the approach to a wider range of animal rights contexts. In doing so, the value of this theoretical perspective will be emphasised; as a tool for mapping out where animal rights approaches, beyond the vivisection debate, are engaging in productive forms of non-anthropocentric politics.

As well as broadening the scope of the study to explore the work of different animal rights groups, thus foregrounding the more general applicability of the theoretical tools developed, the chapter will also develop specific aspects of the theory from the previous chapter. Rather than attempts to challenge the boundary of the field/network at stake in order to disrupt its internal relations (as with the work of the BUAV, for instance), it will look at more concerted efforts by activists to expose and unsettle habitus; the habitual forms of embodied behaviour that perpetuate broader sociological relations. The chapter will then illustrate how this tactic not only works to expose existing social relations, but can prevent new doxa from forming. What is particularly useful about relating Bourdieu to activism in this way, is that it finally creates space for the explicit interrelation of Haraway's ethics with animal rights activism that has been anticipated throughout the thesis.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the process of undermining the boundary of a particular field involved activist groups working to articulate the complex hybrid composition of the actor-network at stake, in order to challenge its treatment as a distinct field where any ethical criticisms could be dispensed with symbolic violence. When groups such as the BUAV adopted such strategies, this effectively altered the perceived boundary of this field/network, transforming its internal organisation and – crucially – the competence necessary to navigate it, thus giving the activists'
arguments greater mediating power. In contrast, this chapter will foreground a different approach to
the same task: rather than focusing on the strategy of challenging the field's boundary, it will
explore the process of unsettling the habitus that sustains the structures of the field.

In other words, the chapter will simultaneously work to broaden the analysis by suggesting that the
productive forms of politics outlined in previous chapters are not just limited to the vivisection
debate, whilst focusing on a more specific theoretical element (the disruption of habitus). These two
concerns will be synthesised through examining the work of local protest movements (Nottingham
Animal Rights and Veggies Catering Campaign) who have engaged in performative forms of protest
in public spaces; articulating alternatives to the existing sociological realities that are enacted in the
sites at which these protests take place. In other words, the forms of protest engaged in by these
groups will be understood as providing a direct physical counterpoint to the cultural practices they
are criticising, in order to expose and unsettle the social norms that these practices sustain.

The work of these movements will therefore be understood in line with Bourdieu's argument that:
'The truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a
field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses' (2008: 165). The work of
the activists can be understood as an attempt to construct this field, by creating space for their
heterodox account of social reality to clash with normative social relations, in order to expose these
relations. In other words, through the activists disrupting the physical space of the city, a route into
unsettling its normative social relations could be developed, in order to highlight the invisible actor-
networks sustaining everyday forms of behaviour and the role of exploited actors within these
networks.

What will emerge as crucial, however, is that these movements cannot simply work to expose
existing social relations, but must develop alternatives to these relations that do not instate new normative values. Indeed, this is what Haraway was warning against (as discussed in chapter two), when she stated that practices such as veganism were not 'Feminist Doxa' (2008: 80). Throughout the following chapters it was argued that, despite Haraway's claims, animal rights perspectives such as veganism can be powerful positions of situated knowledge and thus in drawing upon such philosophies animal rights movements are not simply creating new doxa, that are predicated on the inviolable rights of animals, but using these perspectives as tools to reveal and unsettle existing humanist political structures (as reflected by texts such as Beasts of Burden and Animal Liberation and Social Revolution). Chapter three developed this argument by illustrating how activist movements were constantly working to expose (rather than succeeding in imposing) normative values in the vivisection debate, while the previous chapter foregrounded how articulating the hybridity of actor-networks was essential to the work of the BUAV.

Previous chapters, therefore, did not show how animal rights groups had resolved political issues by providing fully defined alternatives to pre-existing social relations, more how their work created and maintained tensions with existing cultural doxa. The groups focused on developing a politics of articulation in order to expose the hybridity of existing social relations and foreground the impossibility of imposing new, self-contained, conceptual categories onto these networks. This chapter will explore how these approaches are manifested in animal rights more generally, by focusing on groups that work to disrupt habitus in order to expose the network of relations lying behind everyday activities, which relate to animal (and human) exploitation.

The difficulty is how to maintain the tension that is essential in order to render the doxa visible in the field of debate (maintaining the role of a heterodox alternative that is necessary to expose and
unsettle social norms), whilst still finding some form of ethical criteria from which to make decisions regarding political action. This was the problem Adams identified in Haraway's work, when she claimed that Haraway's attempts to maintain ambivalence and focus on critiquing pre-existing social relations, inhibited the possibility of 'something more tangible: non-ambivalent action' (2006: 126). However, whilst this is an important point, as discussed previously, this accusation does not do Haraway justice – especially in light of the subsequent *When Species Meet*. Indeed, the later text attenuates such criticisms by proposing a form of ethical criteria that can be used to guide alternative modes of political action without appealing to pre-existing ethical categories; what Haraway describes as an ethics of flourishing.

She touches on this concept in the final chapter of *When Species Meet*, 'Parting Bites', in which she suggests that – when examining a particular network of relations – a guiding question for exploring whether it could be reconfigured differently is what does each actor: 'contribute to the flourishing of the land and its critters [...]? That question does not invite a disengaged “liberal” ethics or politics but requires examined lives that take risks to help the flourishing of some ways of getting on together and not others' (2008: 288-9). This argument is made in relation to the task of determining whether a particular species is detrimental to a specific habitat that it might not be native to, but in line with her earlier use of Stengers' cosmopolitics, such questions cannot be addressed by appealing to pre-defined categories such as whether each actor is 'original and pure' (2008: 288). Instead an ethics of flourishing marks a refusal to draw upon pre-existing epistemological categories as a foundation for an ethics, because it necessarily entails the production of situated knowledge; of mapping out the actor-network at stake from a situated position within it. Drawing upon Karen Barad she argues that such an ethics 'is therefore not about right response to a radically exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part' (cited in Haraway 2008: 289). In other words, this form of ethics
could be seen as a means of developing a heterodox alternative that remains 'cosmopolitically correct' – in the sense of refusing to impose doxic symbolic categories. The complex issue of what this politics entails will be explored later on in the chapter, but before focusing on what form this ethics could take in practice, it is necessary to explore the approaches to exposing doxa that are a precursor to this development of alternatives.

To develop these themes the chapter begins by focusing on two initiatives in which Nottingham Animal Rights and Veggies played coordinating roles, which took place in Nottingham itself in 2010. Free food give-aways, which were held on a monthly basis on various locations in Nottingham city centre and culminated in a city-wide series of give-aways on 12th December 2010, and the national Spring Animal Rights Gathering’s day of action on 13th March, where various animal rights actions were simultaneously held across Nottingham. The chapter will then focus on the role of campaigning groups such as Veggies in the 2005 anti-G8 protests in Scotland. While the anti-summit protests as a whole could be understood as an attempt to expose cultural doxa underpinning capitalist social relations, the practices that emerged in the development of the protests encouraged a continual reflexivity about activist practice itself – in order to unsettle its own norms – or at least foreground (as opposed to naturalising) them. What is particularly important in relating the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter to these movements is that it creates space for fully realising the dialogue between Haraway and animal rights activism that has been gradually developed throughout previous chapters.

**Meeting Haraway**

As illustrated throughout the thesis, there is potential for a productive conversation to be developed between Haraway and animal rights perspectives, where each can play a valuable role in guarding
against the emergence of any appeal to humanist values. The approaches explored in this chapter relate directly to the argument set out at the start of When Species Meet, where Haraway explicitly traces the relation between her own work and that of alter-globalisation groups. The text begins with two guiding questions: '(1) Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog? and (2) How is "becoming with" a practice of becoming worldly?' (2008: 3). The first question is in reference to the critical interrogation of the metaphysical category 'animal' that occurs throughout the text, which (as discussed previously) foregrounds the way the concept has been constructed by a specific brand of patriarchal humanist reason that fixes the terms human/animal in hierarchical binary opposition. By questioning whom or what our companion species are, Haraway foregrounds the inadequacy of the term 'animal' in articulating the complex human-animal relations that emerge through the co-existence and – as she continually reiterates – the co-evolution of human and non-human creatures. This then opens space for her to launch a critique of the way the animal is categorised against the human, despite the fact that the boundary between the two is permeable on both a metaphysical and material level – a point Haraway continually asserts in arguments such as:

Human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists and such [...] To be one is always to become with many (Haraway, 2008: 3-4).

In other words, she is continually articulating the hybrid composition of social reality; a tactic that (as outlined in chapters three and four) anti-vivisection activists were also working to foreground – despite Haraway's criticisms of these groups.

The second of Haraway's question centres around what she terms the 'encounter value' of human-animal relations (the issue that was focused on in chapter two), namely the material and/or symbolic
significance of these relationships, a question that she explores via her case studies on animal research in laboratories; dog agility training; pure-bred dog breeding; genetic research into cloning animals and livestock farming practices. Encounter-value relates to the issue of 'becoming-with' animals, due to Haraway's insightful comparison between the worker's production of surplus-value and the animal's production of encounter-value, which is any form of value arising from human interaction with animals (2008: 45-67). She argues that both forms of value are perceived as socially normative, with the exploitation of each party being attributed to the constraints of the market or the natural order, respectively; in other words, in each instance exploitation is justified by an apparently inevitable need to produce surplus- (or encounter-) value, due to external demands, whilst the relations that create these demands are never questioned.

These two issues (the critique of the category 'animal' and of developing more ethical ways of 'becoming with' animals) are interrelated on an ethical level due to Haraway's criticism of the way the category of the animal is frequently used to justify practises harmful to animals, which are treated as ethically acceptable due to producing value (be it practical or semiotic) for the human. This was again reflected in chapters three and four, where pro-vivisection discourse tended to treat the subaltern status of animals as a given and activists had to work to expose these metaphysical distinctions in order to denaturalise them. This construction of the 'animal' as subaltern and corresponding legitimisation of processes that systematically subjugate animals (which reflexively perpetuates their being treated as inferior) thus becomes understood as a priori reality. Indeed, it was in response to problems such as this that *When Species Meet* interrogated the matrix of relations that constructed this seemingly external 'natural order' that posits exploitative ways of relating to non-human actors as normative, to argue that this pre-existing order could be constructed differently, in order to open up new modes of 'becoming with' animals.

As well as being used to develop a critique of reductive categories, such as 'animal', and their
corresponding political effects, this parallel between surplus and encounter value that she develops, also sets the stage for Haraway to draw comparison between her work and anti-capitalist movements:

I tie these questions together in expressions I learned in Barcelona from a Spanish lover of French bulldogs, *alter-globalisation* and *autre-mondialisation.* These terms were invented by European activists to stress that their approaches to militarized neoliberal models of world building are not about antiglobalisation but about nurturing a more just and peaceful other-globalization. There is a promising *autre-mondialisation* to be learned in retying some of the knots of ordinary multispecies living on earth. (2008: 3)

In very simplistic terms, therefore, what Haraway recognises in the alter-globalisation movement is its criticisms of humanist reason and its political manifestations (such as representational democracy, possessive individualism and neoliberalism), in an attempt to tentatively develop alternatives to capitalism. For Haraway, this process is akin to her own attempts to move away from humanist categories as a framework for guiding human-animal relations, which result in political or ethical anthropocentrism: leading to her call for alternative relations to be developed, without the solace of pre-defined humanist values. What is significant and, indeed, vital about this development of political alternatives by alter-globalisation groups, therefore, is that they seek to move away from conventional rights-based politics that tends to be grounded in humanism, instead experimenting with developing alternative non-hierarchical modes of social organisation.

Central to this form of politics is the denaturalisation of certain cultural practices and the symbolic relations and categories stemming from these practices; or, in light of previous arguments, the task of exposing the doxa to render it merely orthodox. For instance, in an animal rights context this was seen in chapter three, where anti-vivisection activists worked to unsettle the co-constitutive relation
between the category of animal and the practice of vivisection. Similarly, this problem was faced by the anti-McDonald's activists in chapter one, where the mere existence of certain practices were cited by McDonald's executives as evidence that the inequalities produced by these practices were natural or inevitable: such as current farming practices legitimising the animal's role as subaltern, or restaurant practices legitimising the worker's low-waged, low-skilled role. As discussed in previous chapters, foregrounding these implicit symbolic relations is the first stage in opening them to critique and it is this move away from humanism, in an attempt to develop political alternatives, that Haraway sees as valuable in the alter-globalisation movement. In other words, she views the work of alter-globalisation groups as providing a valuable model for re-thinking human-animal relations, due primarily to the way they expose the same humanist brand of reason that renders the animal subaltern.

Previous chapters argued that Haraway's dismissal of animal rights is sometimes misplaced due to certain animal rights groups already engaging (to a certain extent) in the practices she advocates. This chapter will reiterate this point by foregrounding the role of animal rights in the very forms of progressive social movement that Haraway cites as valuable. The focus in this chapter, however, will not simply be on how these groups work to map out the doxic relations that sustain these hierarchical social realities, but on their attempts to expose habitus by intervening in the mundane day-to-day modes of behaviour that sustain these social realities, in order to bring these practices into cognition. As with previous chapters, this task of foregrounding how certain embodied behaviours and practices perpetuate particular social or even metaphysical categories (such as human/animal) is difficult, for – as foregrounded by Bourdieu – such relations are stubborn to displace.

**Performative Protest: A Means of Disrupting Habitus?**
Before focusing directly on the value of these movements for Haraway, therefore, it is necessary to build on the previous chapter in a little more depth and focus on the significance of unsettling habitus; as the way these movements do this is integral to how they meet Haraway's demands for a cosmopolitical approach to reconfiguring human-animal relations. In line with the previous chapter, the habitus refers to 'the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations' (Bourdieu, 2008: 78), that functions as 'the universalising mediation which causes an individual agent's practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be more the less “sensible” and “reasonable”' (2008: 79). In other words, the habitus is the set of normative behaviours and embodied practices that stem from the sum-total of the dispositions of the actors in the field. These behaviours then become a set of – in Hayles' words – practices that are 'learned, perpetuated and changed through embodied practices [which] should not be thought of as a collection of rules but as a series of dispositions and inclinations that are both subject to circumstances and durable enough to pass down through generations' (1999: 202-3). In other words, these sets of behaviour that constitute the habitus, become a structure that goes on to shape subsequent practice, not by rigidly prescribing modes of behaviour, but in providing a general template of what is normative and socially acceptable, which allows room for context-specific improvisation whilst still preserving a more or less homogeneous understanding of social reality.

What is so powerful about the habitus is that it is embodied and 'each agent [...] is a particular reproducer of objective meaning', meaning that in each instance of individual behaviour there are 'new triggers and new supports for the modus operandi from which they arise, so that this discourse continually feeds off itself' (2008: 79). In Mol's terms, therefore, the habitus has distinct 'reality effects', as:

One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning
(sens) of practices and the world [...] the homogeneity of habitus is what – within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production – causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted. (Bourdieu, 2008: 80)

This argument is significant because in creating this 'commonsense' world, via particular modes of habitual behaviour and practice, certain symbolic categories are established as the normative mode of social interaction:

The practical operators which constitute the habitus and which function in their practical state in gesture or utterance reproduce in a transformed form [...] the oppositions and hierarchies which actually organise social groups, and which they help to legitimate in presenting them in a misrecognisable form. (2008: 97)

Like symbolic violence, therefore, these hierarchies and inequalities are misrecognised as such and treated as legitimate or natural. In other words – in light of the previous chapters – the habitus is what gives rise to the 'systems of classification' that constitute the doxa. Moreover, like the doxa, the habitus is not consciously recognised, as 'the principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness' (2008: 94). In line with Moi, the political significance of this is that while these 'unspoken and unspeakable rules' makes the field resistant to change (Moi, 1999: 271), by bringing these modes of behaviour into cognition they are transformed from being doxic to merely orthodox. In line with the previous chapters, therefore, this process has potential to open space for positing heterodox alternatives, as if the habitus is brought into cognition, it can no longer unproblematically reproduce doxa and can instead be merely seen as supporting orthodox social distinctions. Symbolic distinctions such as human/animal, or class divisions, can therefore be understood as culturally contingent rather than a priori reality.
The process of unsettling habitus is thus essentially the task of intervening in the perpetuation of the field/network's semi-permanent 'structuring-structures', in order to challenge the doxa that these structures produce. For this reason, this process necessitates working at the micro-sociological level in order to expose the relation between mundane day-to-day forms of behaviour and the doxa; as opposed to the macro-sociological scale that is necessary when, for instance, working to instigate legislative change, which (as the previous chapter illustrated) involved transforming the internal relations of the field by altering its boundary. This is where the work of the movements discussed in this chapter will emerge as particularly important; as they are working at this micro-sociological level (disrupting daily routines related to food or shopping, for instance) in order to expose the actor-network that constitutes the broader sociological field. In other words, interrupting behaviour at the micro-sociological level brings this behaviour into cognition, opening space to question it and link it to the underlying network of relations it is both structured by and goes on to structure.

Again, the problem of drawing on Bourdieu for this purpose is that whilst he is valuable in illustrating the problem of instigating social change, his work needs to be understood in line with performative accounts of ANT to grasp the way in which activist movements can move beyond simply unsettling habitus and can work to transform these modes of behaviour and realise alternatives. Essentially the role of the activists is to directly intervene in the enaction of particular actor-networks that give rise to doxic 'reality effects'. Understood in light of the work of the anti-McDonald's activists in chapter one, therefore, such tactics could – on a simple level – be reflected in activists picketing McDonald's in an attempt to intervene in public behaviour and highlight the link between consumer activity and the naturalisation of certain socio-economic relations. The chapter will focus on movements that have worked to take this approach a stage further, not only seeking to de-naturalise certain doxic relations – by foregrounding how they are reinforced by habitus – but in providing heterodox alternatives to these existing social norms. This is evident, in a
tentative way, in the work of the food campaigns engaged in by Veggies and Nottingham Animal Rights.

**Disrupting Commercial Spaces: Making the Doxa Orthodox**

As discussed in chapter one, whilst London Greenpeace initially developed the *What's Wrong With McDonald's?* pamphlet, Veggies had a key role in its subsequent distribution; as Wolfson points out, the Nottingham group were responsible for its bulk reproduction and distribution throughout the UK (1999: 4). Indeed, this role is retained today, with Veggies being the distributional hub of the pamphlets in the UK (although they are also available on *McSpotlight* to download and print). As referred to previously, the group also provided moral support and political solidarity during the McLibel trial, with members of the organisation travelling to London to sit in on court proceedings and give evidence, fund-raising to cover the costs of the trial and continuing the campaign themselves.

Since the end of the trial, Veggies have continued to hold bi-annual international days of action against the corporation. However, this does not consist of simply picketing McDonald's, as from the outset the group sought to develop ways of making their political activity more accessible, in order to directly intervene in public behaviour. Indeed the Campaign originated from a specific action intended to playfully enact a symbolic critique of McDonald’s, whereupon members: 'from Nottingham’s animal rights group had the idea of presenting the manager of a local McDonalds with a huge veggie burger to represent an ethical alternative' (Veggies, 2010: History). This performative act, therefore, was a visualisation and enactment of a heterodox alternative to the food McDonald’s were producing (before the epoch of McSalads and Veggie Deluxe burgers) and from this action, Veggies was launched as a campaign – establishing a permanent street stall in Nottingham that sold veggie burgers outside McDonald's from 1985.
The street stall no longer exists, with Veggies focusing instead on campaign catering at demonstrations (including large-scale events such as the aforementioned G8 protests and the national climate camps), as well as community events and festivals. However, for the past two and a half years a more radical approach to vegan outreach has been developed in conjunction with Nottingham Animal Rights: free food give-aways, which take place both outside McDonald's and at other symbolic locations in Nottingham: such as in the middle of the city's market square, or outside the Nottingham city council headquarters. These campaigns began in spring 2008, but from February 2010 have been organised on a monthly basis, culminating in the city-wide give-away (on 12th December 2010) where ten food and campaign stalls were held in different locations across the city centre. Each event has also been preceded by cookery workshops at the Sumac Centre (an autonomous social centre in Nottingham), which function simultaneously as a means of sharing cookery skills and a way of providing food for the give-away events.

At the give-aways themselves free food is distributed to people in the town centre, who are encouraged to ask questions about the campaign, debate issues with the group and learn about the connections between diet and a range of other environmental, social and animal rights issues (see Figs 6 and 7: 293-294). In addition, the activists attempt to enable people to respond practically to the issues raised; for instance a list of local ethical food outlets that support the campaigns is distributed at each event (see Fig.8: 295), along with pamphlets containing easy recipes that explain how to make the food provided, with interested individuals also invited to the monthly cookery workshops.

The aim of these campaigns was to enact the links between a series of issues that could be impacted upon by seemingly mundane, everyday, activities such as dietary choices or frequenting fast food restaurants. As with the politics of articulation enacted by the anti-McDonald's activists during the
McLibel trial, this approach was designed to articulate the role of consumers as pivotal actors in sustaining the existing network of relations, whilst creating space for illustrating how this role could be subverted. In this sense, both the format and political ethos of the protests was akin to Food Not Bombs – a movement originating in the US, which uses the distribution of free food as a tool to expose 'the raw nerve endings of the contemporary political economy' (Heynen, 2010: 1230). As with the food give-aways, Food Not Bombs distributes free vegan food in public settings, in order to make visible the hidden matrix of exploitation that both sustains, and is rendered invisible by, commercialised city centres. As the California branch of Food Not Bombs made explicit, the performative element of these protests was vital in order 'to show the public that hunger is a daily problem that people must deal with', and reflected their 'refusal to hide the poor away – to expose poverty to the glare of those who do not want to see it' (cited in Heynen, 2010: 1229).

Similar principles guided the development of the free food give-aways – indeed, Veggies directly refer to similarities between the give-aways and Food Not Bombs on the vegan campaigns section of their website – with both groups using the performative distribution of food in a public space as a means of making visible relations that normally functioned as unspoken doxa, as: 'The giveaways always provide a good means of engaging with members of the public (free cake always gets a positive reaction!) and discussing everything from environmental issues, to the exploitation of both humans and animals that is central to agribusiness' (Giraud, 2010a). However, while Food Not Bombs seeks to challenge the removal of visible signs of poverty from the city centre, the free food give-aways focus more on exposing the hidden network of relations that sustain the large multinational food-outlets the dominate the city centre. For instance, an Indymedia report about one of the give-aways, which took place outside a branch of McDonald's, describes how the give-away attempted to:

show that – despite superficially (and characteristically cynically) trying to re-brand
themselves as an 'ethical', 'green' company – the same problems remain in relation to workers' rights, litter, unhealthy food, exploitative marketing aimed at children, animal welfare, and the general steamrolling of anyone who tries to get in their way! [...] The most important part of the day was the amount of people who approached us and wanted to have long and serious discussions about the reasons behind the protest. It was particularly refreshing to have groups of teenagers approach us and want to talk at length about the importance of considering how what you eat relates to so many other issues. (Giraud, 2010b)

Despite this difference in emphasis, therefore, the aims of both movements still have a substantial overlap, as in giving away free food they are both articulating a heterodox alternative to the commercialised city: 'a political economy based in mutual exchange and voluntary co-operation (as opposed to a market in labour power and the exploitation of working people)' (Heynon, 2010: 1233).

The importance of this approach is (in line with Susan Leigh Star's account of ANT) that it makes it 'easier to see the invisible work and the invisible memberships that have anchored them [the networks] in place' (1991: 44). In other words, in attempting to expose doxa, the networks of relations that lie underneath these normative value systems can be exposed, effectively bringing those rendered invisible by the doxa back into the network. In the context of food give-aways, the approach of the activists works to expose the consequences of multinational corporations dominating the city centre, even bringing the notion of capitalism itself back into cognition in an urban context in which it is implicit. As Bourdieu makes clear, the habitus is ultimately 'engendered by the objective structures, that is, in the last analysis, by the economic bases of the social formation in question' (2008: 83). Although this relationship is not straight forward, due to being manifested in
a myriad of subtle ways (as Distinction maps out), bringing these embodied – almost unconscious – modes of behaviour into cognition can be the first stage in tracing the links between these forms of behaviour to particular (exploitative) economic relations.

This process of unsettling the habitus thus works on two levels; firstly, it enables the marginalised to be reintroduced as social actors, providing a point of access between activists and the public that changes their normal patterns of behaviour (by eating free food rather than McDonald's), as opposed to simply distributing a leaflet about the company as the consumer continues with their ordinary pattern of behaviour and frequents the restaurant. While each approach attempts to map out doxa, the former activity disrupts the habitus that works to mask and perpetuate these socio-economic relations, so is a more valuable means of bringing these processes into cognition. Secondly, it enables intervention into existing modes of social behaviour that naturalise the symbolic (and by extension economic) system producing these inequalities, by participating in eating free vegan food, as opposed to paying for intensively farmed animal products; enabling the public to – very temporarily – participate in a heterodox alternative to these relations. In line with Bourdieu, therefore, this makes these habitual forms of behaviour, and the social relations they are in co-constitutive relation with, explicit: rendering them orthodox rather than doxic. In conducting a resolutely non-commercial activity in a commercial space, the activists are not only seeking to foreground issues of animal welfare, but – in Mol’s terms – to create space for asking whether things could be otherwise, for questioning whether certain social relations are natural or inevitable or if there could be alternatives. The give-aways are therefore a means of making visible a perspective that is in tension with the context in which the give-away is taking place, which thus, exposing the cultural doxa underpinning this context.

At the free food give-away on 12th December, for instance, five campaigning stalls were run in conjunction with five free-food stalls in locations across Nottingham city centre, including the
market square, outside a branch of McDonald's, next to the city's largest shopping centre and in the fashionable 'alternative' area of Hockley, with a flagship stall outside Nottingham Council House. Each of these locations was selected due to its potential to disrupt patterns of consumer behaviour; at the shopping centre stall, for instance, activists were in proximity to a local market and wholefoods shop, as well as two Tesco supermarkets. Distributing free food thus provided a means for activists to discuss alternatives to supermarkets, as well as linking consumer behaviour to animal rights issues. The council house stall had a more directly political purpose, as in previous years – on the same day – Nottingham Animal Rights had held the East Midlands Vegan festival in the council house, but in 2010 were informed that they could no long use the building: 'due to the wear and tear sustained to the interior of the building, caused by a high volume of people attending events on a drop in basis' (Tricker, 2010). A key motivation for organising the large give-away was to hold it as a form of protest at this decision, which was perceived by activists as a political one – particularly in light of the ongoing use of the building by commercial organisations (for instance, the previous weekend a trade show had been held by a heating manufacturer in the same venue; Reid, 2010). The food give-away on the 12th, therefore, was thus seen by activists as both a protest against the council's use of the market square and council buildings as show-cases for commercial ventures – with prohibitive costs for local and voluntary organisations6 – as well as the culmination of the year's monthly give-aways.

By developing a city-wide event, a more specific interruption of normative modes of behaviour could also be developed. The stalls near supermarkets and fast food restaurants, for instance, worked to bring the practices associated with these locations into question, whilst also attempting to provoke reflection as to the wider practices these organisations sustained; denaturalising activities such as meat consumption, which are usually deeply doxic in such cultural contexts. The stalls could thus provide specific counter-points to the locations in which they were situated, making the stall's content and literature specific to each location, in order to expose the practices operating in
each micro-sociological context. For instance, the anti-McDonald's stall had leaflets about *McGreenwash* and *What's Wrong With McDonald's?* pamphlets, as well as cooking hot veggie burgers and giving away soya milkshakes, to make a direct visual contrast with McDonald's food.

Significantly, working at this level also prevents certain solutions to this problem being established as activist doxa. For instance, an effect of these tactics was the class issues they raised, the same issues set out in *Devastate to Liberate*, which suggested that a key problem with animal rights movements (and activism in general) is the middle class background of the majority of its members, particularly when encouraging boycotts of certain companies:

> In reality the situation is that most people can't afford health foods, can't afford the time or energy to take regular exercise. It's easy to recommend these things, but hard to put into practice if you've got an energy sapping, mind numbing job and/or a couple of kids at your knees nagging you to take them into Mcdonalds which robs you blind as well. Certainly society offers choice, but importantly for a lot of working class people this is just the illusion of choice. For the middle classes, in their blind indifference to the daily suffering and hurt of this society (reinforced neatly by the middle class dominated media and politicians) it is easy to exercise the privilege of economic and cultural choice and attempt to boycott a specific part of the hurt -- animal cruelty (even though that is an impossible goal within this society). (Anon, 2009)

The act of giving away food for free does not attenuate these problems, but it does bring into focus the relationship between economic relations and the habitus. As Moi argues, 'according to Bourdieu [...] when or if the dominated group applies the schemes of dominant thought to their own situation, they cannot fail to expose the logic of that thought' (1999: 286). On the one hand, therefore, distributing free food in a commercial setting could be seen as a tactic to direct people to alternative
food outlets, but – as pointed out in *Devastate to Liberate*, these alternatives could be more expensive or less accessible than fast food outlets or supermarkets, giving these tactics a potential class bias due to economic constraints. What giving out free food achieves, however, is bringing these issues into the open; by foregrounding alternatives complex questions can be raised as to the nature of existing social relations. Applying the commercial logic to the work of the free food groups raises questions that could not be asked if these relations remained doxic, for instance, questions as to why certain foods are expensive whilst the only foods available to some segments of the population rely on exploiting workers and animals. In conducting a resolutely non-commercial activity in a commercial space, the activists are not only seeking to foreground issues of animal welfare, but – in Mol's terms – to create space for foregrounding the complex reality effects of these networks, in which animal and human exploitation are intertwined and a whole re-configuration of these networks is necessary. While these small give-aways cannot provide an answer about how to respond to these problems (they can only acknowledge them on a simple level, by encouraging homeless people to take food and giving out recipes containing cheap, easily accessible ingredients), they do bring the often invisible social relations lying behind the habitus into the open.

To aid in this task, what Kevin DeLuca describes as the 'rhetorical power' of performative politics is deployed in these forms of demonstration, with protesters attempting to create more visually arresting forms of protest then simply distributing pamphlets. For instance this is reflected in activists bringing camp-stoves to the protests in order to serve the public hot veggie burgers and create a direct visual link with McDonald’s food, or act as waiters – distributing small canapé-like food samples to the public (see Fig.9: 296). In line with DeLuca, such practices work to reconstitute 'the identity of the dominant culture by challenging and transforming mainstream society's key discourses and ideographs' (1999: 17). In other words, these forms of protest both deploy visually recognisable images, whilst de-familiarising the practices they are evoking, through using them to embody values that contradict and undermine the meanings usually associated with them: for
instance, due to the food being free, vegan and distributed on the streets. Again, this is a means of exposing doxa by applying commercial logic to an uncommercial context, to make this logic visible. Furthermore, this particular practice leads to the defamiliarisation of the habitus itself, recreating contexts where the bodies of both activists and public enact normative cultural practices in a slightly different context, which brings these practices to cognition.

Akin to Suzanne Lacy’s discussion of radical forms of public art, such protests can be understood as mapping an ‘alternative cartography’ onto the urban space, which contradicts the logics of commercialism (and more specifically of animal exploitation) that underpins this context (1995: 20). The large food give-away in particular aimed to expose this commercial logic, by providing a counter-point to a busy Christmas shopping weekend and taking place in locations (such as Nottingham market square) which would ordinarily cost prohibitive amounts of money to hire. In relation to Bourdieu, this alternative cartography could be seen as working to directly intervene in and bring into consciousness the habitus, as a route into understanding the relation of these embodied forms of behaviour to the broader symbolic relations (doxa) they are in co-constitutive relation with. For instance, in bringing embodied cultural practices, such as meat consumption, into cognition, the relations that simultaneously legitimise (and perpetuate) this behaviour can be exposed: such as symbolic distinctions between human and animal, or value judgements made about certain forms of work that make low wages seem socially acceptable. The give-aways themselves therefore echo Bourdieu's mechanism of how the doxa can only be exposed once it is reconstituted in the realm of debate (as orthodoxy) and the give-aways provide the hetorodox alternative to commercial logic that is necessary in doing this. This entire process, therefore, creates a heterodox version of social reality – in Haraway's words it is autre-mondialisation on a small and transitory scale – creating space for asking ethical questions that challenge previously unspoken social norms.
This interventional approach was also developed during the 2010 National Animal Rights Gathering, which again was coordinated by Nottingham Animal Rights and Veggies. The gathering took place over three days between 12\textsuperscript{th}-14\textsuperscript{th} March and whilst the Friday and Sunday consisted of workshops (which ranged from banner making to advice on engaging with the media), on Saturday 13\textsuperscript{th} the activists enacted a series of simultaneous protests across the Nottinghamshire region (Veggies, 2010b). Whilst certain actions took place outside of Nottingham itself (such as a protest against the Great British Circus – the last UK circus to hold large cats – which was visiting nearby Lincoln, and local hunt saboteurs travelled to rural Nottinghamshire to prevent foxes being killed by the Grove and Rufford fox hunt), the majority of demonstrations took place in Nottingham city centre. The significance of this multi-target protest model was summarised by an analysis of the Nottingham event on Indymedia in relation to a subsequent protest in Kiel, Germany, which adopted a similar approach in order to 'break from the conventional single march format and experiment with multiple simultaneous actions in the city' (Sheffield Animal Friends, 2010). The report argues that:

The multi-action model presents some advantages over the conventional mass march. Rather than being observed from afar, chanting slogans, activists are more approachable in smaller groups so can explain their message directly (and can choose to take action in areas they have knowledge of). The occurrence of numerous simultaneous actions across a city is also a very visible reminder of the extent and variety of animal abuse – a march against speciesism or animal abuse in the abstract could appear incoherent, but this way the industries being targeted can be clearly seen. (Sheffield Animal Friends, 2010)

As with the anti-McDonald's protests and free food give-aways, therefore, these targeted protests worked to articulate the consumer's role in perpetuating certain exploitative social relations. However, the multi-action format of these city-wide actions developed the performative element of
these previous protests even further. To refer back to Lacy’s description of public art as an alternative mapping of public space, these forms of performative protest can also be understood as a specific form of mapping; the enaction of a situated cartography, akin to Law and Mol’s argument touched on in chapter one (2002: 16). Rather than providing a bird’s eye – apparently objective – view of the city space, this form of situated mapping overlays the city and works to contradict its commercial logic. The multi-target protests at the National Gathering worked to directly enact the network of relations that were related to animal exploitation in the city centre; as the Indymedia analysis of the protests described, the two-hundred activists converging on Kiel gathered ‘under the slogan “because animal abuse is everywhere”. This slogan was therefore a direct reference to the protest model enacted by the activists, which foregrounded the uses of animals that occurred on a day to day basis and whose ‘aim was to disrupt for one day the ignorant bliss of shoppers, and expose the multiple forms of animal exploitation normally hidden from public view’ (Sheffield Animal Friends, 2010). It was at the points where the activists’ specific cartography (of the city as a network of relations that relate to animal exploitation) clashed with the normative commercial logic of the city centre, that the doxic norms underpinning this logic could be exposed: rendering them merely orthodox and open to critique.

Therefore, even whilst both the Nottingham and Kiel protests included some form of free vegan food give-away (which took place outside a cake shop in Kiel and, in line with local tradition, outside a McDonald’s in Nottingham), these protests were just one part of the performative series of protests that worked to articulate the matrix of commercial contexts that relied on some form of – in Haraway’s terms – encounter-value derived from the exploitation of animals. In other words, these protests could be interpreted as a performative response to the call Haraway makes at the outset of *When Species Meet*, for the articulation of *Biocapital*, volume one. In these multi-target protests the unsettling of doxa enabled activists to articulate the role of the animal in generating this value, and opened space to question the ethics behind these processes. In line with Bourdieu, therefore, encounter-value is one of the hidden economic relations from which the habitus stems, and re-
articulating this link is a route into activists mapping out the more complex actor-network lying behind lived reality.

From a purely practical perspective, the Spring Gathering could be regarded as a success due to the fact that – on a single day – campaigns that had been waged by the local Nottingham Animal Rights group for years reached their aim. For instance, although the group had succeeded in their attempts to get the majority of clothes shops in Nottingham city centre to sign anti-fur policies, a designer children's clothes shop, Cashe, had refused until the day of protests. Likewise, one of the restaurants involved in a year long campaign against foie gras in Nottingham (following bans by York, Bolton and Norwich city councils, on the grounds of animal cruelty), agreed to stop stocking it after the protests (Notts IMC, 2010). As the Indymedia analysis of the protests points out, however, certain difficulties still remained regarding the effectiveness of this form of protest:

Such days of action obviously cannot occur very regularly, due to the impracticalities of travelling to different cities all the time and the responsibility of fighting animal abuse in our own areas. In many countries or peripheral regions, the possibility of ever mobilising enough people may seem remote. Another consideration is that a wide geographical spread of activists comes at the price of an unmissable mass of people on a march. Passers-by may easily miss the scale of the mobilisation and not have their attention caught in the way that it might by a march (or other mass action in one place). (Sheffield Animal Friends, 2010)

Such forms of protest are therefore not as sustainable, in practical terms, as online articulations (as discussed in chapter three) or more conventional small-scale forms of protest. Nonetheless, in comparison to other large-scale events (such as protest marches) the series of small scale actions used in the Spring Gathering and December 12th food give-away were a more effective means of developing a politics of articulation. The Indymedia report also suggests that these protests were a useful means of moving away from instating new doxa on a
practical level, in terms of the structure and strategies of animal rights groups:

Allocating power to affinity groups could be seen as representing a democratisation of actions, and allowing individuals to use their creativity rather than just regurgitating well-worn chants. The small group setting could also provide useful experience for those looking to get active or improve tactics in their own groups. (Sheffield Animal Friends, 2010)

In other words, the day of action worked to reconfigure the local groups who had converged in Nottingham, into affinity groups that were composed of a cross-section of local movements, with a specific interest in the issues at stake. In line with SAF's arguments, this proved useful in exposing certain habitual tactics that could have congealed as activist doxa in the work of the Nottingham group who were hosting the Gathering; providing a route into developing more creative tactics. These forms of protests, therefore, were effective at exposing social relations that revealed the complexity of the actor-network at stake, highlighting ethical issues that could not be resolved by imposing simplistic value judgements onto these networks. Instead, the relations within these networks need to be reconfigured on a more fundamental level, which would be beyond the scope of small free food give-aways, which can only provide a transitory heterodox alternative, due to the barriers prohibiting certain social groups from participating in this alternative on an everyday basis. However, in other contexts, attempts have been made to develop these alternatives more comprehensively and to explore this further and it will now be necessary to turn to the work of Veggies at the anti-G8 protests near Stirling in 2005.

**Cosmopolitical Experiments in Activism: Veggies at the 'Hori-Zone'**
It is all too easy to state that 'Another World is Possible' – actually creating that world is far more difficult. For a week, an unlikely field near Stirling became the 'Hori-Zone', a model of large scale horizontal and autonomous decision-making. (Trocchi, Redwolf and Alamire, 2005: 61)

Between June 11th and July 7th 2005 a series of activist groups worked together under the banner of the Dissent! Network, in order to employ diverse forms of protest against the thirty-first G8 summit, which took place at Gleneagles in Scotland. Events ranging from street protests to educational workshops were staged in Glasgow and Edinburgh, and – perhaps more significantly – a temporary eco-village (dubbed the 'Hori-zone' by the activists) was constructed near Stirling, the nearest town to Gleneagles itself, which lay between the two larger cities. The creative forms of protest emerging in these contexts, and international network of activists involved in coordinating them, were wholly in line with Haraway's description of the alter-globalisation movement as not being 'about antiglobalisation but about nurturing a more just and peaceful other-globalisation' (2008: 3).

However, as Trocchi et al point out, these creative forms of protests – and the realisation of the Hori-zone in particular – faced problems in terms of how to re-configure existing relations without constructing new forms of hierarchy or appealing to pre-existing doxa.

The first protest took place over three weeks before the G8, on the weekend of the 11th and 12th of June, when an alternative 'Cre8 Summat' was facilitated in Glasgow, with the term 'summat' (the colloquial for something) being carefully selected to denote that the protest was not a platform for reconfiguring existing social relations by imposing activist values (as the term 'summit' might imply), but aimed to engage with the local community to create a new lived reality with them. Working with local people from the Glaswegian housing schemes of Governhill and the Gorbals, activists helped people within the communities engage in 'guerilla gardening', creating a community garden on land that, in the words of the activists: 'lies on the proposed route of the M74 motorway extension, which will cut through 2 communities and cause massive congestion and contamination'
(Cre8, 2005). Again, facilitators of the 'summat' reiterated the importance of relating local forms of protest to the overarching problems caused by neoliberalism and, conversely, the importance of the network of activists opposed to neoliberalism responding to these issues with local actions:

The goals of the action were three-fold. First, to not only say that 'a better world is possible', but to build the foundations of that world in the here and now. Second, to use activism as a means of supporting and strengthening local issues and to empower those already involved with these issues. And third, to demonstrate that radical resistance can be part of our everyday lives. (Roman, 2005: 235)

As a concrete, context-specific response to the G8, which sought to engage with local people in order to challenge the broader economic policies that had a direct impact on their communities, the activists were therefore embodying the politics of articulation that Haraway advocates. Rather than attempting to push forward an ideological agenda on a large scale, the activists were working within the contexts that were directly affected by neoliberalism (in this instance the communities whose basic services were being shut down in order to prepare the area for demolition) in order to both expose the relationship between broader economic structures and specific local contexts, and develop local responses to the problems caused by these policies. Crucially, this was not achieved by attempting to speak for local people, but by finding ways of encouraging local people to become involved with the protests and enable them to speak for themselves, through engaging with them in practical action: 'Talking to people beforehand wasn't enough to excite them. But being on the land, doing work, and enjoying ourselves was the most effective way to get people involved' (Roman, 2005: 239).

This facilitation of grassroots autre-mondialisation was also reflected in the Edinburgh protests, which took place during the week of the summit itself, whereupon the Dissent! network organised a
series of workshops and events at a central Edinburgh University student union, between 30th June and 7th July, in an attempt to facilitate learning experiences between local people, students and activists engaged in radical forms of politics. In addition, whilst the role of the anarchists in the official March Against Poverty (as endorsed by Sir Bob Geldof) was inhibited, with police detaining the black bloc using (now infamous) 'kettling' tactics, the main anarchist demonstration, 'the Carnival For Full Enjoyment', took place on Monday 4th July. The carnival was cast in the mould of a Reclaim the Streets protest, which sought to foreground the urban contexts that relied on wage labor, in order to 'subvert and attack the actual social relations of capital' (Molyneux, 2005: 111). For this reason:

Targets included organisations implementing the New Deal and workfare, employment agencies, sheriff’s officers (bailiffs), shit bosses and army recruitment centres. Many of us were already involved in claimants’ and debt resistance, and saw this as a chance to raise these struggles from marginalisation and beleagured localism to vibrant transnational resistance. (Molyneux, 2005: 110)

As with other Reclaim the Streets events, activists attempted to explicitly enact their ideals through the format of the protest itself, transforming the central shopping and financial area of Edinburgh into a carnival where boundaries were blurred between its ordinary function as a commercial space and the free festival that posed a challenge to commercial activity. Despite the protest not proceeding entirely as planned, with the use of 'kettling' and police cordons preventing a sound-system from reaching the protesters, protests continued throughout the day, with local people joining the anarchists. In this sense, the disruption and blurring of commercial and public space that the protest intended to enact (foreshadowing subsequent approaches taken by the animal rights groups discussed), was successful.
However, whilst the work of the activists in Scotland’s two largest cities was significant, the richest source of critical reflection and discussion post-protest has been the development of the Hori-zone; moreover ‘its attempts to create a utopic and eco-friendly camp became, in many ways, a protocol for the Camps for Climate Action that followed it’, which have received substantial media attention and been successful in broadening the appeal of the environmental movement – although this expansion is a contentious issue in the activist community (see Saunders, 2010: 1). For the activists involved in the anti-G8 mobilisation, the rural convergence site at Stirling was not simply a convenient position from which to launch demonstrations targeted toward the summit itself (such as the road blockades that took place on July 8th and succeeded in delaying the beginning of the conference and, on the first day, prevented the Canadian delegation from arriving altogether),13 but was a location at which to experiment with developing the sort of alternatives to capitalism that could be realised outside of a humanist political framework. In other words, the village was used ‘to demonstrate sustainable alternatives to life under capitalism’ (Trocchi, Redwolf and Alamire, 2005: 77). Therefore, the construction of the camp was wholly in line with principles advocated by Haraway and Stengers, as it was not simply an exercise in idealism but a series of experiments as to how social relations could be reconfigured in practice. In other words, the activists were not simply dealing in abstract ideals that appealed to transcendent values, which did not take into account the specificities of their context, but were grappling with how to realise their ideals in the most practical sense possible.

At the outset of *When Species Meet*, Haraway claims ‘I am a creature of the mud, not of the sky’ (2008: 3). What she means by this statement is that her approach moves away from making human-animal interactions fit a predefined ethical framework (particularly one grounded in humanist values), instead the text focuses on cases of human-animal interaction and constructs a theory outwards from there. In other words, Haraway is proposing the practical realisation of situated knowledge; rather than taking a god-like stance, she is rooting her text in the inescapable relations
of day-to-day life and trying to map out some sort of ethics from within those relations.

The activists embodied this idea in a very literal sense, not simply positing abstract ideas about how 'another world is possible', but experimenting with ways to create that world – right down to the most mundane of details – and using this as a foundation for their theory, arguments and future activism. For instance, an entire chapter of Shut Them Down, an activist-produced text detailing the anti-G8 mobilisations, is entitled 'Diary of a Compost Toilet Queen' and describes the work of activists as they constructed greywater systems and compost toilets to accommodate the needs of the village. Unlike certain other parts of the text, the chapter is explicitly written by an 'immodest witness' of the type preferred by Haraway, permaculture activist Starhawk, who makes no attempt to write the piece from an bird's eye perspective, (as, for instance, a how-to of compost toilets or an 'objective' account of the protests). Instead, the entire chapter consists of extracts from her diary, which foreground the necessary work involved in realising alternative ways of living:

For ten days we wallowed in compost toilets and greywater systems – okay, I'm being metaphorical here – we wallowed in discussion of these things, conceiving of ways in which problems might become solutions, waste be transformed into resources, physical structures might support directly democratic social structures and people might be encouraged to wash their hands. (Starhawk, 2005: 185-6)

In the network of relations necessary to create a functional village, therefore, seemingly mundane details such as hand-washing become as vital a part of the network as the ideals that instigated these risky social experiments in the first place. In a very practical sense, all of the systems underlying the village were impossible to separate from one another and equally impossible to turn into opaque black boxes with unproblematic roles: even mundane, taken-for-granted actions assumed a new political significance, indeed, the seemingly mundane played a central role in the realisation of the
Because we've built compost toilets, we have to actually think about what happens to our shit, and who is going to deal with it. 'We're spoiled normally,' a young woman says. 'We don't usually have to think about any of this'. 'It's anarchism in practice,' I tell them. 'Being self-responsible at a very, very basic level'. In that moment, watching the realisation dawn on them that water has to go somewhere, and shit has to be dealt with somehow, I feel that all the work and stress has been worth it. (2005: 194)

These 'mundane' practices thus, for Starhawk, become central to unsettling the taken-for-granted relations that are masked in day-to-day life and naturalised via embodied modes of habitual behaviour. In Star's terms, grappling with these most mundane of realities foregrounds the invisible work that lies behind these realities and sustains this behaviour; it foregrounds the network of relations that must be perpetuated in order to satisfy people's most basic needs. More fundamentally, in Mol's terms, it opens up space to ask basic questions as to what form of reality we want to enact, such as who is responsible for cleaning up after us, whether is it fair, if there is a way to deal with the mess that might be more egalitarian or better for the environment. For Starhawk, the foregrounding of this invisible work 'made all the stress worth it' because it opened up space for asking questions and for realising alternative modes of social organisation. By problematising the most everyday and habitual forms of behaviour, 'mundane' questions such as 'how is the sewage dealt with?', became a route into asking the necessary questions that could foreground and challenge the taken-for-granted doxa, and allowed the activists to develop heterodox modes of activity without imposing new activist doxa. In this instance, their heterodox approach challenged the orthodox mode of dealing with the issue to such an extent that even members of Stirling council came to the camp to learn more about implementing greywater systems (Starhawk, 2005: 189)!
Thus in her diary Starhawk clearly mapped out the way in which these mundane realities needed to be resolved in order for political ideals to be realised: they were not mere details that had to be fitted into a larger framework, but realities that had to be dealt with in order for these frameworks to be constructed in the first place. In addition, they were a route into unsettling the doxa and creating space for the development of heterodox alternatives. In Haraway's sense, therefore, this was cosmopolitics in action; this is not to say that no guiding ideals existed in terms of the approaches taken to constructing the infrastructure of the eco-village (for instance, the decision to make it an eco-village in the first place guided the construction of environmentally friendly toilet facilities!), more that how these specific details were realised were not dictated by a totalising framework that ignored the specificities of its context. The question, in relation to animal rights movements, is whether animal rights perspectives can be reconciled with the forms of (cosmo)politics emerging in such contexts.

As chapter two illustrates, Haraway does not totally rule out the possibility of certain forms of vegan politics adhering to the cosmopolitical agenda she sets out. However, there is still an immanent critique of an animal rights stance throughout *When Species Meet* she constantly undermines such a perspective by implying it shuts down certain options, arguing for instance that: 'If one knows hunting is theologically right or wrong, or that animal rights positions are dogmatically correct or incorrect, then there is no cosmopolitical engagement' (2008: 299). Nonetheless, despite this danger of shutting down options, in a very practical sense that she herself acknowledges, at some point decisions have to be made about what form of relating is ethical. Indeed, an integral part of the *autre-mondialisation* that Haraway calls for necessitates deciding how to respond to worldly complexity, a task she casts as being 'the work of situated companion species. It is a question of cosmopolitics, of learning how to be “polite” in responsible relation to always asymmetrical living and dying, and nurturing and killing' (2008: 42). This notion of politeness is essential to grasp, as it relates to the issue of what sort of criteria should govern how
decisions can be made as to what makes one solution to a practical problem preferable to another.

As Haraway makes explicit in *When Species Meet*, this is a complex issue, but for her these decisions should hinge around the question of flourishing:

> The common matrix for these diverse claims on us is an ethics of flourishing. Cuomo suggests that the core ecological feminist ethical starting point is a “commitment to the flourishing, or well-being, of individuals, species and communities.” Flourishing, not merely the relief of suffering, is the core value...' (2008: 134)

This emphasis on flourishing as a means for guiding how human-animal relations should be developed (as opposed to following the Bentham-Singer lineage and focusing on suffering), however, runs into the contradiction mapped out in the previous chapter: again the examples Haraway gives in the text run contrary to this ethical principle. For instance, even though she criticises industrial farming practises, she focuses more on welfarist reforms as opposed to taking a more radical stance in criticising the metaphysical structures that unproblematically render animals as potential sources of meat, referring to 'the struggle for a more viable modern agropastoralism and against the meat-industrial complex' (2008: 295). As Adams argues, if anything this approach falls back on pastoral idealism rather than grappling with the realities of consuming livestock on a large scale. Likewise, the previous chapter illustrated how similar contradictions emerged in her other examples, as reflected by Adams' staunch criticisms of Haraway's positive discussion of certain pedigree dog breeding practices, an example rendered particularly problematic in relation to her ethical account of flourishing due to Haraway figuring flourishing in this context as only breeding 'animals who can improve the breed' (2008: 140).

Nonetheless, despite all of these issues arising in terms of the relation between Haraway's examples
and her ethics, an important mechanism still exists in *When Species Meet* for guiding decisions surrounding the realisation of situated companion species; to reiterate Haraway's argument outlined earlier in the chapter, it is necessary to ask the question:

What do they [the actors at stake] contribute to the flourishing and health of the land and its critters [...]? That question does not invite a disengaged “liberal” ethics or politics but requires examined lives that take risks to help the flourishing of some ways of getting on together and *not* others. (2008: 288)

Thus for Haraway this question is a potential starting point for making decisions guided by ethical principles, namely whether these decisions inhibit the flourishing of other actors; a concept providing a useful means of understanding the work of the activists at Gleneagles. Determining such issues is a complex process and, for Haraway, necessitates understanding the 'detailed material-semiotic conditions' involved in each context and asking difficult questions such as 'for *whom*, for *what*, and by *whom* should a cost-benefit calculation be made, since more than one always entangled being is at stake and in play in all of these hard cases...' (Haraway, 2008:87). It was this form of decision-making that was necessary in all of the mundane details that led to the construction of the Hori-zone in order – for instance – in deciding to opt for greywater systems and construct a camp along ecologically friendly lines. In relation to animal rights, the decision not to eat meat in the eco-village was also guided by these principles and was a decision that – contrary to Haraway's argument that this approach shuts the options down – opened space for asking what the options actually were, in terms of whether human-animal relations could be reconfigured differently, so as not to inhibit the flourishing of nonhuman actors.

Just as mundane details such as a sewerage system needed to be developed in order to lend support to the political values of the village, food also needed to be provided for its inhabitants: and like the
other practical elements of the camp, food production also reflected an attempt to reconfigure existing relations in a way seen as more ethical, by the activists. Due to Veggies and the Anarchist Teapot coordinating the catering, these groups had to make decisions that seemed 'mundane', such as which food to provide on a day-to-day basis, or what resources were needed to do this, but – like the construction of greywater systems – these mundane decisions informed the political realisation of the Hori-zone and, in small ways, embodied what Haraway describes as an ethics of flourishing that sought to benefit all of the actors at stake. As the Anarchist Teapot Mobile Kitchen (another activist catering group) describe, due to they and Veggies already 'being two catering groups working within the movement', they took on the task of organising the provision of food for the demonstrations, forming: 'a catering working group and slowly [...] compiling information, and reaching out to find other mobile kitchens to help cook for the expected 10 000 or whatever random number was being bandied about' (2005: 62).

Unlike Haraway's implications in the concluding chapter of _When Species Meet_, serving vegan food in this context did not automatically exclude certain options by imposing a new form of activist doxa. From a purely practical perspective at the eco-village, if the caterers had decided to cook meat, they would be faced with the problem of having to prepare separate food for the numerous vegetarian and vegan activists. Moreover, in Adams' terms, they would have been taking the animal out of the equation, allowing it to exist only as meat; as an absent referent. This is not to say that this approach was entirely without risk, as it still faced the problem of potentially alienating those who chose to eat meat in their day to day lives. However, in light of what the activists were attempting to achieve in the Hori-zone, this sense of alienation was in line with their overarching political strategies, all of which sought to disrupt social norms and create viable alternatives. Serving vegan food was in line with this model, by forcing people to confront the reality of the food they consumed in their daily lives, the animal was reintroduced into the conversation. In a similar manner to the way that people being confronted with their own waste opened space for creating a
sense of responsibility regarding how existing lived reality was sustained, having vegan food as default disrupted normative assumptions with regard to diet; it challenged and exposed habitual behaviours that sustained perceptions of what was normative, natural and beyond ethical interrogation. In other words, it unsettled social categories such as 'meat', that were used to legitimise (and were legitimised by) existing cultural practices.

As with the food give-aways, therefore, the route into unsettling doxa, and exposing the underlying actor-network, was through working at the micro-sociological level. On the streets of Edinburgh, at the Cre8 Summat in Glasgow and in their own campsite, the activists were attempting to enact an alternative world that moved away from hierarchy – even down to the rural convergence site's name, the 'Hori-zone'. For activists such as Starhawk, however, the value of these protests was not necessarily on the macro-level, but in the way they worked to challenge the most mundane forms of behaviour and reveal the social relations supporting these practices. The rejection of animal exploitation was in line with this approach, with the logic of horizontalism being manifested in practices such as what sort of food was consumed by the activists, who – through these micro-sociological practices – were thus re-working human-animal relations along with their rejection of other facets of neoliberal, humanist logic. In a similar manner to the anti-vivisection activists discussed in chapter two, all of these components of the Hori-zone worked together to uncover the doxa of neoliberal capitalism, rendering it orthodox, whilst attempting to craft a viable hetrodox form of autre-mondialisation. What was essential, however, was that this alternative did not coalesce into a new set of stable and indisputable norms; as Rodrigo Nunes makes clear in his reflexive analysis of the protests, once the principles of direct democracy and non-hierarchical, horizontal modes of organisation can only be conceived of as particular structures, which are perceived as what horizontality 'looks' like (2005: 304), they cease to be democratic:

Nothing is what democracy looks like – horizontality is not a model but a practice. And
as a practice, it remains permanently open to the future and to difference. As soon as one says 'this is what it looks like', one is closing the door to all future and different things that might come under that name [...] By deciding upon an ideal model of what it should be like, all we are doing is creating a transcendent image that hovers above actual practices. (Nunes, 2005: 310)

In reference to Bourdieu, the value of this turn to the micro-sociological – in a refusal to impose absolute values – can be understood in relation to the connection between the habitus and underlying economic relations of a particular cultural context. As he makes explicit, whilst the former bears relation to the latter, it also retroactively works to sustain these relations. Therefore, attempting to unsettle habitus might, on one level, only be seen as challenging the most mundane, everyday, activities, but is actually essential in intervening in the everyday social performances that – collectively – enact the underlying actor-network in a manner that is politically repressive. As argued earlier in the chapter, this unsettling of habitus provides an essential foundation for developing a conversation between Haraway and animal rights movements.

The focus on the micro-sociological is therefore valuable for two reasons: firstly, developing an understanding of the connection between everyday behaviour (from consumer activity to activist practices) to the underlying structures of the field/network that they are locked into co-constitutive relation with. In other words, the way that bringing these practices into cognition provides an opening for developing a politics of articulation whereupon the role of social actors ordinarily rendered invisible can be foregrounded. The second value of this approach is its relation to Haraway's notions of cosmopolitical approaches to ethics; making decisions based on detailed material-semiotic conditions arising on the micro-sociological level, rather than by appealing to transcendental values.
Throughout the thesis, animal rights movements have been shown to be enacting – rather than undermining – Haraway's arguments. The groups discussed in this chapter provide a clearer idea of where their arguments intersect most explicitly. However, they also illustrate the difficulty of reconciling Haraway's cosmopolitical approach with activism due to her assertion that pre-existing value judgements are dangerous because of the possibility of these decisions shutting down certain ways of relating. A practical solution to this problem, however, has been found in Bourdieu's account of the structural role of the habitus in perpetuating the field/network. Thus, by relating the theoretical approach developed in the previous chapter, to the movements discussed in this chapter, the value of exposing habitus has emerged: as a means of exposing the complex actor-network sustaining particular social contexts.

By working at the micro-sociological level, activists can work towards tracing the detailed material-semiotic relations at the heart of these networks: which is a pre-requisite for understanding how to reconfigure these relations in a more ethical way. This means that while it is possible to make decisions about practices such as meat-eating, these decisions can only be made by taking into account the detailed material-semiotic conditions of specific cultural contexts, guided by the aim of maximising the potential for all of the actors embroiled in these networks to flourish.

The process of unsettling habitus, therefore, can play a valuable role for both Haraway's arguments and the work of animal rights groups, by setting the foundation for Haraway's ethics to be manifested in the work of these groups, enabling both to move beyond humanist rhetoric and anthropocentric values.
Notes

1 'Samosas for Social Change' is one of Veggies Vegan Catering Campaign's slogans.

2 Such reflexivity is demonstrated in Rodrigo Nunes' (2005) account of the protests, which will be touched on later in the chapter.

3 In When Species Meet, the endnote at the end of autre-mondialisation leads to a sustained discussion of the use of the term by the 'Spanish lover of French bulldogs' that Haraway refers to, Beatriz Preciado of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Barcelona. Preciado's analysis of the way in which 'the bulldog became an identity accessory, a gender and political marker and a privileged survival companion for the manly woman, the lesbian, the prostitute and the gender reveiler', provides a useful instance of the co-shaping human-animal 'encounter value' that Haraway analyses throughout her text (Preciado, in Haraway 2008: 304, n.1). For Haraway, Preciado's discussion of the bulldog illustrates the material-semiotic significance of human-animal relations, holding a specific symbolic currency, as 'by the early 1920s, the French bulldog had become a biocultural companion of the liberated woman and writer in literature, painting and the emerging media' (Preciado, in Haraway 2008: 304, n.1).

4 The Camp for Climate action is, in the words of the organisers, an 'annual camp at a site chosen to highlight emissions of greenhouse gases', with previous sites including Drax coal power station, next to Heathrow airport, Kingsnorth power station and even central London – as part of the anti-G20 protests in April 2009 (Camp for Climate Action, N.D.). The format and organisation of the camp developed from the Hori-zone, from its use of 'renewable energy, compost toilets, bio-filters for treating grey-water, composting of vegetable waste, extensive recycling and sensitivity to the surrounding habitat' to organisational practices such as 'horizontal decision-making' (Saunders, 2010: 2). However, the Climate Camps have also been accused of de-radicalising the format of the Hori-zone, with their anarchist, anti-capitalist roots being lost in favour of widening participation with a more liberal agenda and co-operation with large NGOs (for sustained critiques of the recent Camps see Saunders, 2010; Pusey and Russel, 2010).

5 Autonomous social centres are independent, non-profit community spaces, which are frequently run and organised by volunteers from progressive radical social movements. For a list of some of the most prominent centres in the UK see: http://www.londonarc.org/social_centre_network.html

6 Upon investigating costs to hire the market square for the event, campaigners were faced with paying not only a £1000 basic fee but would have had to adhere to the standards set by the council regarding what form the stalls could take 'as only high quality exhibition units or promotion vehicles' would be accepted. There were also limitations placed on which sort of literature could be distributed and additional charges for electricity (cited in Smith, 2010).

7 As argued by Ed Mayo in his introduction to The Ethical Consumer: 'the discovery [of ethical consumerism] by commercial giants is also leading to shallow 'ethics lite' products, stripped of their values and communicative power' (in Harrison, et al, 2005: xviii). In line with this argument the McGreenwash pamphlet describes how McDonald had adapted to this trend; with stores around the UK literally having their colour scheme changed from red to green, with a corresponding marketing campaign that depicts animals wandering around in large green fields – inferring that all of their meat is free-range and from British farms (as embodied by the advertisement 'Weather', 2010). To counter this, the pamphlet points out that almost all of their chicken is sourced from outside the UK: 'Some 60% of the chicken breast meat used in sandwiches, wraps, burgers, salads and the copyrighted Chicken McNuggets is imported from Brazil. About 30% is sourced from elsewhere in
Europe, including Holland and France, and nine per cent is from Thailand’. This is particularly significant because ‘up to half the meat eaten in McDonald’s restaurants these days is chicken, said to be equivalent to 30 million birds a year’ (Edwards, 2010). Likewise, on the McDonald’s promotional website Make Up Your Own Mind – seemingly a direct riposte to McSpotlight – the corporation repeatedly state that ‘The beef we use is British and Irish and only whole cuts of forequarter and flank go into our 100% beef hamburgers’, which seems to reinforce their imagery of animals in expansive rural settings. However, in reality none of their meat is free range, despite the fact that this is inferred through their advertising: a fact only admitted on the Make Up Your Own Mind website when consumers asked direct questions about whether McDonald’s meat was free range; more general questions received responses focusing on their beef being sourced from the UK.

A full list of the workshops and events facilitated by the Dissent network is available from: <http://archive.dissent.org.uk/content/view/251/104>. These events took place between 30th June and 7th July, in an attempt to facilitate learning experiences between local people, students and activists engaged in radical forms of politics. Their content ranged from learning skills, such as first aid or basic legal training, and practical tasks such as puppet and banner making (to be used in the protests themselves), to showing political films and hosting art and photography exhibitions. In addition, over ninety separate hour-long talks and discussions were held over the week, about issues such as migration, climate change, technologies of control, mental health, anti-capitalism, anti-militarism, direct action and community activism.

For a critique of the role of large NGOs and celebrities, such as Bono and Bob Geldof, in organising the March Against Poverty around Edinburgh, which actively promoted the G8, see Paul Hewson’s ‘It’s the Politics Stupid: How Neoliberal Politicians, NGOs and Rock Stars Hijacked the Global Justice Movement at Gleneagles... And How We Let Them’ (2005).

The practice of kettling, or crowds being held by police cordons on the streets for several hours, without being permitted to move or leave the area, received substantial media attention in 2009. The tactic first came under criticism after being used on protesters during January protests against the Israeli attack on Palestine in January 2009 and, more infamously, during the anti-G20 protests of April 2009 in which a member of the public died after being hit from behind by a member of the metropolitan police.

Reclaim the Streets are a protest movement that used creative tactics to transform the streets into free parties that were simultaneously spaces of protest. Whilst RTS originated in the UK and were most prominent during the 1990s, the movement subsequently became international and has provided a model for more recent protests (for instance, part of the anti-G8 protests in Scotland featured a street party in Edinburgh entitled the Carnival for Full Enjoyment). Arising in response to the 1994 Criminal Justice Act that was instated to give police special powers in order to prevent illegal raves, the movement united would-be party goers with activists. These groups collaborated to ‘reclaim’ spaces for public use, by transforming them into impromptu raves. The location of the parties often held political significance, for instance taking place in communities and woodland that were due to be demolished in order to construct new roads. Naomi Klein provides an outline of RTS in No Logo, describing how:

Ravers got together with squatters facing eviction, with the so called New Age travellers facing crackdowns on their nomadic lifestyle, and with radical “eco-warriors” fighting the paving-over of Britain’s woodland areas by building tree houses and digging tunnels into bulldozers' paths. A common theme began to emerge among these struggling countercultures: the right to uncolonized space – for homes, for trees, for gathering, for dancing. (2000:312)
The anti-G8 Carnival for Full Enjoyment was explicitly set in this mould, as evident on the Carnival’s’ website, which outlines the day’s event, firstly highlighting the political aim of the day’s events as being ‘to link everyday struggle – especially in the workplace, among claimants, against debt, against the recruitment of working class people to the army – with the international mobilisation against the G8’. People were then called on to fulfil these aims through reclaiming public space: ‘Let's share information and reclaim what's ours on the streets, in the shops, on public transport’ (‘Carnival For Full Enjoyment’, No Deal).

At the time of the protests I was a student living in Edinburgh and witnessed numerous clashes between protesters and the police, which I recorded on my weblog each day. Some of these events were witnessed when I was attending demonstrations, but others were seen when I was engaging in everyday activities (such as walking to the shops) in Edinburgh. There were various instances when locals joined in with the protesters, for instance on Saturday 2nd July, part of the anarchist black bloc was 'kettled for several hours and prevented from taking part in the March Against Poverty (‘Faerycake’, 2005a). Likewise, on Monday 4th – the day of the Carnival for Full Enjoyment – a splinter group of the anarchist Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army were surrounded with police and riot vans and threatened with what I, and other passers by, perceived as a disproportionate level of aggression (‘Faerycake’, 2005b). A particularly memorable occasion saw an elderly lady get so outraged that she started shouting ‘I hope you choke on your crisps’, as policement who were wandering to their cars and eating whilst, in the meantime, riot police had blocked off the central shopping area of Edinburgh – trapping both protesters and ordinary passers by, including women with pushchairs who were clearly not part of the demonstrations (‘Faerycake’, 2005c).

For a more detailed account of the blockades, Karen N. Tina’s ‘This is How We Do It’ (2005) provides an interesting first person account, whilst Trocci et al’s account of the summit explores the strategic and theoretical implications of these tactics. In addition, a cartoon of the events by Isy Morgenmuffel (2005) – which is simplistic and amusing but nonetheless evocative – provides a perspective from within the activist camp, focusing on how its internal infrastructure supported the blockades.
Conclusion

In the concluding paragraph of *When Species Meet*, Haraway suggests that the text:

works by making connections, by trying to respond where curiosity and sometimes unexpected caring lead. No chapter has a bottom line, but they all have barely contained traffic between the lines and between the foretext and endnotes in an attempt to engage a cosmopolitical conversation. Animals are everywhere full partners in worlding, in becoming with. Human and nonhuman animals are companion species, messmates at table, eating together, whether we know how to eat well or not. Many pithy slogans might urge us on in trying to learn more about how to flourish together in difference without the telos of a final peace [...] I prefer to end with a longing that it might be said of me someday what good agility players say of those whose runs they admire, “She has met her dog”. (Haraway, 2008: 301)

Veggies' mantra 'Samosas for Social Change' could equally be the sort of 'pithy slogan' that connotes an attempt to 'learn more about how to flourish together in difference without the telos of a final peace'. In citing dietary change as a form of social change, the slogan brings normative cultural practices into cognition; highlighting their relationship to socio-economic structures and calling for these practices to be reconfigured. As discussed in the final chapter, this provides a route into developing context-specific responses to the issues raised by this slogan, which demand a detailed material-semiotic exploration of cultural relations in order to determine how they can be reconfigured more ethically. Whilst at the outset of the thesis such conceptions seemed incompatible with Haraway, throughout the project animal rights perspectives have been shown to create space for cosmopolitical engagement by unsettling the normative social categories that inhibits this engagement.
The issue set out at the start of the thesis was whether a productive conversation could be developed between the work of Haraway and animal rights perspectives. Despite her criticisms of animal rights movements, this seems to be a conversation that Haraway herself desires, indeed, just as in the concluding paragraph of *When Species Meet* she hopes she 'has met her dog', in the notes to this chapter she also professes her hope to have 'met' animal rights activists such as Adams and 'respected her crucial truths' (2008: 391, n.21). As outlined in chapters one and two, whilst there are certain barriers to this process – and *When Species Meet* does not quite meet Adams' perspective in the way that Haraway suggests – if her work is combined with other theoretical concepts (derived from Bourdieu and performative accounts of ANT) a meeting between Haraway and animal rights movements can occur.

From an animal rights perspective Haraway has been valuable in foregrounding contexts where the work of these movements departs from a politics predicated on humanist understandings of rights, instead developing a politics of articulation that undermines – as opposed to reinforces – humanist political structures. This is particularly important in light of Moi's discussion of the value of exposing doxa, when she describes that even though activist groups are often engaging in productive forms of politics that bring formerly unconscious social structures into cognition, 'the question is [...] whether they themselves always realise the political implications of their own insights' (1999: 286). This is particularly true in relation to animal rights movements, such as SPEAK, who are engaging in these forms of politics at the same time as using more conventional tactics (as discussed in chapter two). The value of Haraway, therefore, is in foregrounding these 'political implications': as when her arguments are related to those of animal rights groups certain tactics (which might only have been one approach amidst of a myriad of different tactics used in a campaign), are shown to be an important means of departing from anthropocentric political discourse.
Reading Haraway's work against animal rights perspectives was also valuable in relation to resolving certain difficulties within her own arguments, being particularly useful in two specific areas: firstly, it exposed the humanist assumptions underpinning her own arguments – as manifested in the case-studies drawn upon in When Species Meet. Secondly, and relatedly, while it reveals her own examples to be un-cosmopolitical, animal rights practice itself has been valuable in providing replacement examples that illustrate how Haraway's ethics can work in practice.

**From Anthropocentrism to Hybridity**

In order to develop this conversation, the thesis has explored responses to the problem of anthropocentrism that have been emerging in UK animal rights activism throughout the past decade. Central to this move away from rights-discourses has been the process of mapping out the complex actor-networks sustaining particular forms of social reality, or in Haraway's terms, of engaging in a politics of articulation in order to craft situated, cosmopolitical, responses re-configuring human-animal relations.

This approach is reflected even in the work of more conservative groups such as SPEAK – whose articulation of the vivisection actor-network foregrounded the role of animals as actors. What was particularly significant was that this was in line with Latour's account of how an actor-network should emerge; not through attempting to trace a network in a literal sense, but through articulating the work of different actors. In the case of SPEAK, this emerged through the antagonistic issue-network they were part of, which revealed a complex network of relations that undermined the use of simplistic categories (such as man/animal) and prevented indisputable black boxes from being maintained (such as vivisection as an uncontroversial tool). In this context, therefore, a politics of
articulation emerged as the result of opening a particular black box that was difficult to access for the non-expert so both necessitated engagement with actors that had more extensive knowledge and led to antagonism from actors already part of the scientific field. The resulting issue-network led to a comprehensive articulation of the actor-network at stake, due to the articulation of the debate produced by SPEAK and other anti-vivisection actors clashing with that put forward by pro-vivisection actors, a process that – to again reiterate Bourdieu – constitutes 'a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses', in which the doxa can be revealed (2008: 165).

In other words, the antagonism inherent to this issue-network necessitates that formerly doxic relations had to be defended and so became merely orthodox. The result of this was that the terms of the debate could be altered, with the ethical categories distinguishing between human and animal being problematised due to the intrinsic hybridity of these networks emerging.

The work of the activists thus created a context where humanist rights language was an insufficient response to the debate, prompting a more complex engagement with the issues, that sought to problematise the use of vivisection in a more detailed material-semiotic manner: mapping out the myriad of factors that undermine the dichotomy between human and animal well-being. The BUAV similarly work to unsettle the doxa that separate ethical from scientific concerns. Thus, rather than focusing on campaigning for the inviolable rights of animals, they are instead attempting to impact upon legislation in such a way that the complexity of the issues at stake are acknowledged. In the politics of articulation engaged in by the BUAV, ethics, science and law are irrevocably interrelated practices, that are drawn together by animal research. Again, therefore, normative categories such as human/animal are unsettled, with the legislation itself acknowledging the complexity of these processes.

Finally, the groups discussed in the final chapter work to unsettle the implicit norms and values embodied in everyday practices that are reliant on an underlying distinction between human and
animal. In other words, these groups work to reveal the invisible networks of relations that lie behind social contexts and are masked by the values of possessive individualism: foregrounding the work of other social actors that underpin these 'rights'. The value of the activists' approach is therefore to reveal the invisible hierarchies sustained by possessive individualism and challenge the way that certain actors are rendered subaltern and legitimately exploitable so long as the rights of the possessive individual are preserved. Working at the micro-sociological level, activists helped to uncover these hierarchies and expose the complex actor-networks sustaining lived reality.

All of these groups, therefore, reflect a move away from appealing to possessive individualism or humanist accounts of rights (approaches that are intrinsically anthropocentric), to articulating the hybrid composition of lived reality, by mapping out the actor-networks sustaining this reality. As chapters three and four suggest, this can be a powerful approach for unsettling the doxa that casts possessive individualism as the only legitimate means of conceptualising rights. Moreover, the work of these groups suggests that this approach can provide scope for articulating animal rights in a way that does not attempt to speak for the animal, but simply points towards how human-animal relations can be reconfigured in less exploitative ways.

**Networks and Articulation**

Even though this unsettling of pre-existing ethical categories was essential to each form of politics, the way that each movement approached this task was slightly different and the chapters worked to reflect the way that, echoing Nunes’s arguments post-G8 protests, that there is not a set route into realising cosmopolitics and indeed acting as though a particular method is intrinsically democratic is itself un-cosmopolitical if it does not take into account its context. For this reason, the thesis has drawn on three valuable tactics that have been emerging in the work of animal rights groups, in relation to networked politics: the use of ICTs to aid the development of a politics of articulation;
engagement with disparate actors involved in the debate to enact a politics of articulation; and intervening in the habitus in order to reveal the invisible relations structuring the actor-network at stake.

Hence, while some movements worked to articulate actor-networks in an online context (with ICTs proving valuable tools for this purpose), in Nunes' words: 'the point is not to say “horizontality is something that happens to people with internet access”, but to highlight the difference between a model that springs from certain practices and models that spring from different ones' (2005: 302). In other words, it is not the mere use of new media that leads to a politics of articulation, more that ICTs provide a valuable tool in developing such articulations. Furthermore, other practices can also lead to the emergence of a politics of articulation; as illustrated in chapters four and five, which explored attempts at reconfiguring the network/field from different ends of the political spectrum: governmental lobbying on one hand and performative anarchist protests on the other. Despite these differences in aims and tactics, what these groups had in common was that they were all attempting to forge material networks, in order to articulate complex actor-networks.

Indeed, it is this act of articulation that has been vital in enabling animal rights movements to depart from anthropocentric political strategies. In developing the conversation between Haraway and animal rights, initially a paradox seemed to emerge between the aims of animal rights groups and their development of a non-anthropocentric approach to politics. While the chapters have illustrated how cosmopolitical approaches to politics are emerging in practice, the very nature of animal rights groups suggests that certain preconceptions must be held regarding the necessity of re-configuring human-animal relationships in the first place. For instance, even though the groups discussed are enacting a politics of articulation in practical terms (with these values permeating their arguments, to differing degrees) each still makes clear that they believe animal exploitation to be unethical. In this sense, these groups could be perceived as holding pre-existing value judgements. However,
what has emerged is that even though these judgements – taken in isolation – could be seen as un-cosmopolitical, for the animal rights groups at stake they have proved a vital means of developing a more cosmopolitical approach, by forming the foundation of a politics of articulation that led to the production of a heterodox account of social reality, which – in turn – worked to expose and critique cultural doxa.

As outlined in chapter three, rather than being seen as biased (and dismissed on this basis) an explicitly animal rights perspective can provide a powerful position of situated knowledge from which to articulate a particular actor-network. The situatedness of the activists’ politics of articulation means that the stories they tell and accounts they construct of these networks are heterodox bodies of knowledge. As such, these apparent value-judgements are necessary in developing a more nuanced politics of articulation and fully realising a heterodox perspective. What is important, therefore, is not that these initial values are held, but the process of articulation that occurs thereafter. If this perspective leads to a politics of semiotics then, yes, such a value judgement is problematic.

However, if this perspective is simply the route into a more comprehensive politics of articulation, it can – conversely – allow (and even encourage) critical reflection upon this initial assertion. An initial judgement does not have to inhibit cosmopolitical engagement but can enable it; even if these judgements are articulated in a manner that presumes animals to have inviolable rights, the politics of articulation that stems from this assertion creates space for destabilising such value-judgements. In simple terms, value judgements are not the problem per se, more the forms of politics that stem from them. If a politics of articulation is developed from these perspectives then such assertions can actually lead to the emergence of a heterodox perspective, rather than being doxic – as long as this initial judgement is made explicit rather than treated as implicit. An animal rights perspective is therefore useful in foregrounding the doxa that perpetuates existing sociological realities, due to this
perspective itself denaturalising these realities and providing an opening to articulate the networks of invisible social relations at stake.

The problem is therefore how can this occur on a practical level? Whilst ambiguity and complexity can be articulated does this – as Adams fears – inhibit practical engagement? In chapters four and five Bourdieu emerged as a means of reconciling Haraway's demand for cosmopolitics and the need to engage in practical action. Chapter four mapped out how hybridity can be foregrounded in practical terms, via legislative changes to the field-boundary. Emphasising the hybrid composition of lived reality can develop a more nuanced approach to engaging with it, where ethical and scientific issues are not treated as separate. Chapter five again illustrated a practical response to this issue, by arguing for the value of operating at the micro-political level as a means of crafting viable alternatives to existing human-animal relations, that are not predicated on universalising abstractions.

Ultimately, therefore, tensions exist within the concept of animal rights, but these can prove productive tensions. This might change in a different cultural context, in which animal rights is treated as a given, but the point is that nothing should be abstracted from its cultural context. In line with Haraway: 'we learn to be worldly by grappling with, rather than generalising from, the ordinary' (2008: 3). As it stands, therefore, despite its problems, animal rights proves a route into a heterodox alternative in the cultural contexts at stake. As Haraway argues, these demands are problematic if they become doxa, but in the present context they can only ever be a heterodox alternative and – as such – are compatible with Haraway's ethical perspective.
Figures

Fig. 1: SPEAK website, with link to Safer Medicines' film in the top menu bar.

Fig. 2: Text from 'Bad Science' section of SPEAK website, with links to specialists in non-animal research, including the Dr Hadwen Trust.

Looking to the Future not the Past

The UK - and indeed, Oxford University - could be a centre of excellence in science without resorting to animal use. The Neurosciences Research Institute at Aston University is a prime example of such foresight, with its new Academy of Life Sciences scheduled to open in April 2004.

The £8 million Academy will provide the opportunity for cross-disciplinary work by the integration of clinically related research in neuroscience. It will include research groups working on behavioural and cognitive sciences, neuro-imaging, vision and ophthalmology.

World-class research on human brains, both living and post-mortem, such as that conducted at Aston University, the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre and Cambridge Brain Bank, is the key to the future of neuroscience. It is time the public knew that using non-human primates is outdated and dangerous to human health.

More Effective Research

There are more reliable methods to predict the safety and effectiveness of drugs for people. These include in vitro (test tube) tests using human cells and tissues and sophisticated computer simulations designed to mimic human metabolism. See Dr Hadwen Trust.

Screening new drugs in silico (on computer) is now replacing many animal tests. Investigating diseases that infect humans in any species other than human is useless since pathogens and immune responses to them are species specific.
Fig. 3: Safer Medicines Campaign website.

Fig. 4: Screenshot of links on Safer Medicines to letters that were critical of the campaign.

Fig. 5: Letter from the BBC that the third of the above links leads to.
Fig. 6: Free-food stall outside McDonald's on 12\textsuperscript{th} December 2010.
Fig. 7: Free food stall outside Nottingham Council House on 12th December 2010.
Fig. 8: Pamphlet distributed at food give-aways.

**VEGAN FREE FOOD!**

Vegan Free Food Giveaways, are held to encourage and support a move towards a more healthy and compassionate diet, to benefit people, animals and the planet.

If you would like to enjoy more vegan food, everything you need to know can be found via our website or by contacting us as shown below.

Nottingham's Vegans, together with Veggies Catering Campaign and Nottingham's Animal Rights group hold many social and campaigning events at which your support would be welcome.

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**VEGGIES CATERING CAMPAIGN (Nottingham)**

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**We thank the following for their support for Vegan Free Food Give-away events:**

**Alley Cafe:** Cannon Court, Long Row West, Nottingham, NG1 6JE. 0115 955 1013
http://www.alleycafe.co.uk/

**Dotty's (Cafe):**
197 Mansfield Road, Nottingham, NG1 3FS
http://www.vegan.co.uk/dottys_cafe

**Fry's / Beannes**
Vegan foods available from wholefood shops around Nottingham
http://www.beanneshealthyfood.co.uk/

**Natural Food Company** (shop): 37A Mansfield Rd, Nottingham, NG1 3FE. 0115 955 9914

**Redwood Wholefoods**
Dairy & meat-free alternatives from wholefood shops and online
http://www.redwoodfoods.co.uk/

**Screaming Carrot** (Shop/bakery): 42 Football Road, Forest Fields NG7 6LJ. 0115 910 3013
http://www.screamingcarrot.co.uk/

**Squeek** (Restaurant): 23-25 Heathcoat Street, Nottingham, NG1 3AQ. 0115 955 5550

**Sumac Centre (Vegan Social Centre):** 245 Gladstone Street, Forest Fields, NG7 6HX. 0845 458 9595
http://www.sumac.org.uk/

**Nottingham Animal Rights:** Contact c/o Sumac or visit http://www.vegzone.org.uk/animal-rights/
http://www.vegzone.org.uk/nottinghamanimalrights

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**Nottingham Vegan Guide:**
http://www.vegan.nottingham.co.uk/

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**People's Kitchen - Shared community meal**

Vegan Meal by Donation. Every Saturday. 6:30pm

Sumac Centre, 245 Gladstone Street, Forest Fields, NG7 6HX
Phone 0845 458 9595 to confirm.
Fig.9: Giving out food samples on trays at a give-away on 30\textsuperscript{th} July 2010.

Images reproduced with kind permission from SPEAK (Figs 1 and 2), the Safer Medicines Campaign (Figs 3, 4 and 5), Veggies Catering Campaign (Fig. 8) and Alan Lodge (Fig. 9).
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Appendix

Item 1:

[Email forwarded to Nottingham Animal Rights email list.]

----- Original Message ----- 

From: Jackie Hardy

To: 'Patricia Tricker'

Sent: Thursday, November 18, 2010 11:54 AM

Subject: RE: annual vegan fair cancelled [Scanned]

Dear Patricia

Thank you for your email regarding the Vegan Festival not being held at the Council House this year.

The decision was made due to the wear and tear sustained to the interior of the building, caused by a high volume of people attending events on a drop in basis. We are a Grade II * listed building and have a need to preserve the building, in particular the Ballroom floor, which is becoming increasingly worn. We also have to limit cooking at events strictly to the kitchens due to the sensitive alarm system that we now have in place.

It is not just the East Midlands Vegan Festival that we are no longer able to accommodate, for the same reasons, the Nottingham Evening Post Jobs Fair, Trent FM Jobs Fair and NTU fashion shows, among others, have also been notified that we cannot cater for their events anymore.

We have enjoyed working with the organizers of this popular event over a number of years but unfortunately, this event has simply outgrown our venue. We do hope that a suitable, alternative venue can be sourced.

Regards

Jackie

Item 2:

Re the argy-bargy about the Council House supposedly being off-limits for events, this is being held on Thurs, 24th Nov:


Page created by this company:

Billed as an 'Affordable Warmth' event, it's basically a trade fair for private firms to plug their products to NCH tenants... Just thought you might like to know.

Bx

**Item 3:**

Re: East Midlands Vegan Festival.

> Report back in two weeks at the NottmAR meeting at Broadway on Thurs 25th, (meeting starts 8pm, could get to this on the agenda for 9pm).

XXXXX has obtained further info re potential use of market square

Full docs can be forwarded if needed, but (on top of the £1000 set fee) these are a few points I noticed:

From Operational Standards and Information

Any event booked into the Square, must be of a sufficient quality and standard to promote the Square as a venue for high-quality events:

# No handouts or fliers can be handed out without authorization and the appropriate permits.

# All event infrastructure and presentation must be to a high standard and work in harmony with the aesthetics of the Square. Events must not damage the Square in any way.

# Only reputable and recognized contractors and suppliers are to be used in the production of any events on the Square (Suggested Suppliers and Contractors List attached)

- All users should provide high quality exhibition units or promotion vehicles. Stand alone buses or vehicles will not be accepted, unless as part of a larger event or if they are felt to have significant enough interest or importance to the people of Nottingham.

- Paste tables, tarpaulin or plastic cover stalls and old converted caravans will not be acceptable in the Old Market Square

- All units have to be agreed in advance and a photograph is required of the unit/stall to be used.

- Specific permission is required for sampling of products

- The Companies should either utilize stalls/canopies provided by Nottingham City Council or

- Provide high quality marquee/promotional stalls which should be clean and presentable and safely secured.

- No vehicle/display is to be sited within 6 meters of the Council House steps.

- Subletting the site/part of the site is not permitted.

- Approval must be obtained prior to agreeing any media of other promotional vehicles onto the Square as part of your event.

From Booking Guidelines:

Marquee Hire

If you are looking to run a large scale market/event utilizing a
minimum of 8, 3m x 3m marquees, we can provide the use of our own pop-up marquees.

This service includes crewing and set-up costs, however electricity and water will be charged separately. Stewarding and security will need to be organized separately, as will the hire of chairs and tables (see Suggested Suppliers and Contractors section below).

Marquee hire fee (£30 per stall)  
+ Crewing Cost  
+ £10 per vehicle

Up to 10 £300 £160  
Up to 20 £600 £240  
Please note that these fees would be on top of the appropriate standard booking fee

From 'Enquiry Form'
Please note, if you are wanting to hand out any kind of informational leaflet or other items to the public, free of charge, you will need a distribution permit. If you require this please contact Public Health on 0115 915 6170. Please note that these require at least 7 days notice for information and payment to be received.